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ABSTRACT
Tie Language of Equality is contained in three parts.
The first part is an elaboration upon the theory of modem
legality as largely understood in the view of E.B.Pashukanis.
In this connection legality appears, firstly, as an antithesis
between individuality (as many different individuals) and (their)
equality in law. This antithesis appears as the most basic
category of modern legality, namely, the equal or abstract
individual, or, more concretely, the "persona" of private law:.
Secondly, this element itself appears in antithesis with the state,
which cannot be considered as simply another co-equal legal
individual. This latter opposition comes foreward, for instance,
in. the traditional dualism of law and state, and of private and
"public" law. The material elements behind these antitheses are
considered as subsisting, respectively, in the generalised form
of private commodity-ownership and, in the second case, as
subsisting in the opposition of private and social interests.
The second part is a development of this form of legality as
expressed in modern-classical thought (primarily Rousseau and Kant),
nere the emergent language of equality coincides with the historical
emergence of generalised commodity relations, and certain lessons
that are to be learned from this process are considered in detail.
The third part is a criticism of Historical Jurisprudence and
Legal Sociology in the views that are here expressed of modern
legality, Roman law, feudal law and natural Law; criticism,
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In troduction
The principal concern of this work is with the
form of modern legality, and as with all other subject
matters that are constituted in their essential
nature through man's social activity, it is a process
which has been thoroughly steeped in the manifold
of idealistic sentiment , This is xxerhaps more so
in the case of law than anything else and its
treatment from a properly scientific standpoint,
despite innumerable appearances to the contrary, is
therefore a rare event. Such is the state of affairs
that I can name, without hesitation, only one
solitary figure of recent times who has actually
lived up to this requirement: E.3. Pashukanis, who,
taking Marx's theory of commodity relations as a
X>oint of departure, established the investigation
of modern legality upon a scientific footing
hitherto unparalleled - and since unimproved.
The theoretical material of the present work is
cut here.
1
The question of legalxty, or right, has always
1. The term "right", used here and elsewhere is
used in what has become recognised as the
"German" sense, namely, the sense xdiich denotes
the principle of rights in concreto, which
conveys the principle of law as distinct from
the immediate or sensuous empirical manifold
in which it comes -dressed. "Tt is tixe merit
of the German term 'Reeht' that it maintains
the connection between law and the spirit of
law.." - Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory
of the State, p.240.
appeared inextricably bound up with idealism of
one kind or another. With astonishing tenacity
such things as justice, morality, nature, will and
so forth have again and again been confounded with
the specifically legal form, even in the most
profound reflections thereupon, indeed, especially
the "most profound" - X mean here those characteristic
of modern-classical thought, from Grotius to Kant
- which, with an apparent immunity from the passage
of time, have at all events done a remarkably good
job of keeping the form of legality sealed off from
a more down-to-earth scrutiny. This has remained
the case, moreover, notwithstanding the increasing
frequency, since the early nineteenth century, of
"more realistic" appraisals of law. The positivistic
stance in relation to legal subject-matters, for
instance, has not established its spokesmen in any
significant position beyond the theoretical boundaries
set by modern-classical idealism, and even those who
have recognised this and explicitly made the return
to modern-classical ideas of right have generally
failed to acknowledge that-these ideas had already
begun their eclipse in Adam Smith's day vand in
Smith's work). So given this state of affairs, the
i :L i .
criticism of the modern-classical ideas of right
still retains a high significance today in the
criticism of modern legal culture generally.
There is nothing entirely tongue-in-cheek,
then, in stating that modern—classical idealism
presents us with some of the finest and "most
profound" examples of reflection upon the form
of modern legality, even in the face of the almost
mystical conundrums which it produced in this
regard. Here is an example:
Rights are not based on powers: because of
the moral nature of justice, they are based
on the fact that in each man the same will
to live appears ^.t the same stage of its
objectivisation.
This statement is pure metaphysical hocus—pocus.
But it is not merely this. Just as Freud showed
how the most fantastic dream conceals within itself
the sublimated elements of very real repressed
anxieties, so here it becomes possible to show how
the dream—like content of Schopenhauer's statement
hides certain very important objective elements of
the form of modern legality.
1 . Schopenhauer, Essays etc., p.l43, - who, strictly
speaking, is an eighteenth-century idealist
of the nineteenth.
.iv .
"Rights are not based on powers..." What this
statement like so many similar ones really expresses
is the truth that modern rights, in principle,
consist in a generalised forrn of equality; they
are the same for all and therefore the principle
of a right becomes opposed to the relation of
power. An equally crucial point, however, is that
this is only true of modern, that is to say, bourgeois
society. Rights are opposed to power only when they
are held equally by all, when in principle, so far
as rights and rights alone are concerned, no one
person can appear in a superordinate position in
relation to any other person. Only in bourgeois
society is this the case, and therefore only here
does it appear that "rights are not based on powers".
Here rights are equal rights, which is the case in
no other previous society. And, as a generalised
form of equality, the legal form appears in opposition
to the formal logic of power relationskips, which
are always at all events the embodiment of inequality,
of super- and subordination, and hitherto manifest
as such, in pre-capitalist societies, in unequal
legal rights.
V *
Still, the generalised form of equality which
becomes the principle of modern rights has nothing
to do with "the fact that in each man the same will
to live appears at the same stage of its o'ojectivisation."
If we rnay continue with the dream-analogy, this
"fact" is like the kind of fact which appears in
the dream-thought; it does not really happen, yet
neither is it unconnected with reality. The real
basis of rights, as involving "each man...at the
same stage," as involving, in other words, a
generalised form of equality, is bourgeois society.
Only here is "each man...at the same stage" from the
legal standpoint, i.e. as a matter of right. In
previous societies there is no such thing as "each
man ... at the same stage" in this connection;
hence, there is 110 such thing as "man" as a legal
subject, only freemen, slaves, knights, vassals,
serfs, guildmasters, landed nobility etc..
Essentially, the problem of right in modern-
classical thought was not wronglx'' posed: Hot/ do
the mass of individuals, who are all by nature
different, become equalised under the form of a
right? What is this equal standard which brings
vi .
with it the abstraction of "man"? Tfaere it went
adrift was in the answers it gave? by reason of
nature "roan" has equal rights ( Rousseau, for
example), or at least, by nature of reason (Kant).
TThat was generally overlooked in these solutions
were the conditions under which "man" found himself
with equal rights. For, nature and reason in modern-
classical thought were universal, and if "man" had
equal rights under such auspices, then he had had
them since the time of Prometheus, or at any rate
since the time when he emerged from the forests and
began to live in a civilised kind of way (which is
what Rousseau had to conclude). "Man", however,
had equal rights neither in civilised antiquity nor
in the Middle Ages. Only in bourgeois society had
this result come about, namely, the abstract legal
subject, and as Marx often pointed out, the conditions
of this lay neither in nature nor reason, but rather
in the emerging configuration of social relations
dominated by the form of commodity-ownership in
which "man" appears predominantly as the bearer of
property in exchange. The generalised form of
cominodity-mmarsliip, i.e. ownership of property in
its exchange form, its equivalent form, is the real
basis of modern legality.
Nevertheless, returning to our little piece of
Schopenhauerian mysticism (which comes, incidentally,
directly from Kant as does the theoretical part
of Schopenhauer's philosophy as a whole), we find
that it is highly instructive. For, concealed here
are the essential material elements of the modern
form of legality. Firstly, that it consists in a
generalised form of equality ("each man...at the
same stage"), and secondly that, as such, it becomes
opposed to the relations of power ("not based on
powers"). These two theses, or rather antitheses
(since they both contain a unity of opposing elements
contain the key to the scientific investigation of
the process of modern legality.
As we have already intimated, modern post-
classical legal thought has never really criticised
the idealist formulations of right; it has observed
their "obviously" impossible character without feelin
the need to state any real reasons in this regard
and has, consequently, fallen foul of the same
fundamental error of conflating the generalised
form of rights with rights' in general, of conflating
the specifically modern form of law with the form of
law in all historical periods. The same is true, in
particular, of legal sociology, which frequently
observes correctly the connection between the
generalised form of rights and the generalised form
of commodity-relations, but then proceeds to conflate
this latter with commodity-relations in general,
i.e. in all historical periods, and as a result of
this equally impossible notions become commonplace,
e.g. the "reception" of Roman law, the "secularisation"
of natural law, the "substitution" of status by
contract - all of which in different ways and with
varying degrees of obscurity suppose the existence
of bourgeois society in pre-bourgeois social formations
Only in bourgeois society does the form of
legality coincide with a form of equality encompassing
the great majority of people. Only here, therefore,
does the form of .legality come up against the
principle of organised state power, i.e. the
domination of one particular "will" over all others,
since only here is it an essential principle of law
that no one particular class of right—holders have
any priviledge-distinction over any other such class.
The form of modern legality is therefore characterised
specifically by these problems: Firstly, the problem
of generalised equality - how do the great mass of
people become abstracted and equalised tinder the
foxun of a riglit? Secondly, the problem of power —
how does this fundamentally equivalent form accomodate
and become accomodated under, the power relationships
of the state? These are the connections in which
the form of modern legality are to be comprehended,
namely, the connections which are peculiar to
bourgeois society. It is only here that its basis
is to be revealed, in other words, neither in
nature nor in reason, neither in the Middle Ages
nor even in Rome.
Since each of the parts of this work naturally
bear their own introduction of the subject-matter,
it would be superfluous to go into any further
detail with the issues glanced upon here. But
from the few remarks that have been made, it will
be apparent that .the aims of this work are those
recapitulated in the following three divisions;
Firstly, the investigation of the conditions
in which the form of modern legality appears as an
abstraction and equalisation of a large mass of
different individuals. Materially, this is the
investigation of the connections between the legal
equivalent form of "persons" and. the .
structure of generalised private ownership of
property in exchange (commodities). From "this
follows an inquiry into "the conditions of the
antithesis which develops out of this, namely, the
opposition as between the legal equivalent form and
state power, or, in other words, the opposition of
generalised private interests (reflected in the
legal form) and social interests (whence the
character of the state's activity as a guarantor of
social production vis a vis private interests).
Secondly, and in a somewhat different style,
to look in some detail at the modern-classical
connections of the form of legality (as has been
more-than-hinted in these introductory remarks) .
Quite deserving of the term "classical", we have
here a still-admirable yet still-powerful representative
language of equality. From the most material end
of the legal spectrum in part one, we come here in
part two to the more "spiritual" end, as it were,
and look at some of the issues surrounding the "high-
points", or points-of-no-return, of modern legal
culture. Here, I believe, the project turns into
an aesthetic exercise, quite distinct from the
scientific character of part 1 . But I shall leave
xi .
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the reader himself to judge the forn of the connection
between jearts 1 and 11 .
Thirdly, to observe some of the more historically-
inclined vieivs of the connections of modern legality
with such things as Natural Law, Roman Law,
"rationality", the "Market" economy, "contract"
and so forth. Here, in Historical Jurisprudence
and Legal Sociology, these connections are derived
under erroneous conditions, i.e. under the form of
modern legality itself. Thus we observe what is,
in general, the error of historicism, which in this
case resembles the rapro duction of the modern-
classical error of conflating the generality of the
modern legal form (in bourgeois society alone) with
the form of legality in general. In the case of
Historical Jurisprudence the isolated abstract
legal subject, the specifically bourgeois legal
form (bourgeois because abstract, undifferentiated,
because "persona" and not freeman, slave, vassal etc.),
this historically particular form, is taken back
to antiquity; in Legal Sociology, the "free"
contract comprising this same abstract legal persona,
is observed in Rome and the Middle Ages, and Roman
law becomes "received" as bourgeois law. "status" law
"becomes" contract. But this is not the place to go
into these issues.
Indeed, nothing further needs to be said here
except that it is time to begin.
Part I
CLi. 1 . Right and Equality: Some Preliminary
Remax'ks .
Right and Equality: Soma Preliminary Remarks
1 . Despite the fact that legal right always inhabits
the area of state authority and thus appears in
connection with relations of super- and subordination,
it is only fitting to suppose that legal thought has
not been entirely in error over the past two hundred
and more years and that right of this kind subsists,
first and foremost, as a relation of equality® But
equality amongst whom? And, why, if this principle
is true, should it appear primarily in connection
with legal thought merely "over the past two hundred
and more years"? The two questions are not unconnected,
because it is, in fact, only in bourgeois society
that the idea of right coincides with the principle
of equality and thi3, in turn, arises on account of
the fact that it is only here that the mass of people
become included under the same categories of legal
right, and therefore as equals. Accordingly, the form
of right is not merely a form which expresses equality,
but a form which expresses equality which is of a
particular social nature.
It is true that the notion of right in general
implies an equivalent form.1 But this doesn't tell
1. "Right by its very nature can consist only in
the application of an equal standard.."— Marx,
M.E.S.W. (1 Vol.), p. 320.
us a great deal about its actual nature, which is not
at all to be considered "in general" but only "in
particular". The fact that right in general consists
in a form of equality merely provides us with the
meagre information that, for instance, the right of
Roman citizenship supposes a form of equality amongst
all those who are Roman citizens and, by the same
token, that the right of the slave (there are examples?
thus, in the later Roman empire, the right to be treated
without cruelty) entailed a form of equality amongst
slaves, or, similarly, that the rights of the feudal
serf meant equality with other serfs sharing like
conditions of land tenure, and so on and so forth.
In other words, there Is a great deal which is left
wanting in the identity of right and equality when
it is considered only in general. If right is always
conceivable as a relation of equality, that is fair
enough, but what really needs to be known is who
shares this equivalent form and upon what basis.
Clearly the equivalent form of right in general
leads hardly anywhere. In the examples given above,
the equivalent form of right has the significance of
mere tautology: Roman citizen equals Roman citizen,
slave equals slave, serf equals serf, and so on. But
the equivalent form of right in particular, i.e. in
bourgeois society, is of tremendous importance, for
here we get the relation, person equals person. In
other xvords, the category of right no longer requires
any differentia in respect of a particular social
class. Consequently, we get the interesting riddle
that the equivalent form of right in particular, in
specifically bourgeois society, can be defined as
the form of right in general.
However, the definition of bourgeois law as law
in general depends upon a fundamental sleight*"Of~hand
trick. Let us give an illustration of how convincing
this can be:
The form of bourgeois law is universal. It is
neither distinguished from other forms of law by the
fact that it embodies equal rights, nor even by the
fact that it embodies equal rights for all. A moment's
reflection makes this clear. The form of right in
general, i.e. regardless of the specific society, is
equality. Right therefore means, in general, equal
right. Thus, equal rights for all means, simply,
rights for all «- a condition which is conceivable
even in a society based upon slavery.
The supposition that this kind of argument is
correct underpins the whole of modern legal thought.
But let us see what i3 wrong with it. The proposition
that the form of right in general, regardless of any
particular society, consists in a form of equality,
is correct. However, the second proposition, that
right therefore means, in general, equal right, is
a non sequitur. If right in general is an equivalent
form, we can use either of the terms to denote the
same thing, that is to say, we can use either "right"
or "equivalent form". But if we say "equal right",
we are not doing this; we are, in fact, saying "equal
equivalent form". This "equal" of the "equal equivalent
form" thus becomes an entirely unaccounted for addition
which creeps in without our notice. What it, in fact,
stands for is the generalised character of right or,
what is the same thing, the generalised character of
the equivalent form -* which is the precise differentia
of bourgeois law.
The important distinctions to be borne in mind
are therefore these: Right in general is an equivalent
form. But equal right is not right in general. The
equivalent form is only equal, that is to say, right
is only generalised and shared in common by the mass
of people, without distinction, as a condition of
specifically bourgeois society.
The foregoing example illustrates logically what
has been the persistent error in modern legal thought.
It is the error of turning the form of bourgeois law
into the form of law in general by confounding one very
definite and specific principle of equality with one
which is not.
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Xn pre—bourgeois societies, in feudal society
for instance, tiie form of law is heterogeneous* For
what it is worth, it may still be made to conform
with the form of law in general in that a given right
may be said to reflect an equivalent form; but this
is only true in regard of the members of a given one
of each of the many separate classes of right—holders *
Feudal law is, in fact, a manifold of different
equivalent forms, or, what is the same thing, a
manifold of unequal rights. Thus it is impossible
to speak here of right in general, except to say that
it is heterogeneous, i.e. that there is no such thing.
As a result of this, the expression "subject of a
right" is, by itself, meaningless in connection with
feudal society because there is no one single class
of right-holders. Xn bourgeois society, on the other
hand, there is no additional information required in
respect of such an expression, because it is immediately
clear who the subject is without asking: the subject
of a right is here neither lord, vassal, serf etc.,
1
but simply the abstract "subject".
1. It is, of course, merely supposed here and elsewhere
that this abstract legal subject automatically bears
the qualities of non-infancy, non—idiocy. The
negative terms are preferable to adulthood, sound-
mind etc. because we shall see, this "subject" is
essentially a property relation.
o*-*
These kinds of conclusions are important even if
they seem obvious. Thus it is only in bourgeois
society that the "subject of a right" becomes actuated
as a category of legal thinking, because it is only
here that such an abstraction can have any meaning
independently of being qualified in respect of some
particular social class of one kind or another.
Accordingly, something so innocently universal in
appearance as the notion "subject of a right", when
it finds application as such, is marked at the outset
as particular, for it is uniquely an achievement of
modern legal thought that a simple .right~bearing unit
has application without further specification in
regard of the subject to whom it is applicable.
2. In purely formal terms: the form of right in
general, i.e. as merely a form of equality, stands
opposed to the form of individuality in general.
Individuality and equality are mutually exclusive
categories, each repulses the other. This is because
individuality means that which is different and
distinct, whereas equality is sameness. In so far as
X is an individual, he is unlike all others-
Consequently, individuality is never the basis of a
legal right. The only exception to this is the case
where a right exists for the sake of one person and
one person alone. As soon as a right is shared by two
people, it3 basis ceases to be individuality. The
foundation of legal right is therefore always non«
individuality — which i3 precisely what makes the
character of law always a social question, a question
that has to do with the nature of the social ties
between man and man.
Naturally the attempt to make individuality the
basis of legal right has been the source of the most
incredible feats of philosophical acrobatics in the
history of modern legal thought. This is because
beginning Tv±th individuality , in the above-meiitioned
sense of the word, ha3 entailed its immediate negation
in order that the members of this class may be subsumed
under the category or right, that is, in order that
individuals (who are all by nature different) may
be made equal. Now unless the form of right is to
disappear completely by being sundered into the
manifold of individuality, the inevitable result of
such a procedure is that individuality is turned into
something other than that which it is supposed to be,
whereupon the category of "abstract individuality"
(or something of the same essential nature) makes an
appearance.
The above procedure of making individuality the
basis of law is, needless to say, characteristic of
specifically modern legal thought, because only in
bourgeois society does law appear as "abstract
individuality". Again, this appears to coincide with
the form of right in general where a right, whatever
the society, is always the abstraction from, and in
this way an equalisation of, individuals. But it is
only in bourgeois society that this category of
"individuals" operates as such, that is, without any
further specification as to which social class of
individuals is being reckoned with. Consequently,
the abstract antithesis of individuality and equality
is a specific expression of the form of modern law
and it naturally finds its classic formulations at a
time when bourgeois society is making its revolutionary
advances in the face of the decaying fetters of the
ancien regime. Thus Kant, for example, makes the
individual give himself up to the equal measure of
right by giving individuality a "faculty" for so
doing; and Puchta says, "The principle of right has
been bestowed upon man as a spiritual element inherent
in his constitution",^ while Savigny claims that,
1. Puchta, G.F., Outlines of Jurisprudence as the
Science of Right, p.20.
"All law exists for the moral freedom indwelling in
every individual man."^ In all these cases the
individual man is made out to be source and foundation
of law. Accordingly, part and parcel of his
individuality must be turned into its opposite,
into an inherent ability to cast aside his individuality
so that ha can actuate something in common with others
and thus realise the principle of right » The result is
"abstract individuality", which, as such, as a
category in its own right, is uniquely an expression
corresponding with the form of boureois law.
To talk merely of "man", the "individual", the
"subject", or to use one or another expression which
abstracts individuality, to do this in connection with
the form of law, is to talk specifically about a
particular form of law which subsists as a generalised
equivalent form, that consequently recognises no
distinctions as regards this or that class of
individuals. To do this, in other words, is to
express the form of bourgeois law.
The individual, as such, acquires rights plainly
in spite of his individuality, because holding a right
means that he shares it with someone else. This does
not mean that the time-honoured phrase, "the rights of
1 . Savigny, System of Modern Roman Law, Bk. 2, p.1 .
the individual", is contradictory. Clearly, it is
only in bourgeois society that the individual (without
distinction as to which particular social class he
belongs in) has rights, but this is not to say that
this character holds rights because he is an individual *
No—one holds rights as an individual, but individuals
certainly hold rights. It may also be remarked here
that it is not contradictory to demand that individuality
be respected; this only becomes so when such a demand
brings with it the view that individuality can be
enshrined in the form of a right. For, as soon as
individuality is properly realised, then, by definition,
it determines its own course and becomes what it is
entirely of its own accord. Similarly, the demand
that nations respect the right of other nations to
determine their own affairs is anything but superfluous
in the modem age of imperialism, but once a given
nation does determine properly its own affairs, once
it is truly 3elf—determinate, it is precisely that,
i.e. it gets by without guarantee from outside and the
right becomes superfluous. To properly respect a right
for an oppressed nation to determine its own affairs is
just the opposite of demanding that some other nation
do the legislating to that effect.
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The fact that an individual holds a right bears
testimony to the fact that he is not, in this connection,
an individual at all, but a member of society. The
fact that the right-holder appears as an individual,
that is, as an abstract subject, without need of any
further differentia, is a condition of bourgeois
society which achieves this result on the basis of
a wholesale erosion of individuality proper.
3. In bourgeois society, right becomes equal right,
which is to say, right becomes an equal equivalent form,
or, to put it yet another way, right becomes an
equivalent form that is generalised, shared by the
mass of persons who are thus distinguished merely as
individuals. The secret of this equivalent form lies
in bourgeois society itself. But what is it in
particular about bourgeois society that makes the
mass of "persons11 equal in this way? This is a question
to which we shall address ourselves in the next chapter.
Here, we may just anticipate the answer with an
illustration.
In hi3 criticism of the Gotha programme, a series
of demands drawn up by the German Social Democratic
Worker's Party, Marx rigorously exposed the one—sided
character of the idea that producers have the right to
be rewarded equally, that is, in proportion with the
labour which they provide while engaged in a given
-1 2-
productive process. He says:
But one man is superior to another physically
or mentally and so supplies more labour in the
same time, or can labour for a longer time;
and labour, to serve as a measure, must be
defined by its duration or intensity, otherwise
it ceases to be a standard of measurement .
This equal right is an unequal right for unequal
labour...Xt is, therefore, a right of inequality,
in its content, like every right. Right by its
very nature can consist only in the application
of an equal standard; but unequal individuals
(and they would not be different individuals if
they were not unequal) are raeasureable by an
equal standard only in so far as they are
brought under an equal point of view, are taken
from one definite side only, for instance, in
the present case, are regarded as workers only
and nothing more is seen in them, everything
else being ignored. Further, one worker is
married, another not; one has more children
than another, and so on and so forth. Thus,
with an equal performance of labour, and hence
an equal share in the social consumption fund,
one will in fact receive more than another, and
so on* To avoid these defects, right instead
of being equal would have to be unequal.
This statement is highly illustrative of the conceptual
equipment required in grasping the form of law. Marx's
criticism here is essentially that the German workers
had ensnared their demands within the principles of
bourgeois law. Now this is not immediately clear
because the statement doesn't even mention the term
"bourgeois"; on the contrary, Marx talks explicitly
of law in general. Thus: "..a right of inequality..
like every right," and "(r)ight by its very nature.." etc.
1. Marx, Marx/Engels Selected Works, 1 Vol., p. 320.
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In other words, these criticisms have nothing to do
with bourgeois right in particular., The criticism is
universally applicable, namely, equality is not achieved
by considering the same measure in relation to different
things (even though these different things must in at
least one regard be the same in order that they may be
logically subsumed under the measure). Or, to use a
numerical analogy, if we have the numbers .5, 6, 7? 8 , . c
etc., and then add to each of them the equal measure of
1, we do not equalise those numbers (even though they
all avail themselves of the measure — because they all
have the logical character of numbers); clearly by
such a process we sustain exactly all the initial
differences of each with every other. This is the
criticism of right in general, i.e. of right a3 an
equal standard.
But Marx doesn't just criticise right as an equal
standard, he criticises it as a particular equal standard,
as an equal standard which consists in the measure of
labour—time (duration) or labour—intensity (non—duration,
i.e. a measurable amount of some other quality of labour).
Now it is precisely this equal standard, the equality of
human labour, that lies at the roots of the modern legal
form. In no other society than bourgeois society is the
principle of equal human labour, and hence of equal right,
—14-
fully realised. But the precise connections between
the two, we must leave until later.
These connections» however, are what are at the
back of Marx's mind in the foregoing criticism. The
principle of equal right on the basis of equal human
labour is a very particular1 equal standard and is by
no means characteristic of the form of law in general.
Xt is the yardstick of specifically bourgeois law.
Thus, although the demand of the German workers that
labour be rewarded in proportion with the labour provided
has the appearance of a progressive focus of struggle
in the face of productive relations which reward labour
only in proportion with the labour expended over the
production of exactly what it gets, i.e. the wage-value,
which excludes that labour which is expended over the
production of not only the value of equipment, tools etc.,
worn out over the course of the given productive operation,
but also a surplus value which appears in the form of
profit, interest etc., although this demand appears
challenging, it is in fact based upon the exact same
principle. Under bourgeois conditions, labour is, on
average, rewarded equally,.1.e. in proportion with the
labour-time embodied in the product of a given productive
operation. But this riddle we shall also leave to be
elaborated later on.
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All that needs to be said here is that equal
right means an equal standard, and if that equal
standard has for its basis human labour} then for the
latter to serve as such it must be commensurable,
because there is no equality without commensurability«
Moreover, for human labouf to be commensurable, for
it to be reckoned by time or intensity, it must be
homogeneous social labour, which, in turn, supposes
very definite social conditions under which the manifold
of productive tasks are in common undertaken. Again,
we shall come to these things in detail later on, but
it is precisely these conditions that are concealed
behind the generalised equivalent form of modem law.
Only where labour has become homogeneous social labour,
xvhere, consequently, the products of labour and labour
itself are all commodities, where in other words, the
dominant social relation between man and man is that
of commodity—ownership; only here does it become
possible for the mass of people to be subsumed as
equals under the legal form of an abstract right-
bearing unit. The generalised form of commodity
ownership is the key to the generalised equivalent
form of modern law.
4. The foregoing remarks all take very seriously
the form of law as an equivalent form, and in particular,
the form of law as an equal or generalised equivalent
form, which is the special form of modern law. But
•-16—
the need to make this kind of remark is symptomatic of
a very profound antithesis, because law is "obviously"
a relation of poT^er, or at least it always comes dressed
with the trappings of power. The consideration of the
form of law as an equivalent form eventually has to come
to terms with the following antithesis: law as such is
opposed to power. This at least is the case with
bourgeois law since the equivalent form is here
generalised and as such it recognises no differentiation
of rights in respect of any particular social grouping.
If the form of law consists in an equivalent form of
persons (and by this word "persons", it is to be noted,
we can only mean bourgeois law, when it stands in this
way without any qualification in regard of any particular
social class), then, on its own terms, there can be no
one or more persons holding sway over any one or more
of the others. If we suppose that law consists in a
generalised relation of equality, then, as such, it is
completely antithetical to the relation of power, which,
merely in formal terms, consists always in the domination
or preponderance of one "will" over that of another.
In other words, we have a profound contradiction on
our hands: on the one hand, the form of law is
essentially a generalised equivalent form; on the
other hand, it always appears under the auspices of
state power.
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Clearly, this antithesis is already supposed in,
and develops directly out of, the primary antithesis
of law, i.e. as an equivalent form of individuals.
The solution to the riddle of this primary antithesis
we have already anticipated: as the opposition of
individuality and equality, in other words, as
"abstract individuality", it becomes basically a
question that concerns the generalised form of
commodity relations in bourgeois society. Individuals
become equalised as such under the form of law as a
condition of generalised commodity ownership. But
this solution, since we have merely anticipated it
rather than actually demonstrated it, naturally
remains to be fully elucidated. It is, therefore,
to take too much on trust to anticipate further the
solution to the riddle of the second antithesis, the
dualism of. law and state power, which develops directly
out of this primary one. On the other hand, the
character of this second antithesis is already clear
(and posing the problem clearly is always a step in
the direction of its solution), it is the opposition
of law, as a generalised equivalent form, with its
natural resting place in the domain of political power.
In fact (if we may be permitted to anticipate one
final time) the solution of this second antithesis in
the process of modern law is that it is never reconciled,
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except as a contradiction. We shall deal with this
in detail in chatper three and, in a rather different
fashion, elsewhere. Here, it will suffice to say
that law, as essentially an abstract equivalent form,
is not actual as such, but only becomes so when it is
"touched", so to speak, with the trappings of external
authority. But, the moment that this occurs, however,
the equivalent form is negated and the language of
equality which, figuratively speaking, it came
prepared to pronounce, is immediately compromised.
This dualism, which appears in numerous forms, has
its roots in the specifically bourgeois condition
that the individual interest (upon which the legal
form is premised as an equivalent form) stands
opposed to the social interest.
5. The form of modern legality is to be considered,
therefore, as a process consisting in two essential
antitheses. Firstly: as an antithesis of individuality
(as many different individuals) and equality, i.e. as
the problem of the abstract subject, which somehow
manages to suppose in this way that the mass of the
community can be brought together under one uniformly
equal legal standard. Secondly: as an antithesis of
this legal equivalent form and state power, i.e. as
the problem of how an essentially equivalent form
accomodates and becomes accomodated tinder a relation
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that is logically opposed to it, namely, the relation
(just in purely formal terms) of super- and subordination.
Our aim in chapters 2 and 3 will be to get- at
the material elements working behind these antitheses.
Firstly (in chapter 2), the material elements behind
the (first) antithesis of individuality as such, as
concrete individuality, and equality; that is to say,
the material elements of the generalised commodity
structure which lie behind the notion of the abstract
subject. And secondly (in chapter 3)» the material
elements behind the (second) antithesis of this legal
equivalent form and state power, namely, the opposition
of private and social interests premised in the
opposition of private property in general, i.e. as
generalised commodity ownership (whence the legal
abstract subject), and private property in particular,
i.e. in regard of private ownership of the means of
production, whereupon the state becomes increasingly
coxnpelled, in the interest of capitalist production
as a whole, to compromise the narrow shell of
egotistical private interest upon which the form of
legality is grounded.
Legal Relations and the Relations of
Production and Exchange: Basic
Interconnections.
a. The Equivalent Form of Property
in Exchange
b . The Equivalent Form of Commodities
and the Equivalent Form of Persons.
c. Commodity Production and Legal
Relations:
1 . Generalised Commodity
Production.
2. Petty Commodity Production.
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Legai Relations and the Relations of Production and
Exchangei
Basic Interconnections.
In bourgeois society, unlike in any other previous
society, the mass of people become subsumed under the
equivalent form of an abstract right-bearing unit.
Here, each becomes the subject of the same general
set of rights and the category, "subject of a right",
becomes historically quite distinct as something that
is synonymous with a general social equivalent form.
Now it is a very old lesson that there can be
no equality without commensurability. No two things
can be equated without measure, but measure needs
to be of something.1 From the standpoint of modern
law, then, it seems that the mass of people are
commensurable in a rather mysterious way, for right
is not height. To cut the matter short, this measure
is, in a word, money, or, at least, money furnishes
the secret of this particular commensurability: of
"persons" in bourgeois society.
1. Measure can neither be just a quantity, nor
simply a quality. It is, in fact, a unity of
the two, a qualitative quantum. cf. Hegel,
Logic, p. 172 et seq.
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However, with this magic word, the problem of
the form of modern law is far and away from being
solved. Indeed, in the same way that the modern
"subject of a right" indicates a general social
equivalent form which remains a riddle to be solved,
so is it the case with the notion of money and the
commodities which it somehow renders equal in the
act of exchange. Just as the individual gives
himself up to the measure of law, so the problem
is transferred in the commodity giving itself up to
the measure of money. That it is the same problem
which is here transferred is, of course, merely a
supposition yet to be justified. The supposition
is, that the "economic^ relation contains the secret
of the "juridical" relation.
It follows that one of our primary tasks in this
chapter will be to consider the nature of the equivalent
form of commodities in bourgeois society. It is this
which furnishes the material basis of the equivalent
form of "persons" in the modern "subject of a right"
or, using Savigny's terra, "jural relation". Thus,
it will also be our task to show how the equivalent
form of commodities or, what is the same thing, the
equivalent form of property in exchange, becomes the
equivalent form of "persons", in other words, how the
"juridical" moment grot/s out of the "economic" relation.
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Before we get about these tasks, one especially
important point must be observed. We are here
dealing with the form of law as an equivalent form,
which as a general equivalent form is specifically
the form of modern law. The basic category of modern
legal thought, the general right-bearing unit, is a
form under which the mass of "persons" become thus
subsumed as equals. As we have already made clear
in the introductory remarks upon right and equality,
there is a great deal more to the matter than just
this, in other words, it is not simply a matter of
some kind of legal authority declaring its will that
all men of sound mind etc. be treated equally. However,
as an equivalent form, law logically stands in an
antithetical position vis a vis the relation of power,
considered just simply as a relation of super- and
subordination. Yet it is quite clear that law always
appears merged with political authority and ultimately
depends upon it. Consequently, to suppose the form
of law as an equivalent form is to suppose at the
same time that it is just the opposite of the form
in which it actually appears, as a relation of power,
the dominance of one will over that of another. In
what follows w.e shall merely suppose this antithesis
and shall defer discussion of it until chapter three.
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The Equivalent form of Property in Exchange
Property in exchange is the commodity—form of
property. As such, it possesses a two-fold character
the commodity, as an article of exchange, is also a
use-value. This dual nature of commodities, as
articles of consumption and as articles of exchange,
vas aPknowledged by Aristotle, who says: "..every
article of property admits of two uses..To take, for
example, a shoe, there is its use as a covering of
the foot and also its use as an article of exchange..
The same is true of all other articles of perperty;
there is none that does not admit of use in exchange.
Aristotle could not, however, get to the bottom of
the equivalent form embodied in commodities, "the foxrni
rendering possible their "use in exchange". Marx
presents Aristotle's difficulty as follows:
In the first place, he (Aristotle) clearly
enunciates that the money-form of commodities
is only the further development of the simple
form of value — i.e. of the expression of the
value of one commodity in some other commodity
taken at random; for he says: 5 beds «=* 1 house
is not to be distinguished from 3 beds = so much
money.
He further sees that the value-relation which
gives rise to this expression makes it necessary
that the house should be made qualitatively the
equal of the bed, and that, without such an
equalisation, these two clearly different things
could/
1 . Aristotle, Politics, p. 22.
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could not be compared with each other as
commensurable quantities. "Exchange1*, he says,
"cannot take place without equality, and equality
not without comraensurability". Here, however,
he comes to a stop, and gives up further analysis
of the form of value. "It is, however, in reality,
impossible that such things can be commensurable"
— i.e. qualitatively equal. Such an equalisation
can only be something foreign to their real
nature, consequently^only "a makeshift for
practical purposes."
So, for Aristotle, although both the properties of
use and exchange value inhere in the commodity, the
2
one is "proper to the article and the other not."
Later on, Marx adds, appropriately, that the greatness
of Aristotle's genius is illustrated by the fact
that he got this far, that he recognised exchange
value as a problem which apparently thwarted all
attempts at a rational solution.
Aristotle fully understood that money could only
express an equivalent form in commodities themselves,
that the measure itself does not render things
commensurable. Today, over two thousand years after
Aristotle, vulgar economists still carry on as if it
were self—evident that money, having supplanted God's
old role, is "the measure of all things". In the same
way the equality of "persons" is self—evident to the
modem lawyer with his right-bearing unit of currency.
1. Marx, Capital Vol. 1 . , p. 65-
2. Aristotle, Politics, p.21 . cf. Ethics, p» 103-4.
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Tn fact, the equivalent form of commodities, of which
both money and, in a different way, the modern right-
bearing person are expressions, is a very complicated
matter.
The equivalent form of commodities, or, property
in exchange, is the problem of value in exchange«
Returning to Aristotle, it is the problem of how the
bed is made the equal of the house, the shoe etc., or
rather, how so many beds equals so many houses etc.
The answer, the secret of the equivalent form of
value, is that equal amounts of human labour are
materialised in the products which figure in the
given equation. The classical political economists,
especially Smith and Ricardo, had moved a considerable
way because and in so far as they held fast with this
basic axiom, but it wasn't until Marx appeared on the
scene that the theory of value was fully worlced out.
For our purposes here, however, we can simply stay
with Marx and Aristotle. The reason why Aristotle
gave up on the form of value, Marx tells us, is that
equal human labour for him was inconceivable. The
reason Aristotle could not penetrate the equivalent
form of commodities is the same as that which prevented
him from considering the possibility that it arose from
equal amounts of human labour embodied in them;
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There was, however, an important fact which
prevented Aristotle from seeing that, to attribute
value to commodities, is merely a mode of
expressing all labour as equal human labour, and
consequently as labour of equal quality. Greek
society was founded upon slavery, and had,
therefore, for its natural basis, the inequality
of men and of their labour-powers. The secret of
the expression of value, namely, that all kinds of
labour are equal and equivalent, because, and
so far as they are human labour in general, cannot
be decyphered, until the notion of human equality
has already acquired the fixity of a popular
prejudice. This, however, is possible only in a
society in which the great mass of the produce
of labour takes the form of commodi. ties, in which,
consequently, the dominant relation between man
and man, is that of owners of commodities. The
brilliancy of Aristotle's genius is shown by thi3
alone, that he discovered, in the expression of
the value of commodities, a relation of equality.
The particular conditions of the society in which
he lived, alone prevented him from discovering
what, "in-j truth", was at the bottom of this
equality.
There are some very important points condensed within
this statement and we must take careful note of them.
Marx expresses here a condition whereupon his own
theory is made possible, namely, that human equality
has established itself with the "fixity of a popular
prejudice". But this is not all (the words here could
seem ill—chosen, for popular prejudices are often
fleeting). This particular notion of human equality
figures as a condition which arises directly with the
social form of exchange, a form which appears "only
1. Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p.65.
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in a society in which the great mass of the produce of
labour takes the form of commodities, in which,, the
dominant relation between man and man, is that of
owners of commodities". It is precisely this social
form of exchange (not its mere logical form), bringing
with it the equivalent form of "persons" as owners
of commodities, which develops it as the form of law.
But we shall come to this later.
There are two sides to the nature of exchange
value which are both illustrated, in different ways,
by Aristotle: the logical and the historical.
Aristotle was undoubtedly correct to suppose that
property in exchange, expressing itself as a quantum
(so much money), could not be a mere quantum, but
had first to be a qualitative relation in order to
appear as a quantitative one. Aristotle, the founding
father of philosophical logic, was, needless to say,
logically correct: quality then quantity. Moreover,
he was "correct" again in his failure to apply his
logic to the conditions of exchange of goods in his
own society. He said that exchange supposes a relation
of equality. If he had gone further and said that
exchange supposes a relation of equal amounts of human
labour in the commodities on either side of the exchange
equation, this solution would still have been impossible.
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The reason for this is that the rational form of
exchange is contradicted so long as slavery forms
the productive base of society. Slavery, consequently,
provides definite limits to the development of the
exchange economy.
"The secret of the expression of value" is that
"all kinds of labour are equal and equivalent, because,
and so far as they are human labour in general"„ The
phrase "because, and so far as" is an important
conjunction here. It expresses the essential unity
of the logical ("because") and the historical ("so
far as") in the nature of exchange value. Slavery
is a definite barrier against making all kinds of
labour equal, a clear and unambiguous constraint upon
the realisation of human labour as human labour in
general. Aristotle couldn't make the form of exchange
value rational because the institution of slavery, which
was perfectly natural to him, could not do so either.
Logically, the equivalent form of property in
exchange expresses equal amounts of human labour.
Historically, corresponding with this, the exchange
economy and trade generally is only developed so far
as human labour has become human labour in general,
or, to give it a more technical-sounding term, so far
as human labour has become homogeneous abstract social
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labour. The institution of slavery contradicts this
development. Consequently, slavery can only develop
petty commodity production and exchange, it contradicts
the logic of exchange value. Slavery cannot make the
form of exchange value rational and as trade and
commerce become increasingly significant, as they
become developed to their limit under such conditions,
as in the later Roman Empire, one or the other must
give way. This contradiction between the forces and
relations of production and exchange furnishes here
the material basis of the famous decline and fall
of Rome.
In Aristotle's day, petty commodity production
was a great deal less developed than that realised
under the later Roman Empire. Thus it is no surprise
that the expression of value, as it appeared in the
development of a money economy amidst the unstable
anarchy of the city—states, appeared also as "a
makeshift for practical purposes", for that, by and
large, is what it was. The labour of antiquity, slave
labour for the most part, did not meet with the
contradiction that it was to be rendered equal with
other forms of human labour because production for
exchange only existed in a very rudimentary way.
H. Arendt, The Human Condition, p«7^-«
According to this author, this rigid brute/
human dichotomy is "the reason Tor the much
misunderstood Greek theory of' the non-human
nature of the slave". She continues:
"Aristotle, who argued this theory so
explicitly, and then, on his deathbed, freed
his slaves, may not be so inconsistent as
moderns are inclined to think. He denied not
the slave's capacity to be human, but only
the word 'man' for members of the species
mankind as long as they were totally subject
to necessity." — ibid. The inconsistency,
however, is still with Aristotle, because if
the slave has "the capacity to be human", as
Arendt puts it, then, in Aristotle's own terms,
he need not be subject to necessity. In
other words, "necessity" here is not absolute,
but social. Necessity, for Aristotle, however,
meant necessity, that is to say, natural
necessity, and as a result of this he never
managed to get out of the circularity involved
in saying that a slave is a slave because he
is a slave. Thus: "Whoever, therefore, are as
much inferior to their fellows as the body is
to the soul, or the brutes to men (and this
is in reality the case with all whose proper
use is in their bodies, and whose highest
excellence consists in this part), these, X
say, are slaves by nature ... He then is by
nature formed a slave, who is fitted to become
the chattel of another person, and on that
account is so, and who has just enough reason
to perceive that there is such a faculty,
without being indued with the use of it". -
Aristotle, Works, p. 12-13. The phrase
"chattel of another person" is quite
contradictory since it accredits the slave
with the mutually exclusive qualities of the
person and the thing, and Aristotle, recognising
this, does not get rid of it by qualifying the
personality here with "just enough reason to
perceive etc.", for to admit this is to admit
the quality of personality while trying to
exclude it.
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Consequently, for Aristotle, the institution of slavery
as social labour figured not as a contradictory mode
of expressing value in exchange with other forms of
labour, but as a node of excluding necessary labour
from the activity proper to free men. Arendt makes
this latter point when she writes:
The institution of slavery in antiquity, though
not in later times, was not a device for cheap
.labour or an instrument of exploitation for
profit but rather the attempt to exclude .labour
from the conditions of man's life. What men
share with all other forms <pf animal life was
not considered to be human.
The crucial point which is emphasised in all this
is that the form of value cannot be considered
independently of its social character. Aristotle
could not discover "in truth" the equivalent form
formally embodied in exchange because the society
of his day did not have this "truth", it had, in
fact, just the opposite, unequal human labour.
Slavery, generally, is a barrier against the rational
development of exchange. It is specifically bourgeois
society which furnishes the historical conditions
under which the form of value becomes rational. It
is specifically bourgeois society which realises
the principle of equality in all forms of human labour.
Here petty commodity production becomes generalised
commodity production and human labour becomes, par
excellence, human labour in general.
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From tills it follows that to talk about the
equivalent form of commodities is really to talk,
specifically, about the equivalent form of commodities
in bourgeois society, because it is only in bourgeois
society that its principle, equal human labour, is
fully and properly realised, because it is only in
bourgeois society that production is, absolutely,
production for exchange, where, consequently, human
labour is realised as human labour- in general, or,
what is the same thing, as homogeneous social labour.
It follows, moreover, that it is only when these
conditions have been established historically, that
the form of value can be properly comprehended and
thus yield the novel insights into the contradictory
character of exchange under previous conditions.
The anatomy of man, as Marx said, is here the key
to the anatomy of the ape.
The form of value is thus a social relation of
bourgeois society. Its "application" to previous
societies therefore yields the correct result that
it is not there as such, but only as something
increasingly irrational depending upon how far exchange
has become developed under conditions which contradict
its principle of equal human labour.
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However, we cannot go much further without saying
what it is in particular about bourgeois society
which enables it to realise the principle of equal
human labour, and thus produce everything, so far
as it is earthly possible, as articles for exchange
on the market. The secret lies naturally in the
relations of production, but to say that these are
characterised with the aim of realising human labour
as homogeneous social labour, that is to say, by the
aim of producing exclusively for exchange, although
true, is a rather circular process of argumentation.
We have to say something more about the character of
the relations of production themselves. Moreover, we
have yet to bring the form of law into the picture.
Why is the form of value so important in this
connection? In a word, it furnishes the form of
modern law in as much as it is the material basis
of an equivalent form. The whole business here
turns on the social development of this equivalent
form, which is, simultaneously, its legal development.
Of course, in pre-capitalist societies, where the
exchange form is relatively undeveloped, its implications
for generating legal categories is correspondingly
diminished, although, as we shall see, in Roman law,
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because commodity production had been developed to
a high level of sophistication given the limiting
conditions of slavery under which this development
was constrained, an apparently "modern" system of
legal reasoning appeared alongside it. But all
these questions, production relations, legal relations
and their connections, we shall come to in a moment.
Before we do this, however, there is a little more
which may be said on behalf of the form which provides
the basis of these connections;» namely, the equivalent
form of commodities.
Clearly it is not the use-value performed by
the individual labourer which, under bourgeois
conditions, is equated with all other forms of labour.
The welder does not perform the same task as the
herdsman, and neither of these perform the same task
as the clerk, and so on and so forth. What renders
these manifestly different activities equal such
that their products may relate to each other as values
is the productive system under which these tasks are
in common performed. The productive system which
develops to perfection human labour as abstract,
homogeneous social labour is that system which produces
exclusively for exchange, in a word, the system of
capitalist production, or, what is the same thing,
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generalised commodity production® The equivalent
form of property in exchange, depending upon, its
social development, expresses the extent to which
human labour has become homogeneous social labour,
and the homogeneity of human labour, in turn, is a
condition of the historical development of production
for exchange. The whole business here turns on the
extent to which production is production for exchange.
This depends entirely upon the relations of production.
The equivalent form of commodities thus expresses in
its essentially social character, a relation of
production. Moreover, without actually looking in
detail at the form of law (except in so far as tve
need to suppose that it expresses an equivalent form
with a material basis, that is to say, that it is a
social development of an equivalent form) and without
looking at the specific character of the relations
of production, it is already apparent, in merely
considering the equivalent form of commodities, that
both legal and productive relations are essentially
bound up with one another. But we shall come to the
explicit character of these connections in a short
while .
As a final illustration of the character of the
equivalent form of commodities, we may mention once
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more its measure (not least because a good deal of
confusion surrounds this) . Measure appears as
magnitude but is not synonymous with magnitude as
such. The measure of value in exchange realised
by a given commodity is a socially necessary quantum
of labour-time expended throughout the course of its
production. The measure here appears as a quantum (5
hours social labour), but even in this the quantum
is never independent of the qualitative relation
(social labour, socially necessary labour). This is
made clear by Marx when he writes;
Some people might think that if the value of a
commodity is determined by the quantity of labour
spent on it, the more idle and unskillful the
labourer, the more valuable would his commodity
be, because more time would be required in its
production. The labour, however, that forms
the substance of value, is homogeneous human
labour, expenditure of one uniform labour—power.
The total labour-power of society, which is
embodied in the sum total of the values of all
commodities produced by that society, counts here
as one homogeneous mass of human labour—power,
composed though it be of innumerable individual
units. Each of these units is the same as any
other, so far as it has the character of the
average labour—power of society, and takes effect
as such; that is, so far as it i3 no more than is
socially necessary. The labour-time socially
necessary i3 that required to produce an article
under normal conditions of production, and with
the average degree of skill and intensity
prevalent at the time. The introduction of
power looms into England probably reduced by
one—half the labour-time required to weave a
given/
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given quantity of yarn into clothe The hand-
loom weavers, as a matter of fact, continued
to require the same time as beforej but for
all that, the product of one hour of their
labour represented after the change only half
an hour's social labour, and consequently fell
to one-half of its former value.
The magnitude of value, labour-time, as a measure, is
inseparable from the social development of commodity
production. Marx's model here, without being
explicitly stated, is the capitalist model, because
production is supposed to be exclusively production
of commodities.
The equivalent form of commodities thus becomes,
materially, a socially determined quantum of labour-
time expended over the course of their production.
This value, which can only appear and be realised
in the act of exchange, conceals, without need of
being explicitly stated, a definite relational
integument of specifically capitalist production,
because, as is illustrated in the quote taken from
Marx, all labour is supposed as homogeneous social
labour, which is a condition of capitalist society
alone. Hereinafter, when we shall have cause to
speak of the equivalent form of commodities, or, more
often simply the equivalent form (since its social
1. Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p.46.
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development by no means stays with, commodities),
it is important that this connection is never
lost sight of.
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The Equivalent form of Commodities and the Equivalent
form of Persons.
The equivalent form of consnodities > we have said,
is a social relation expressing equal human labour.
The "truth" of this matter is realised only in
bourgeois society, for in other kinds of society it
is systematically contradicted by inequalities in
the various forms of labour, where; accordingly,
production can only ever by petty commodity production,,
Now in law, the equivalent form of commodities becomes
an equivalent form of persons, and this also is a
"truth" which is only fully appropriate to bourgeois
conditions of social production.
How does the equivalent form of commodities become
an equivalent form of persons? The commodity is
property in exchange. Property is a relation of
person to thing. Therefore the commodity as such
never exists independently of an owner. As Marx
says:
Commodities are things, and therefore without
power of resistance against man...In order that
these objects may enter into relation with
each other as commodities, their guardians must
place themselves din relation to one another, as
persons whose will resides in those objects, and
must behave in such a way that each does not
appropriate the commodity of the other, and
part with his own, except by means of an act done
by mutual consent. They must, therefore,
mutually recognise in each other the rights of
private/
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private proprietors. This juridical relation,
which thus expresses itself" in a contract,
whether such a contract be part of a developed
legal system or not, is a relation between two
wills, and is but a reflex of the real economic
relation between the two. It is the economic
relation that determines the subject patter-
comprised in each such juridical act.
T'wo kinds of relationships may be distinguished, here,
2
the relation between commodities as equivalents, and
the relation between the participants in the exchange
act. Each of these relations is a condition of the
other. The corrsnodity, being inanimate, cannot take
itself to market, and the person, without the commodity
in his possession, has nothing to take. Exchange
supposes both commodity and person on either side of
the act. However, what puts the person in the exchange
act in a relation of equality with his opposite number
is not his will as such, but his will as a personifi¬
cation of the commodity. It is the commodity which
furnishes the equivalent form, not the person. People
do not automatically relate to one another as equals
except on condition that they recognise in each other
something which may be rendered equal without addition
or subtraction. This condition is provided directly
with the commodities which each holds in his possession
1 . Marx, Capital Vol. 1 , p.88.
2. It is to be assumed, for simplicity's sake, that
the commodity need not be distinguished from
its money equivalent.
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upon the initiation of the business of exchanging
them. This is the sense in which the mutual agreement
between the two wills, is "a reflex of the real
economic relation between the two".
Xt is to be pointed out that the reflexive
character of the "juridical" moment in the exchange
act by no means corresponds with some sort of illusory
quality. Xt is an absolutely necessary result which
comes hand in hand with the fact of both person and
\
commodity being necessary on either side of the
exchange relation. On the other hand, we shall see,
this doesn't prevent the equivalent form of persons
giving rise to the most fantastic illusions.
Let us make quite clear what this equivalent
form of persons amounts to. It is the form of the
individual in the strictly limited sphere of commodity
exchange. Here the "person" figures essentially as
the "will" of his commodity and it is only as such
that he becomes the equal of his opposite number.
"What chiefly distinguishes a commodity from its
owner," says Marx,
is the fact that it looks upon every other
commodity as but a form of appearance of its
own value. A born leveller and cynic, it is
always ready to exchange not only soul, but
body, with every other commodity, be the same
more/
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more repulsive than Maritornes herself. The
owner makes up for this lack in the commodity
of a sense of the concrete, by his own five
and more senses. His commodity possesses for
him no immediate use—value. Otherwise, he would
not bring it to the market. It has use—value
for others; but for himself its only direct
use—value is that of being a depository of
exchange—value, and, consequently, a means of
exchange. Therefore, he makes up his mind
to part with it for commodities whose use-
value is of service to him. All commodities
are non-use—values for their owners, and use-
values for their non-owners. Consequently,
they must all change hands. But this change of
hands is what constitutes their exchange, and
the latter puts them in relation with e^ich other
as values, and realises them as values.
For commodities to exchange they must have owners who
recognise in one another their likeness. The basis
of this inheres in the commodities themselves.
To recapitulate: Commodities cannot exchange
themselves, they need an owner to personify them.
In this way a "juridical" moment appears in the
exchange act, which refers to the relation between
the persons participating In the exchange. Clearly
it is a necessary relationship. Marx, whom we have
already quoted in this connection, says quite
specifically (and it is sufficiently important to bear
repeating) that, "In order that these objects may
enter into relation with each other as commodities,
their guardians...must...mutually recognise in each
other the rights of private proprietors." In other
1. Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p.88.
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words, such, a recognition is a logical condition upon
which commodities actually appear as commodities«
The commodity is the form of property in exchange,
and for commodities to exchange, for them actually
to realise their implicit value in exchange, they
must change hands between their owners, who, moreover,
must recognise each other as owners, and furthermore,
as "rightful" owners, at least in the rudimentary
sense that each does not appropriate, without alienating
an equivalent in return, that which belongs to the
o ther.
Now what puts the owners of commodities into
relation with each other as equals, recognising as
they do the same rights in each other, is precisely
the common substance which they both possess as
equals, without need of any addition, namely, commodities.
Xt is the commodity—form itself which moves them to
the position of recognising the same rights in each.
Each party to the exchange does not need to come
dressed as a lawyer, all he needs to do is to bring
his commodity to the market and have the will to
exchange it. Indeed, each party does not need to
recognise anything beyond the aim of giving up something
in exchange for something else. Each sees here only
the object of his own selfish desires, the commodity
Marx, Grundrisse, p.2^3. The text here
from which the quotation is made comprises
a large bulk of* Marx's rough notes.
Hence the appearance of the following
important continuation (the Hegelian terms
in parentheses are Marx's): "..each
arrives at his end only in so far as he
serves the other as means; ..each becomes
means for the other (being for another)
only as end in himself (being for self) . .
(T)he reciprocity in which each is at the
same time means and end., is a necessary
fact, presupposed as a natural precondition
of exchange, but, as such, it is irrelevant
to each of the two subjects in exchange..
(T)his reciprocity interests him only din
so far as it satisfies his interest to
the exclusion of, without reference to,
that of the other..(T)he common interest
which appears as the motive of the act
as a whole i3 recognised as a fact by
both sides; but, as such, it is not the
motive, but rather proceeds, as it were,
behind the back of those self—reflected
particular interests." ibid. Marx
summarises all this in a phrase which
graphically captures the essence of the
so—called general interest:
"The general interest is precisely
the generality of self—seeking
interests." - ibid.
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of the other, and in so doing realises the other's
means of attaining this end. The hidden basis of
this mutual self—interest is the equivalent form
of commodities.
In the act of exchange:
No one seizes hold of another's property by
force. Each divests himself of his property
voluntarily. But this is not all: individual
A serves the need of individual B by means of
the commodity a only in so far as and because
individual B serves the need of individual A
by means of the commodity b, and vice versa.
Each serves the other in order to serve himselfj
each makesjuse of the other, reciprocally, as
his means.
The interest of one is here the interest of all.
It is the material basis of the form of modern law.
The individual, in looking only to himself, satisfies
the interest of the other, and that other, looking
also only to himself, satisfies the interest of the
former. Individual interest in this way becomes at
the same time a general interest, and so far as this
exchange relation is developed socially it becomes
increasingly characteristic of the form of law.
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Commodity Production and Legal Relations
a) Generalised Commodity Production.
Where commodity production is generalised the
equivalent form of commodity ownership corresponds
with the form of law. As commodity owners, the mass
of people avail themselves of equal legal personality.
The condition of the form of modern law is therefore
the condition under which the mass of people become
owners and exchangers of commodities. Historically,
this condition is provided with the appearance of
free wage labour.
Wage labour is free in a two-fold sense, which,
according to Marx, means "that as a free man he can
dispose of his labour—power as his own commodity,
and that on the other hand he has no other commodity
for sale, is short of everything necessary for the
realisation of his labour—powerLet us take the
first sense first. Wage labour is free because and
so far as the ability to work is separated from the
person in whom that capacity inheres, that is to say,
because and so far as labour-poxver has become an
alienable commodity and figures, therefore, as a
relation of property, i.e. as a relation of person
to thing. In order that he may be able to sell, as
a commodity, his ability to work, the wage-worker must,
1. Marx, Capital Vol. *, p.166.
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according to Marx, "be the untrammelled owner of
1
his capacity for labour, i.e. of his person." This
additional "i.e. of his person" looks odd, for the
subject who owns appears, with this, as the thing
owned. Xf the property relation is to stand as
such, it must be a relation of person to thing, and
so in this case the thing, the commodity labour-power,
cannot be the person of the wage-labourer® Xf this
were not the case, as soon as the labourer sold his
commodity he would sell himself. He would revert
to becoming a slave. But the riddle is explained
by Marx when he adds:
He (the wage-worker) and the owner of money meet
in the market, and deal with each other on the
basis of equal rights, with this difference
alone, that one is the buyer, the other seller;
both, therefore, equal in the eyes of the law.
The continuance of this relation demands that
the owner of the labour-power should sell it
only for a definite period, for if he were to
sell it rump and stump, once for all, he would
be selling himself, converting himself from a
free man into a slave, from an owner of a
commodity into a commodity. He must constantly
look upon his labour-power as his own property,
his own commodity, and this he can do by placing
it at the disposal of the buyer temporarily,
for a definite period of time. By this means
he can aijoid renouncing his rights of ownership
over it."*
In this way the person of the labourer is only
apparently inalienable, in the sense that, as distinct
1 . Marx, Capital Vol. 1 , p. 165.
2. ibid. p. 165.
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from the condition of slavery, personality always
returns to him as the exclusive owner of it. But
this constant "return" must always be a constant
return from somewhere, that is to say, the worker's
personality, so far as we accept that it inheres in
the form of labour, only returns to him on condition
that it has been given up by him over and over again.
Personality, as active human labour, is alienated as
a commodity and consumed by another only to reappear
1
again in the hands of its original owner. The
inalienable right of personality in this way
expresses a condition of its being constantly
alienated in the repeated purchase and sale of the
commodity labour-power. But we must look at this
peculiar process a little closer.
As with all other commodities, the purchase and
sale of the commodity labour—power is an exchange of
equivalents. The labourer receives, in return for
his ability to work for a given duration, the value
of his labour-power, which, as with the value of all
1 . The truth of the assumption that personality
is the same thing as that which is repeatedly
alienated and appropriated as the commodity
labour—power, is expressed in the commonly—held
view that one only "comes alive" at the end of
the day's work, despite the tremendous effort
made on the part of the purchaser of labour-
power to get his full "poind of flesh". cf.
generally, Braverman, "Labour and Monopoly
Capital" .
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commodities, is expressed materially in the socially-
necessary labour embodied in the value given in
exchange, in this case the wage-goods that he acquires,
indirectly, as a result of having sold this labour-
power. In other words, the exchange-value of labour-
power, as with all other commodities, is, on average
(and here, as throughout, only properly abstract
average conditions are supposed), the socially
necessary labour embodied in its production.
Concretely, this value is represented in the wage-
goods which the labourer receives as a result of
having alienated his commodity labour-power in
exchange; goods, moreover, x^hich he consumes and
in so doing reproduces this latter commodity afresh,
ready for re—sale. This then is how the labourer's
commodity, the only one which he has to sell, always
comes back to him, namely, by exchanging it for the
subsistence which reproduces it. Consequently, it is
always his, the ability to work, this life—activity
inherent in the person of the labourer is his and
his alone, so long as he continually alienates it.
Labour-power is, in fact, all the active and
creative life-giving potential of man subjugated
under the commodity-form of property. The labourer's
commodity thus remains essentially himself, his person,
says Marx. Yet this seems quite contradictory. The
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commodity-forra is a form of property, and property
is a relation of person to thing. The property
relation as person owns person only comes about when
the person, as object, as thing owned, is a slave,
and in this case both subject and object are separate
entities. To say, therefore, that a person owns
himself, which is what ownership of the commodity
labour—power amounts to, is to say that he is a slave
to himself. This is really Marx's point; free wage
labour is voluntary slavery. Being possessed of his
capacity to work, the wage labourer is no slave;
he has the free disposition to do with it as he
wishes. On the other hand, the condition of this
right is that he has no productive means of his own
with which to actuate this labour-power. He must,
therefore, sell it — "Hobson's choice". But in
order that this process does not take place once
and once only, in order that this free and equal
transaction be repeat ed over and over again, it can
only apply for a fixed and definite duration; where¬
upon the wage labourer avoids selling himself into
slavery and the repeated alienation and appropriation
of labour-power furnishes the inalienable rights of
the individual over what is his.
¥
The purchase and sale of labour—power, taking
place as it does in the sphere of circulation or
exchange of commodities, is an exchange of equivalents.
This we have already mentioned. Moreover, being an
act of equal exchange, there is no question here of
the seller of labour-power being exploited by the
purchaser. However, this equivalent exchange
initiates a peculiar process of consumption. As
with the consumption of all use-values, the consumption
of labour—power is a private matter. What is really
purchased in the exchange of labour—power is not
merely something for which the equivalent is eagerly
provided, but the labourer's capacity, once purchased,
to create value way in excess of this outlay. What
is purchased here is not just the capacity of the
worker to re—create in the value of the product the
value of the materials initially laid out on the
given productive operation (raw materials, wear and
tear of machinery, tools etc. and labour—power itself,
i.e. wages) but on top of all this, a new value, a
surplus-value, which appears in the forms of profit,
interest and rent. This mode of appropriation of
surplus-labour, which begins with an apparently free
and equal transaction between buyer and seller of
labour—power, is the "hidden secret" of capitalist
production.
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The equivalent form of commodities in the
purchase and sale of labour-power and in the innumerable
contracts entailed in the purchase and sale of wage-
goods means that in law the worker is an equal with
his opposite number, the capitalist, from whom he is
paid for his capacity to augment the capital—value
initially invested in the productive process, and to
whom he pays, ceteris paribus, for the wage-goods
that he, the worker, has produced. The proper meaning
of bourgeois legal ideology is therefore that the
law does not without truth consider persons as equals,
for equals they are so far as they are merely
exchangers of commodities, but that in fixing its
gaze here, on the form of exchange alone, it
systematically prevents itself from considering the
less conspicuous relations underlying it. This
systematic blindness, we shall see, operates throughout
the entire spectrum of modern legal culture rather
like the doctrine of original sin in the application
of Christian dialectics to culture in general.
To recapitulate: the equivalent—form operates
in the exchange of labour—power just as it does with
all other commodities. In the exchange of labour-
power, the worker receives an equivalent via the
social labour embodied in the wage-goods that accrue
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to him as a result of this exchange and it is in
the consumption of these goods that nature restores
afresh that same labour-power ready to begin the
process again. Labour—power is thus cheapened, the
less social labour there is congealed in the relative
means of subsistence, a process which appears
concretely in a general attack upon working-class
living standards. The point here, however, is simply
that in the exchange of labour—power, equivalent is
exchanged for equivalent. Xt is therefore quite
erroneous to say that, under capitalist conditions,
the worker gets paid less than his value. Exploitation
does not take place, ceteris paribus, in the realm
of exchange. The worker does not get paid less than
his value, for his value is what he gets; rather,
he gets paid less than the value which he produces,
which, under capitalist conditions, includes not
merely his own value, the value of his labour—power,
and neither merely this alongside the value of raw
materials and worn-out equipment re-created in the
value of the product, but, in addition to this, also
embodied in the value of the product of the given
productive process, a surplus-value. It is all for
sake of this latter that the entire bouregois social
order clings to the narrow form of equality which
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initiates and terminates over and over again its
production. At the end of the second part of the
first volume of Capital, Marx, in a well-known
passage, comments on the realm of circulation,
where commodities change hands, thus:
This sphere. .within whose boundaries the sale
and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in
fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man.
There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property
and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer
and seller of a commodity, say of labour-
power, are constrained only by their free
will. They contract as free agents, and. the
agreement they come to, is but the form in
which they give legal expression to their
common will. Equality, because each enters
into relation with the other, as with a simple
owner of commodities, and they exchange
equivalent for equivalent. Property, because
each disposes only of what is his own. And
Bentham, because each looks only to himself.
The only force that brings them together and
puts them in relation with each other, is the
selfishness, the gain and private interests
of each. Each looks to himself only, and no
one troubles himself about the rest, and just
because they do so, do they all, in accordance
with the pre—established harmony of things, or
under the auspices of an all-shrewd providence,
work together to their mutual advantage, fo:p
the common weal and in the interest of all.
Freedom, Equality and Property (we can forget
about Bentham) are the hallmarks of modern legal
thought. These categories take on their various
guises in modern legal thought in direct response
1. Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p.172.
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to the generalised, form of commodity production and
exchange. Their legal appearance sub specie aeterni
is a result which comes about precisely on this
account, namely that they are grounded in the specific
historical form of generalised (capitalist) commodity
production and exchange.
The sphere of exchange, taken along independently
of the productive relations which it supposes, appears
as a domain of perfect equality and freedom. But
the equality here is really only the equality of
persons as owners of property in exchange, as exchangers
of commodities. This "juridical" moment of the exchange
act, however, becomes transformed into a manifold
of legal equality. For example, the latter has appeared
historically as "natural" equality in natural law theory,
and this, in turn has undergone a whole host of
metamorphoses under the auspices of the category of
"nature". In unreflective legal dogma, in private
law doctrine for instance, where no attempt is made
to bring anything else to light regarding the riddle
of equality, the equivalent form is inclined to rest
in its raw state, as merely the "juridical" moment
of property in exchange. But all these developments
of the equivalent form we shall coma to in detail later
on. All that we need to note here is that at the roots
~5^~
of the vast and complex modern legal structure there
lies a simple abstract "juridical" form which becomes
the legal persona which, as such, becomes fixed as
the eternal mystery of "one and all". This persona,
in essence, is merely the form of the individual in
his aspect as an exchanger of commodities. In this,
he becomes a veritable deus ex machina, a living
incarnation of property, equality and freedom,
because the basis of this process is the form of
property in exchange, the equivalent form of commodities,
which freely change hands in the market. In this,
he becomes, so far as all are commodity owners, the
equal of everyone else, because every act of exchange
is an exchange of equivalents, whether it is a prince,
a parson or a worker who brings his pound of silver to
market. Here property becomes, in law, personality,
because here, in the sphere of exchange, property
is personality. The commodity actuates its "will"
through its owner, who, as Marx says, "makes up
for the lack in the commodity of a sense of the
concrete by his oxvn five and more senses" . Consequently,
the norms of individual behaviour are here the same
as those of everyone else; each looks only to his own
selfish requirements and in so doing posits himself
as a means for the achievement of his (that other's)
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end. The individual interest becomes the common
interest, and, by the same route, this form of the
individual as a commodity owner, becomes the form
of modern law.
Exchange, however, supposes production for
exchange, and production for exchange supposes
definite relations of production. The act of exchange
is, in a sense, the most "obvious" of socio-economic
relations, taking place as it does on the surface
of society before the eyes of everyone. But the
very fact of the individual as an exchanger of
commodities supposes that he enters, first and
foremost, into relations of a rather different nature,
namely, as a producer, for without production there
would be no commodities at all let alone the mode in
which they change hands and circulate.
The conditions of generalised commodity relations
and thus also the universal-abstract character of law
which arises therefrom, are the relations of production.
These we have considered primarily in connection with
free wage labour. But the wage labourer, it is not
to be forgotten, is "free" in the double sense: firstly,
as a commodity—owner, an owner of labour-power, along
with all the rights which come with the legal
personality attached thereto, and secondly, "free"
Thomas More expressed the dawning of British
capitalism when he wrote in his "Utopia",
"These placid creatures (sheep), which
used to require so little food, have now
apparently developed a raging appetite, and
turned into man-eaters. Fields, houses, towns,
everything goes down their throats. To put
it more plainly, in those parts of the
Kingdom where the finest, and so the most
expensive wool is produced, the nobles and
gentlemen, not to mention several saintly
abbots, have grown, dissatisfied with the income
that their predecessors got out of their estates.
They're no longer content to lead lasy, comfort¬
able lives, which do no good to society — they
must actively do it harm, by enclosing all the
land they can for pasture.. .Each greedy individual
preys on his native land like a malignant growth,
absorbing field after field, and enclosing
thousands of acres with a single fence.
Result ~ hundreds of farmers are evicted.."
- Bk.1, p.46-7.
Xn Britain, this and similar forms of
expropriation continued throughout the 16th.
and 17th. centuries. Legislation on the one
hand fought vainly against these acts of
violent expropriation, and on the other hand
fought viciously against the consequences,
namely, the masses of expropriated peasants who
became beggars, vagabonds, thieves etc..
Legislation against these latter is striking
for its briital and horrific nature, entailing
such punishments (for having been robbed) as
branding, ear-cutting, whipping etc.. Later on,
as these expropriated masses began to be
increasingly made use of as factory fodder, the
resulting new-found sources of wealth, in turn
furnished appetites and resources for much
grander forms of expropriation, and by the end
of the eighteenth century, parliament becomes
directly involved in it with its Acts for the
enclosure of the Common lands. cf. Marx,
Capital Vol. 1 , p. 676—7.
In the face of this long historical process
wherein capitalist property relations come into
the world "dripping from head to foot, from
every pore, with blood and dirt," Blackstone's
legal casuistry is amusing. He writes: "..there
are very few that will give themselves the
trouble to consider the origin and foundation
of this right (to property) . Pleased as we are
with the possession, we seem afraid to look back
to the means by which it was acquired, as if
fearful of some defect in our title..." He
continues boldly, "These inquiries (into the
means by which the right to property is acquired),
it must be owned, would be useless and even
troublesome in common life. It is well if the
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in the sense of being deprived of all the means of
actuating for himself the use-value of his commodity.
Wage-labour thus expresses a condition in which the
means of production are concentrated in the hands of
a class other than itself, namely, a capitalist class
of owners. Although Shylock's claim may not be
exactly true, and certainly few would want to admit
it in his own case, that "You take my life when you
do take the means whereby I live", it is clear that
the wage—labourer, with no means of actuating his
ability to work, is compelled to meet the owner of
those means in the market and do business with him;
and it is clear moreover, as a glance at the history
books shows, that these means have, historically,
been taken from him. In Britain, for example, this
latter process of the expropriation of the means
of production from the mass of direct producers, begins
in the late 15th century with the enclosures of sheep-
pastures and continues, in one form and another, on an
1
increasingly social scale as capital develops. This
(note 1 cont..)
mass of mankind will obey the laws when made,
without scrutinising too nicely into the reasons
for making them." - Commentaries etc., Vol. 2, p.1.
For those not engaged in "common life", sufficiently
intellegent to understand this mystery, Blackstone's
answer begins: "In the beginning of the world, we
are informed by holy writ, the all-bountiful Creator
gave to man 'dominion over all the earth; and over
the fish of the sea..' ..." etc. etc. And modern
property rights arise post hoc ergo propter hoc.
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bloody history' of the separation of labour from the
means of production is the secret history of the
development of modem law.
The historical separation of labour from the
means of production is the basis of free wage-labour.
The result is that the labourer must sell, as a
commodity, his ability to work to his opposite number
in the market. This latter character also figures
here as a commodity owner and so both are considered
as equal personalities so far as the law is considered.
But the basis of this transaction is just the opposite
of a relation of equality; its basis is the fundamental
inequality regarding ownership of the means of production.
The basis of this transaction, the condition compelling
the labourer to do business in the market with his
opposite number, is that the former has no other means
of actuating his ability to work and therefore must
sell this ability to the latter in whose hands these
means are concentrated. However, it is precisely on
account of this basic inequality that labour becomes
subsumed under the commodity-form of property, and
therefore on this very same account that the mass of
persons acquire equal legal personality. Property,
as always, is the basis of legal personality, and just
as the "capacity to be human" was never the issue so
far as Roman legal personality was concerned, neither
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is it the case with bourgeois law. The greatest and
most significant modern legal development bearing
forceful testimony to this is the development of
corporate personality, for the whole point of a
corporation as a "person" is that it can thereby
own property independently of its constituent members.
It is only in modern law that equal
legal personality applies to the mass of persons,
and this arises directly as a result of generalised
commodity relations. Thus it is only here that the
equivalent form of commodity relations furnishes
the basis of legal abstraction and generates the
general "subject of rights" enabling the development
of abstract patterns of legal reasoning characteristic
of specifically modern law. On the other hand, it is
nonetheless true that, where we find in earlier times
legal thought strongly resembling modem legal
abstraction, we find, also, the development of
cojomodity relations in some degree of relative
sophistication. There are, however, important
differences and it is instructive to take note of
them .
b) Petty Commodity Production.
Commodity relations, wherever they have become
developed on. a relatively elaborate social scale,
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bring with them as a general rule a corresponding
development of legal relations rudely approximate
to their fully developed modern form. Nowhere is
this more apparent them in the case of Roman law,
which gets its highly significant "modern" connections
from the fact of a highly developed system of commodity
production and exchange politically centered upon
Rome and spread throughout the great Empire. Much
earlier still, ancient trading nations like the
Babylonians or the Phoenicians have, for similar
reasons, been noted by legal historians for the rude
"modern" character of their law. But let us stay
with the classic example of Rome.
Roman commodity production is developed within
the fetters of slavery. Consequently, the kinds of
legal developments which arose alongside the growth
of production and trade throughout the Empire reflect
this condition. The slave, even within the "law of
nations", which is the most important in this connection,
cannot have legal personality and therefore the Romans
knew nothing of a general right-bearing unit. Slavery,
as a fetter upon the development of commodity production
and exchange, is correspondingly a fetter upon the
development of legal abstraction. But let us look
at these connections in more detail.
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One of the highest achievements of Roman civili¬
sation, it is well-known, was its law. This law
attains its most comprehensive statement in
Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis. What modern
jurists and legal historians have scarcely paid any
attention to, however, is that the works of Justinian
appear at a time when the Roman Empire was on the
verge of collapse - a coincidence which is not
accidental. The rational simplicity of the Corpus
Juris reflects the material erosion of an irrational
system upon which the imperial edifice was grounded.
The finite limits to Roman legal abstraction are
reached at a time when commodity production and
exchange reaches its limits under the irrational
fetters of slavery.
The symptoms of these connections are apparent
in Justinian's legal writings. Here is an example.
In the first title of hi_s Institutes, we observe a
very important opposition, an opposition which,
in its modern connections, we shall devote some
time to in the next chapter, namely, the opposition
between public and private law. For Justinian:
The study of law consists of two branches, law
public, and law private. The former relates to
the welfare of the Roman State; the latter to
the advantage of the individual citizen. Of
private/
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private law then we may say that it is of
three-fold origin, being collected from the
precepts of nature, from those of the law of
nations, or from those of the civil law of
Rome •
To properly understand the historical limitations
operating upon Roman legal abstraction, it is
important to get a clear sense of the character
of the opposition which is reflected here. Private
law and public law figure here as an opposition of
interests: on the one hand, the "welfare of the
Roman State"; on the other hand, "the advantage
of the individual citizen". As an Emperor, as
the figurehead representing the interests of the
Roman state, Justinian shows a keen awareness of
that which opposes his imperial majesty. This
"opposition" appears here as private law, and a
"politically opportune" mode of dealing with it
is, first and foremost, to give it a divided origin
- for unity is strength. Thus, private law has a
"three-fold" origin, sundered into the "law of
nations" (jus gentium), the "precepts of nature"
and the civil law of Rome. These three are, however,
all "to the advantage of the individual citizen".
More specifically, they are all to the advantage of
a developing form of individuality. Xt is a form of
individuality which develops alongside the growth of
1 . Justinian, Institutes, Bk.1 , title 1 .
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comraerce and trade. Thus, "the law of nations...is
1
the source of almost all contracts," and was, in
reality, fast becoming distinguished from the civil
law of Rome merely as a genus is distinguished from a
particular species of it. The "precepts of nature",
on the other hand, is a piece of early Christian
rhetoric, or, to be fair, corrupted Christian rhetoric,
having become transformed from the language of the
oppressed into the language of the powerful. But
this does not concern us here.
The important question which transpires from all
this is, why is this form of individuality, which is
typified in the persona of the jus gentium, opposed
to the interests of the Roman state? This form of
individuality is in fact the Roman equivalent of the
modern persona which springs up alongside the develop¬
ment of commodity relations. The question therefore
is the same as that which asks, why is the development
of production and trade a threat to the Roman state?
And the answer is that such development, by the time of
Justinian, is rationally opposed to the slave system
upon which it is based. Slavery is both the foundation
of the Roman imperium and the fetter upon the rational
1. ibid., Bk.1, title 2.
Slaves in Roman Society were incapable of
lawful marriage. They were considered on
rare occasions, and most contradictorily,
as persons for the practical purpose of
assigning liability in certain criminal
matters. In the event of delictual
liability only the slave's owner could
be legally responsible.
"In commerce slaves were important.
In the classical age free hired service
was not common: most of the work now done
by clerks and servants (i) was done by
slaves. Though they could have no property,
it was customary from early times to en¬
trust them with a fund, ca3.1ed peculium,
sometimes large, in connection with which
slaves appear, in the Empire, almost as
independent businessmen, contracting with
their owners and others as if free. As
they could neither sue nor be sued, the
master intervened if any question of
enforcement arose. As a slave's acquisitions
were his master's, the latter could bring
any necessary actions, but obligations
contracted by the slave did not bind the
owner at civil law, and a man would not
readily contract with a slave, if he had
to rely upon his naturalis o'oligatio, useless
while he was a slave, and having little
effect if he was freed. The praetor
therefore facilitated the employment of
slaves din trade by giving actions against
the master imposing a liability, varying
with circumstances, of which the actio de
peculio was the most important." - Buckland,
Roman Law, p.65.
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development of the exchange economy, which, as we
mentioned earlier, requires the equalisation of all
forms of human labour. The appearance in the "law
of nations" of an equivalent form of individuality
reflects the increasing instability of the system
of slavery which stands nakedly opposed to it. The
dualism which Justinian reflected as law public and
law private is therefore in essence the contradiction
between the institution of slavery on the one hand,
and the further development of the exchange economy
on the other.
Slavery is the key to the form of Roman law.
The slave cannot be included in any category of
legal personality J But for our purposes there is
only one persona which needs to be borne in mind,
and it is that which arises juris gentium, with
the law which develops alongside petty commodity
production and exchange within the Roman empire. It
is this legal form which ultimately reduces to a mere
question of pride the distinctions attached to the
special classes of Roman citizenship and therewith
the final significance of Rome itself. But what is
especially important is that it is this Roman legal
form in particular which approximates most nearly to
the basic form of modern law. With this, therefore,
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the significance of the different relations
of production under which the commodity—form is
developed can be most clearly comprehended in their
connection with law.
Slavery was juris gentium, and it is this which
makes the latter completely and utterly distinct
from the form of bourgeois law. Basically, the
slave is not a person in law because he cannot
own property, and he cannot own property because
he is, himself, property, Ownership is a relation
of person to thing, whereas, morality apart, the
slave is merely a thing, or rather, a contradictory
person—thing, an instrumenturn vocale.
Just as property ownership provides the secret
of legal personality in modern law, so is it the
case in Roman law. The form of property ownership,
however, is quite different and, consequently, so is
the form of law. In a roundabout way, the jurist,
Savigny, gets to posing the essential questions in
the matter of slavery and Roman law. He says,
1. We shall see later on the kinds of contradictions
which arise for those historians and others who
think otherwise, who think, in other words,
that the Roman form provides us with the "origins"
of the modern form.
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"Xn order to determine what the Romans actually
admitted in regard to this matter (the rights and
obligations of the slave in law) it is necessary
to distinguish two principal questions» Could the
slave acquire credits? Could he contract debts?
Or, what is the same thing, could he become a
1
creditor or a debtor?" The economic relation,
Savigny realises, is the secret of the juridical
relation. The slave could neither owe nor be owed
anything because he could not own anything. Whatever
he advanced was his master's and whatever he received
was his master's also.
1. Savigny, Jural Relations, p.302. He arrives
at these questions in the following way:
"When a Roman slave undertook such acts,
from which obligations would have arisen in
the case of freemen, their efficacity might
come into question under wholly different
circumstances: during the condition of
slavery and after emancipation. During the
condition of slavery, a civilis obligatio was
clearly impossible, since the slave could
not appear before a court, either as a claimant
or a defendant, though a naturalis obligatio
was din this condition certainly conceivable.
After emancipation, on the other hand, a
civilis obligatio, just as well as a naturalis
obligatio, was conceivable." — ibid.
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The persona juris gentium was, therefore, a
status category meaning, essentially, "not-slave",
not of the mass. Consequently, it is different in
both form and content from the modem commodity
right-bearing unit. The form of the latter is
general and subsumes the mass of persons and
therefore becomes the very incarnation of the
principle of human equality, whereas in the case
of the former, it is still particular and still
exists alongside a specifically Roman mode of legal
regulation.
Of course, none of this is to say that Roman
law ignored the slave; he was, after all, property;
and Savigny makes another most important "economic"
observation on the issue of slavery in Roman law
when he writes:
But as in consequence of the numerous conquests
of war the number of slaves increased beyond
all measure, and people were taught by a bloody
experience hox* fraught with danger was a wholly
cruel treatment of those who, by their numbers,
had become a powerful class. So it came
gradually to be held as a firmly established
rule, that a cruel master could not only be
compelled to sell his maltreated slaves, but
could also be criminally punished.
1. Savigny, ibid., p.24-5.
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As the slave system matxired within the Empire,
"concessions" to the producers of wealth appear
just as they did when capital similarly made its
great moves towards maturity during the 19th century.,
In the latter case, however, it is a class of free
wage-labourers "becoming a powerful class", which,
for reasons we shall come to» makes the form of
"legal" intervention here very different.
The slave was ignored in Roman law as a legal
subject, and this imposed very definite limitations
upon Roman legal abstraction. Hegel had this in
mind 'when he wrote in his Philosophy of Right,
But the science of positive law at least
cannot be very intimately concerned with
definitions since it begins in the first
place by stating what is legal, i.e. what
the particular legal provisions are, and for
this reason the warning must be given: omnis
definitio in jure civile periculosa. In
fact, the more disconnected and inherently
contradictory are the provisions giving
determinate character to a right, the less
are any definitions in this field possible,
for definitions should be stated in universal
terms, while to use these immediately exposes
in all its nakedness what contradicts them.
Hegel had, especially, Roman law in mind here, where
there could not possibly be a definition of "man", as
he puts it, since "slave" could not be brought under
it. Now Hirst and Hindess in their book, Pre—Capitali
1. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p.l4—15 •
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Modes of Production, say of Hegel's view of Roman
law that it is a function of his "essentially
humanist philosophy: he takes for a failing what
1
is most advanced in this legal form," These notions
of "failure" and "advance" are conditional upon
each other, and Hegel certainly did not view them
as one-sidedly as these authors make out. For
Hegel, as the above quotation makes clear, the
"failure" (in this instance the fact of slavery)
is the limit to the "advance" (the degree of
universality embodied in Roman legal definition),
Hegel had grasped the dialectical relation between
the two; the "failure" here reproduces itself in
another form as an "advance". True, Hegel only got
at this relationship in a general and idealistic
fashion, but Hirst and Hindess display their own
more complete one-sidedness when they say:
Roman law provides the basis for an abstract
concept of legal personality; a personality
which exists in the sphere of law alone and
which is attributable to non-human entities,
corporations etc.
This is utterly erroneous, for were it the case that
Roman legal personality could be "attributable to non—




human entities", there would have been no trouble
in granting it to the slave. In any case, "Roman
law provides the basis...of legal personality" is
nothing more than a variation on the tautology
"law is the basis of law". Nor is this conceit
assisted any with the added contradictory assertion
that, "this development of Roman law is a function
of post-Roman analytic jurisprudence." This is an
absolute impossibility. The mistake of making
Roman law, not—Roman law (i.e. "post-Roman" or, what
is generally intended, modern bourgeois law) is
shared, but with generally more subtlety, by most
writers on the subject. The basis of this error
rests in a failure to distinguish the forms of petty
and generalised commodity production and, consequently,
the different forms of legal abstraction arising
therefrom. But we shall elucidate this error later
on when we come to discuss the idea of the "reception"
of Roman law.
In view of the fact that tautologies abound in this
area, we may take the liberty of saying here that Roman
law is Roman law. And what makes it Roman is the slave
1. ibid.
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system which it reflects. It reflects the latter,
for the most part, by being silent; the slave is
not a legal person and therefore it does not
address itself to him. But before ever it begins:
"the first division is into free men and slaves"J
1. Justinian, Institutes, Bk.1, title 3.
Part I
Ch. 3- Equivalent Form and Legal Form.
a. Private Law and the "Persona".
b . The Private/Public Dualism within
the Legal Form.
c. "Public" Law: The Legal Form and
State Power.
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Equivalent Form and Legal Form
(1 ) Private Law and the 'Person'
Xt is precisely the appearance in persons of
the equivalent form of commodities (viz. as owners
of property in exchange), that gives modern legal
abstraction its actual (as distinct from its
essential) character. Historically, this is clearly
ever more the case, the more developed and generalised
has become commodity production i.e. production for
exchange. This appearance, this "juridical" moment
arises directly out of the act of exchange itself
which, as such, is only concerned with individuals
in their capacity as mere exchangers of commodities.
However, in the actual juridical view of things
this slight qualification, that the equivalent form
merely concerns individuals in their singular
capacity as exchangers, is overlooked. In this way
the equivalent form gets transformed, in a fetishised
1
fashion, into a form of equivalence between persons
1. Fetish, as "(i)nanimate object worshipped by
primitive peoples for its supposed inherent
magical powers or as being inhabited by a spirit"
(Concise Oxford Dictionary), is, of course,
used metaphorically here, but not, as we shall
see again and again, without justification.
Compare Marx, Capital Vol. 1, on "The Fetishism
of Commodities and the secret thereof".
qua persons, quite oblivious to its essential and
strictly limited basis in the mere exchange relatione
Once this distinction is blurred, all manner of
difficulties and contradictions arise, and this,
empirically, becomes the life-blood of modern
1egal thought.
The clarity of the connection between the
equivalent form of commodities and legal abstraction
is most apparent in private law. The equivalent
form of commodities posits the equality of persons
as abstract individuals engaged in the act of
exchange. The form of the individual as a mere
exchanger supplies private law (as well as legal
abstraction generally) with its most fundamental
category, a category upon which the specifically
legal edifice is built — the legal person. The
legal person is, in essence, the form of the
individual as an exchanger of commodities. However,
the legal form doesn't appear in this way in actual
legal doctrine.
The legal person or abstract legal subject, to
which we shall occasionally refer as simply the
"legal form", is distinct from what we have
previously referred to as the "juridical" moment in
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the exchange of equivalents. It is distinct from
the latter on this account: the "juridical" moment
implicit in the exchange act has a strictly limited
nature by way of its implicitness in the exchange
relation alone, whereas the legal form, in its
various developments, deliberately repulses this
connection. The "juridical" moment refers,
specifically, to the form of the individual in his
capacity as an exchanger of commodities, in his
essential capacity as an equal with others. The
legal form, on the ether hand, is this "juridical"
form unconscious, so to speak, of its precise
exchange connection. In other words, the legal form
becomes the actual or empirical form of the "juridical"
%
moment in the sphere of law. The two are closest
together in private law. Private law displays, as
a relatively undisguised prototype of the legal form,
its essential inner connections with the equivalent
form of commodities. Let us now illustrate this.
Although the essence of the legal form is
contained in the form of the individual as an
exchanger of commodities (and the productive relations
therein supposed), it does not appear as such —
especially when it is stretched and strained, in
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legal theory, to cover such things as the state and
law itself. We shall come to this later. To
recapitulate, the clarity of the legal form's inner
connections with commodity exchange appeal's, first
and foremost, in private law thinking. Here, the
legal form appears most clearly as the "juridical"
moment implicit in the exchange of equivalents.
This "juridical" moment which is contained in the
abstract legal subject of private law is nothing
more than the individual considered in his aspect
as an exchanger of commodities, which in turn
supposes, in its abstract generality, a specific
social development of productive forces under
definite, historically evolved property relations.
These particular property relations, moreover, are
systematically reduced to indifference at the level
of mere exchange of goods. This much we are already
familiar with. However, to return to the matter
under discussion, the legal form, which has to do
with the actual appearance of law, is not exactly
the same as the "juridical" form, the form of the
individual as a mere exchanger of commodities. Thus,
in private law the strictly limited form of equivalen
which is consciously acknowledged in the conception
of the "juridical" form, appears dislocated from its
exchange basis and is posited, in some degree, in
persons per se.
Pashukanis, Theory of Law etc., p.136.
(Allgemeine Rechtslehre, p. 5^+)« I will
take the opportunity here to point out
that although references are made, here and
elsewhere, to the Babb and Hazard trans¬
lation of Pashukanis' work, I have taken
the liberty on a number of occasions to
render the sense more in accord with the
superior translation into German by Hajos.
The English translation consistently makes
a number of jarring literal transpositions
from the Russian which are utterly inconsist¬
ent with normal usage in the context of the
subject matter to which they refer, e.g.
'barter' instead of exchange, 'worker-
strength' instead of labour-power, and so
forth. Trivial though this may seem, the
effect is far from trivial since it makes
a number of passages quite at odds with
their intended meaning. Pashukanis' work
in the "Theory of Law and Marxism" is very
rigorous (which is not the case, incidentally,
in that other essay which appears in the
Babb and Hazard edition, which has an
entirely different — indeed, tragic —
character to it) and every term here
conveys a precise meaning. Thus, when he
speaks of exchange, he means this in the
context of a definite stage in the
development of production for exchange.
To render this as 'barter' is quite out
of place, since 'barter' applies to a form
of exchange where the equivalent form does
not exist, that is, where exchange in its
modern connection with generalised commodity
production, the form of law etc. has
absolutely nothing to do with the matter.
The complexity of the relations with
which Pashukanis deals, moreover, makes
this generally inattentive translation
doubly unfortunate.
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The more abstract legal thought becomes, the
greater this dislocation appears and, consequently,
the more appropriate becomes the "fetish" metaphor
noted earlier. Accordingly, private law has always
appeared relatively sound in its detailed internal
systematisation ~ precisely because its categories
are nearer to their essential basis. In this
connection, Pashukanis wrote:
In reality, it is precisely in the field of
private law relationships that the most solid
kernel of juristic haziness, if the expression
is admissible, is to be found. It is in the
concrete personality of the egoistic managing
subject - the property owner, the bearer of
private interests - that a legal subject such
as the "persona" finds complete and adequate
embodiment. It is specifically in private law
that legal thinking moves with the greatest
freedom and confidence, where conceptions take
on the most complete and symmetrical form...
It is specifically in private law that the
a priori premises of legal thinking are clothed
with the flesh and blood of two contending
parties, defending "their right" ~ vindicta
in hand ...The dogma of private law is neither
more nor less than an endless chain of
considerations for and against imaginary claims
and potential suits. Unseen behind every
paragraph of systematic advice stands the
abstract client ready to use the corresponding
propositions as professional advice.
In private law the equivalent form appears as
something arising din connection with persons per se.
In abstract legal theory, which we shall come to
later on, these "persons per se" become abstracted
into "pure" categories of will. But it is private
law thinking which sustains the greater sense of the
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concrete, precisely because, as Pashukanis remarks,
the legal form is here "clothed with the flesh and
blood of two contending parties"«
Stripped of all its specific determinations,
the legal form merges with the "juridical" moment
of the exchange act — the "personification" of the
commodity. in reality, however, this latter is
automatically mediated because this deus ex machine
necessarily appears as a real person. This
mediation posits the substantive character of private
law. The legal historian, Maitland, expresses a
similar view when he says:
"Sometimes its neighbours will have cause to
complain of its legal impersonality. They
will have been thinking of it as a responsible
right—and-duty-bearing unit, while at the
tough of law it becomes a mere many, and a
practically, if not theoretically, irresponsible
many" .
In the actual act of exchange, the individual
doesn't merely appear as an exchanger of commodities,
but in the concrete form of an individual per se,
1. Maitland, F.W. "Moral Personality and Legal
Personality", in Selected Essays p. 232.
Maitland, however, skirts elegantly round the
inelegant compound adjective, viz the right—
and-duty-bearing unit, recognising merely
that on this phenomenon, "theorising, of course,
there has been." p. 23^ ibid.
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even though it is just in the former capacity that
he is the equal of his opposite number and hence,
the bearer of the legal form. Personality, outside
its aspect as the "will" of the commodity within the
boundaries of the sphere of exchange, is the essence
of human differences — "no two people are alike",
runs the common phrase. So it is that "human"
differences constantly seek reconciliation with the
equivalent form which grows up behind their backs,
as it were, which arises independently and between
them as possessors of commodities in exchange.
Individuality, in the actual business of exchange,
appearing here necessarily as concrete individuality
along with all the many—sided connections thus
implied, inevitably brings with it differences which
seek reconciliation with the abstract sameness
implicit in exchange and supposed by the legal form.
We may say, following Hegel, that the unity of
identity and difference here provides the ground
1
of private lax*.
The legal form - here, the abstract legal
subject of private law - only arises because and in
so far as it can reflect a real equivalence between
1. Compare Hegel, Logic, pps. 183-198.
This is the true sense in which the legal
world turns on money. Talk about commerc¬
ially oriented lawyers, phrases of the kind,
"money buys justice" and so forth, are all
very well, but none of this distinguishes
law in relation to money from that of any
other occupation which must compete to make
a living. Needless to add, "criticism" of
law from this sort of standpoint is quite
commonplace. Often self—styled as "critical",
"Marxist", "Radical" etc., much of this
popular debunking of the legal profession and
law must be considered as little more than
invective against something which is little
understood. Legal theorists and judges
themselves, of course, have fared little
better with the hidden connections between
money and the form of law. Savigny has the
distinction of being a legal theorist who
displayed at the same time a penetrating
insight into the nature of money; for, he
says: "In the first place money appears
in the function of a mere instrument for
measuring the value of individual parts of
wealth. As regards this function, money
stands on the same basis as other instruments
of measurement...But money also appears in a
second and higher function, viz. it embraces
the value itself which is measured by it, and
thus represents the value of all other items
of wealth ...(M)oney thus appears to be an
abstract means to dissolve all property into
mere quantities." Obligationenrecht, cited,
Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money, p.24.
Such conclusions as these mark Savigny as
one of the most distinguished jurists of
modern times. The treatment of money by
other, less notable legal figures, is
often quite comical. Here, for instance, is
a view of the English legal mind in this
connection; "I take it that if a tort had
been commited in England before England went
off the gold standard, the plaintiffs could
not say: • We insist,...on being paid the
value of the gold standard pound at the time
of the commission of the tort.' A pound
in England is a pound whatever its inter¬
national value." Scrutton L.J., cited in
Mann's book, pps. 77-8 ibid. Rule Britannia i
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persons. And that real equivalence is certainly
not a matter for the exclusive attention of meta¬
physics; it inheres neither in a "natural" scheme
of things nor in an ether of "pure reason", but in
the commensurable form of commodities and money,, the
things reciprocally alienated and appropriated by
their possessors in the relation of exchange. The
legal form embodies the equivalence of persons only
because and in so far as they are equated with one
another specifically as possessors of commodities
1
and the money which circulates them. This, moreover,
is the indicium of modern law. Hence, the legal
form as abstract personality, unlike, for instance,
the legal form of feudal society where every right
is dependent upon a particular "status", is common
to the mass of people — and it has this distinction
precisely because it arises alongside the generalisation
throughout society of commodity production, which is,
absolutely, production for exchange.
To return to the matter of private law, we have
said that the actual personality of the individual
is not merely that he is an exchanger of commodities,
a "juridical" moment in the exchange act - he is a
real person with an occupation, intelligence, character
etc. We have said, furthermore, that it is in the
-79-
reconciliation which is sought between such factors
and the abstract legal form (in its naked connection,
its absolutely essential connection, with the
"juridical" form of the individual as an exchanger)
that the substantive side of private law attains
its detailed classificatory content. On the whole,
however, the essential strength of the legal form,
that is, its inner connection with the "juridical"
form, is quite sufficient for the mass of daily
contractual exchanges. In this, the legal form
subsists in its essential connection as the
"juridical" form of the subject in the exchange
act. It is precisely this phenomenon which has
given rise to the modern stress upon the "customary"
basis of law (pioneered by Savigny) and, what is
but an inverted reflection of this, notions about
the "gapless" quality of modern legal thought
(Stammler, Weber). The whole point is that the
equivalent form already subsists in the exchange
of commodities, the "juridical" form is here implicit,
before the legal form articulates itself upon it,
before it acknowledges it in its characteristically
dislocated modes.
The characteristic dislocation of the legal form
in private law, that is, its movement away from its
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essential "juridical" connection, comes when this
normally adequate basis of formal legal acknowledge¬
ment (i.e. where the legal form and the "juridical"
form are practically one), is observed in the breach.
Such a moment corresponds with the reconciliation
which is sought between "concrete" individuality
(difference) and the abstract equivalence of
individuals (identity) in the exchange x^elation,
whence the form of the legal persona initially
springs. The vital point to be grasped here is
that the legal form can never eradicate the limits
provided by the form of the individual in the
exchange relation. The private law development of
the legal persona, its most fundamental category
which is essentially though not actually the latter
(i.e. the form of the individual in the exchange
relation, the "juridical" form) can never get beyond
it, it is always presupposed. Thus, "concrete"
individuality may only be reconciled with the
abstract form because and in so far as it is a
bearer of it. In other words, if there is no legal
persona, there can be no further development of
legal relations. Xn the legal view of tilings, of
course, this is generally recognised simply by
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being presupposed. This is the sense in which
Pashukanis, quoted earlier, remarks, "Unseen behind
every paragraph of systematic advice stands the
abstract client...etc." Without the "abstract client",
1 . The law doesn't always recognise this by taking
it for granted. Following the practice of legal
scholarship, we may give the following example
of explicit recognition: In New'oorae v. Sensolid
Ltd. (1954) 1 Q.B.45; (1953) 1 All E.R., a
contract was made by "Leopold Newborne Ltd."
with the defendants for the supply of certain
goods. Subsequent to the sale, the defendants
refused to accept delivery of the goods. An
action was commenced for damages arising from
breach of contract, upon which the plaintiff's
solicitors discovered that the company had not
been registered at the time of the contract.
They therefore took steps to substitute
Newborne himself (the promoter of the company)
as the plaintiff. He had, however, signed the
original contractual letter with the company's
name, merely adding his own signature to
authenticate it. The defendants argued that
they had made the agreement with the company,
not with Mr. Newborne, and that since the
company had no legal existence at that time,
there was no contract; hence, no breach of
contract. The action was, accordingly,
dismissed. Judges, of course, are not immune
from giving contradictory judgements — which
makes examples of this kind of dubious
scientific merit. Generally, however, the
rule, "no legal persona, no legal relations",
is essentially implicit in law; its explicit—
ness not being beyond the reflective capacity
of legal thought itself - as the example shows.
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howaver, there could be no "systematic advice",
even though from the legal standpoint it is this
latter, the detailed classification and so forth
which seems all—important. Yet it is clear that
it is the abstract persona and the historical
connections in which it arises and assumes its
social significance are all-important for a full
sind proper comprehension of the nature of law*
Norms about the "reasonable" behaviour of
parties in typically recurrent "fact situations",
as Weber would put it, are already put forward for
the substantive working—out of private law by virtue
of the fact that the form of the individual in the
exchange relation necessarily appears as a real
person. The potential for intellectual classific¬
ation and articulation of private law dogma is thus
set by the general state of development of commodity
production and exchange, since it is this latter
which develops socially this form of the individual.
"In the development of legal categories",
Pashukanis wrote,
the capacity to perfect exchange arrangements
appears merely as one of the concrete
manifestations of the general attribute of
legal capacity and capacity to act.
Historically, however, it is specifically
the/
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the exchange arrangement which furnished the
idea of a subject as the abstract bearer of
all possible legal claims. It is only under
conditions of developed commodity production
and exchange that the abstract legal form is
generated - that is to say, it is only there
that the capacity to have a right in general
is distinguished from specific legal claims.
It is only the constant transfer of rights
taking pLace in the market which creates the
idea of an immobile bearer of those rights.
In the market the obligee is himself obligated
at the same time: he is ceasing every moment
to be in the position of the party demandant,
and is becoming a party obligated. The
possibility of being abstracted from the
specific differences between subjects of
rights and of bringing them within a single
generic concept is thus created.
Private law doctrine is really a proto-type of
the entire modern legal edifice, as Pashukanis says.
Private law thinking, and especially that major
branch of it which is known as contract, displays
in a relatively clear fashion its inner connections
with the equivalent form of persons in their aspect
as exchangers of commodities, since here the legal
form is considered directly in relation to the
sphere of exchange, out of xrfiich it first arises.
It is, for this very reason, no accident that private
law has developed its various ideas and patterns of
systematic advice in the most coherent or, rather,
1. Pashukanis, Theory of Law etc., p.167.
(Allgemeine Rechtslehre, p.96).
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least contradictory fashion as compared with other
branches of modern legal thinking; and for this
reason, as Pashukanis puts it, "it is precisely in
the field of private law relationships that the most
solid kernel of juristic haziness..is to be found".
However, the equivalent form provides not merely
the legal form as private law, but, of course, the
legal form as such i.e. in all its guises.
In the varieties of "public" legal thought, in
abstract legal theory, the self-same subject of the
exchange act who appeared as the persona of private
law now appears as an abstract Ego accentuated in
a "public" aspect. By the same token in which the
private figure becomes public in private law (i.e.
as law), the public figure, the state,becomes private
in legal theorising thereupon. In abstract legal
theory the "public" sphere is conceived under the
form of a subject just as in private law, the
"private" sphere was conceived under a "public",
that is, shared or common form. Not surprisingly
then, in abstract legal theory, we find again and
again the "public" sphere considered as a matter
of will, precisely because it is considered under a
form which is equally "private".
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Before we move on, it is useful to recapitulate
the following three points:
Firstly, the legal form has been taken, first
and foremost, in its least mystified connection;
namely, as it arises directly from the form of the
individual in the exchange of commodities, as the
most immediate and formal acknowledgement of the
"juridical" moment implicit in the exchange of
equivalents. We may, with guarded qualification,
conceive of this simple legal form as appearing
at the moment when the "juridical" form in the
exchange of equivalents is acknowledged by a
competent authority outside the direct process
of exchange.
Secondly, and herein lies the important
qualification, this legal form immediately appears
to be something present in all societies where
production for exchange has been developed with
some degree of sophistication. Consequently, as we
shall see, some of the most historically conscientious
observers are led to the belief that the form of
bourgeois law is historically universal. But this
belief arises merely from the commodity-connection,
that is, the fact that older societies also had
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production for exchange. This commodity—connection
we shall have a chance to discuss further in part 3«
Here we may just note that the commodity-form cannot
be torn from its ground, cannot be divorced from
the productive relations which produce it in its
full social significance. Just as the generalised
form of right is not to be considered as right in
general; nor are generalised commodity relations
to be conflicted with commodity relations in general.
The ancient Phoenicians were a great trading people,
they had developed production for exchange and,
indeed, certain legal forms appropriate to this
ancient development of productive forces under
slavery. But that is all; in ancient Phoenician
law the modern legal form is not even "there" in
a rudimentary and stunted capacity since the modern
form supposes a society based on capital and free
wage labour. Hence, even the ancient forms appropriate
to commodity exchange.can, by no stretch of the
imagination, be connected with bourgeois law. In
earlier societies commodity-legal forms in any case
only existed alongside and in combination with
other more dominant modes of legal regulation. Only
in modern bourgeois society is the equivalent form
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embodied in commodity exchange the dominant indicium
of law, because only here is society completely
dominated by a mode of production geared towards
production for exchange on an ever increasing scale.
Xt is only with reference to specifically modern
society, therefore, that we may speak alone of the
equivalent form of commodities in connection with
the form of law.
Thirdly, as the form of law, the form of the
individual as an exchanger of commodities is the
dominant relation behind all modern legal discourse,
notwithstanding its abstract and scholarly guises.
The principal connection between the naked legal form
and the dispersion which it achieves over a massive
empirical terrain, we have said, is one of "dislocation'*,
that is, a process in which the essential form of
equivalence is more or less shifted from view
depending upon the subject mater through which it is
mediated. Some of the "classical" highways and
byways upon which this process of mediation has
travelled (and attained hundreds of years of mileage)
we shall come to in part II.
But first, there are some rather important
questions, which have so far been left begging, to
be dealt with now.
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(2) The private/public dualism within the
legal form
The principal source of the confusion in modern
legal thinking which accentuates one-sidedly first
the "private" aspect of the legal form and then, in
another breath, its "public" aspect, is that the
legal form is, at the same time, both "private" and
"public". In private law, we have seen, the isolated
private individual appears as the bearer of the legal
form, which, however, as law, must be also "public".
In this process it is possible to conceives a
private bearer of a public right, a private bearer
of a private right, a public bearer of a private
right and a public bearer of a public right. With
its characteristic lack of dialectic, modern legal
thinking has inevitably failed to disentangle itself
from this mess. Each one of these statements is
true, yet at the same time false, or rather, if it
is permissable to speak in this way, each one is a
quarter true, three-quarters false. For, the whole
truth, if the turn of phrase may again be forgiven,
is that in this process we must observe a public/
private bearer of a public/private right. The
public/private description here cancels itself out,
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and we are back to the original question of simply
the "subject of a right". And what we have here is
none other than the form of "abstract individuality"
regarding the inner character of which legal thought
always draws a blank. For the same reason, then, the
public/private dualism remains a riddle which is
never solved. The problem of the "public" and the
"private" becomes here a development of the basic
problem of the "subject of a right" - in bourgeois
• +■ 1society.
However, there is a great deal mora to the
problem of the "public? and the "private" than we
have so far been prepared to admit. The private
aspect of law, for instance, is so-called because
its aim is the reconciliation of private interests.
But, of course, as law, this form of reconciliation
is something over and above the ordered anarchy of
exchange, something more than the mere "juridical"
moment of the exchange act. In a word, it inhabits a
domain of power. And here its "public" character
becomes something quite different from its equivalent
form.
1 . Chs . 1 , 2, ante.
-90-
The foundation-stone of private law is the
pure right-bearing unit, the persona, in which the
"private" and the "public" are entirely merged
into one and the same thing. The legal form here
stands (almost) undifferentiated from the "juridical"
moment of the exchange act. ¥hat is "public" here
is the shared equivalent form and what is "private"
is the isolated individual who is subsumed, as such,
under this form. In this, the public/private duality
returns, just like the riddle of the general "subject
of a right", to the inner nature of the exchange
act and the various relations supposed therein. The
"public" here transpires in the social production
relations congealed in the commodities which those
apparently isolated and independent private individuals,
requiring solely the will to exchange them, bring
to market. These are the suppositions we have made
so far. Now, however, there are new avenues to be
opened up, and the reason comes in this: the legal
form would have no raison d'etre were it to be simply
considered as the "juridical" moment of exchange.
The important distinction, which we have so far
merely supposed here is that the legal form, as
distinct from its subsistence level in the exchange
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structure, occupies the domain of power. Even in
its closest exchange connection, in private law,
the legal form aquires the power to regulate exchange
relations when their normally adequate "juridical"
basis breaks down. The legal form and power: an
equivalent form and its opposite, a relation of
domination and subordination. It is here that the
public/private dualism of the legal form becomes
transformed into the dualism of state and law. The
first dualism, of equality and individuality, we
have already considered. The latter is a dualism
of an altogether different order, for it contains
the former dualism (which is united in the legal
form as such) juxtaposed with something else, namely,
state power.




This concerns the legal form as such, i.e. as a
generalised equivalent form. As an equivalent form
it is "in common", shared by "individuals". In this
way it figures as a unity of opposites, as "abstract
1. "Law as a form...exists only in antitheses",
Pashukanis, Theory of Law etc., p.119 (A.R.,
p.30).
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individuality" : "abstract" because "in common"
(public) as against individuality as such (private).
It is the same riddle as the "subject of a right"
- of bourgeois society.
Second Antithesis:
This concerns legal form juxtaposed with the
relation of power. An equivalent form ("abstract
individuality") here appears united with yet another
opposite: power, a relation of one will over that
of another. Equality and inequality. This dualism
appears as the antithesis of private law (the archetype
of the legal form as such, as an equivalent form) and
"public law".
It is the second antithesis which we must now
consider. In order to first clear the way a little
it is appropriate to exemplify seme of the confusions
of modern legal thinking upon the matter, i.e. upon
the subject of the dualism between "public law" and
private law. In this, we may draw upon the assistance
of the legal theorist, Hans Kelsen. Kelsen has a
clear grasp of the confusion of others in this connection,
but is, himself, incapable of furnishing a solution
to the problem. We shall allude to the erroneous
character of Kelsen1s solution, but for a thorough
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criticism of the basis of his views we must wait
until we deal with Kant in the next chapter (Kelsen
is a "Kantian"). Here is an example of Kelsen's
clear grasp of the problem as it appears in
"traditional legal theory";
The contrast assumed by traditional legal
theory between public and private law clearly
displays the fundamental dualism that dominates
modern legal science and thereby our entire
social thinking; the dualism between state
and law. If traditional theory of law and
state opposes the state to the law as an entity
different from the law, and at the same time
asserts that the state is a legal being, they
accomplish this by comprehending the state as
a subject of obligations and rights, that is,
as a legal person, and at the same time
attributing to it an existence independent of
the legal order.
Private-law theory originally assumed
that the legal personality of the individual
logically and temporally precedes the legal
order; in the same way the public—law theory
assumes that the state, as a collective unit
and subject of willing and acting, exists
independent of, and even preceding, the law.
According to this theory the state fulfills
its historic mission by creating the law, "its"
law, the legal order, and submits itself to it
afterward, which means the state imposes
obligations and confers rights upon itself by
means of its own law. Thus, the state, as a
meta-legal being, as a kind of raacro-anthropos
or social organism, is presupposed by the law
- and at the same time, as a subject of the
law, i.e., as subjected to it, obligated and
authorised by it, presupposes the law. This
is the doctrine of the two sides and self-
obligation of the state which manages to
maintain itself with unequalled tenacity despite
the manifest contradictions -which it implies.
1. Kelsen, "The Pure Theory of Law", p.284-3. We
shall consider "traditional legal theory" in its
more profound modern—classical connections in
part II. Kelsen never says who he means in
this respect.
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Kelsen, however, never discloses the source of this
tenacious dualism; in fact, he denies that it exists
- after having spoken with such authority upon the
matter. It follows, then, that Kelsen doesn't
really "criticise" here at all, but rather "ignores".
In a similar kind of way, the French legal theorist,
Duguit, "criticised" the doctrines of Jhering and
Jellinek, which subjected the state to its "own."
law (in the sense which Kelsen makes clear above),
and ended up with theoretically the same results
as Kelsen, namely, that the "true" theory is based
upon "will".^ But let us consider Kelsen's position
a little further.
Kelsen is quite correct to summarise the position
of "traditional legal theory" in the following manner;
According to the majority view we are confronted
here with a classification of legal relation¬
ships: private law represents a relationship
between coordinated, legally equal-ranking
subjects; public law, a relationship between
a super— and a subordinated subject, that is,
between subjects of whom one has a higher legal
value as compared with that of the other.
The typical public-law relationship is that
between state (or government) and subject (in
German, characteristically, Untertan). Private-
law relationships are called simply "legal
relationships" in the narrower sense of the term,
to/
1 . cf. L. Duguit, "Theory of Law Anterior to the
State", Modern Legal Philosopiry Series, Vol. VII.
Kelsen is not as naive as Duguit and does not
draw this conclusion in so many words.
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to juxtapose to them the public-law relation¬
ships as "power relationships" or relationships
of "domination". In general, the differentiation
between private and public law tends to assume
the meaning of a difference between law and a
non-legal, or at least a half—legal, powe^,
and, particularly, between law and state.
Instead of being so alarmed at the implications of
the "majority view" here, Kelsen would have done
better to have probed it a little further, since,
for once, the majority view is, superficially at
any rate, correct. In other words, this traditional
view concerning the private/public law dualism has
the sense of the legal form as a form of equality
which, as such, stands in an antithetical relation
vis a vis state power, the latter, supposing as it
does, the form of inequality, of hierarchy, domination
and subjection. Kelsen's "solution" to the problem
here is essentially the "solution" of all positivists
to all difficult questions; he ignores it, declaring
in the process its metaphysical connections. Anything
a positivist cannot solve is "metaphysical".
According to Kelsen, "A closer analysis...
discloses that we are confronted here with a different-
o
iation between law-creating facts." What appeared as
1 . Kelsen, "Pure Theory of Law", p.281 .
2. ibid.
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an absolute dichotomy now appears as a mere
"differentiation between law-creating facts."
in other words, the antithesis in the "majority
view" is ignored and the problem supposedly resolved
by simply contradicting it, by uncritically supposing
that the term "law" must equally apply to the business
of the state. Thus, "the legal plus-value assigned
to the state",^ Kelsen's phrase, is a sleight-of-
hand which ignores, with that use of the little
word, "legal", the whole issue which is at stake,
namely, the "majority view" doubts as to a legal
value at all in connection with the state, let
alone a "plus—value".
Kelsen's way of saying that he prefers to
ignore the problem of the absolute public/private
dualism, rather than furnish a "closer analysis"
is as follows: "the Pure Theory of Law 'relativises'
the contrast between private and public la-w, changes
it from an extra—systematic difference, that is, a
difference between law and non—law or between law
and state, to an intra—systematic one." And, not
satisfied xvith just this, he adds: "The Pure Theory
proves to be a true science (sic) by dissolving the




with the absolutising of the difference in question."
To "relativise" the dichotomy is tantamount to
ignoring it, denying its existence. For ordinary
common sense, let alone a "true science", mere
existence is rarely the question, but rather, the
connection in which a given thing has existence.
Xn so far as "traditional legal theory" has been
constantly thwarted with the apparently insurmountable
public/private dualism of law, it is certainly not
something of its own choosing. Accordingly the
most unscientific appeared, imaginable is one which
calmly declares that the problem is a red herring,
that the dichotomy does not exist. Of course it
exists, and if "traditional legal theory" has
ceaselessly wrestled with the problem and inevitably
become entangled in a net of typical contradictions,
then the overbearing character of this "existence"
is patently obvious and, clearly, there is some
objective connection concealed behind it. The
denial of "existence" is tantamount to foreclosing
analysis before it can even begin.
"Traditional legal theory" has not erred in its
recognition of the public/private dualism in law. In
so far as it has noted that the legal form is a
1 . ibid., p .282.
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relation of equality, it has also noted correctly
that, as such, it is irreconcilable with state
power, which entails in its barest essentials "the
relation of domination and subordination. Where
it has erred, however, is in its mode of reconciling
these opposites, something which it has been compelled
to do in order to accomodate what is "obvious" in
reality, that law is power. As we have already
noted, we shall come to "traditional legal theory"
proper in part II; but before we do this we must
make an attempt to get at the roots of this dualism
of law and state, or, what is the same essential
thing, of private law and "public law" .
In the purely empirical sense it is "obvious"
that the state's demands, appearing in the form of
statutory rules and so forth, are law. Still,
contrary to the positivist view of things, the
word "obvious" here has its right to inverted commas,
just as the apples observed by Newton "obviously"
fell to the ground. For, it is not on account of
their issuing from the "political" sphere that the
various "public" demands attain the form of legality.
On the contrary, such demands, in so far as they do
not bear the stamp of private interests, are utterly
antithetical to the legal form. The real basis upon
which these "public" demands appear as law is their
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laboured and cumbersome translation into a vocabulary
which, is furnished both logically and historically
by private law doctrine. This is precisely what
"traditional legal theory" has reflected in the
dualism of "public law" and private law. Conceptually
and historically the legal form (private law) is
the prius into which the demands of the "political"
sphere find their way.
On the other hand, without supposing a "political"
structure in and through which the demands of society
as a whole may (well or ill) be expressed, the legal
form, as a language of equality which arises on the
basis of generalised commodity ownership, cannot be
spoken with any authority; it cannot serve any
purpose unless it becomes compromised as part and
parcel of that structure, unless the logic of private
interest is prepared to subsume also (contradictorily)
the social interest. Without the "political" sphere
the legal form falls back to its subsistence level
as a powerless articulation of the equivalent form
implicit in the system of generalised commodity
ownership. With the "political" sphere, on the other
hand, it is compromised and can no longer remain true
to form.
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Xt is a matter for detailed empirical investi¬
gation to see how a given subject-matter of "public
policy", or rather, a demand having no direct
private interest behind it, becomes accomodated
under the legal form which is basically antithetical
to any interest which cannot be construed as a
private interest: for instance, the area of state
contracts with the private sector of industry, where
the state has to be contradictorily subsumed under
the private law form of contract. It is the same
contradiction in principle here manifest as a
specific technical legal attempt to reconcile the
power of the state with the form of legality which
figured more abstractly and in purer form in the
classical attempts to devise a social contract
theory of the state. So far as this present work
is concerned we shall only be concerned with the
general conditions of this contradictory process
and therefore the historically pure manifestations
of it, namely, in the classical formulations of the
social contract. The presence of the same essential
contradictory elements in such things as the modern-
day legal working out of state contracts with the
private sector is something which will not be
considered within the confines of this present work.
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But whatever the specific character of the
state's demands at any given time and in any given
"policy area" may be, this much, in general, is
always true: so long as such demands have their
origin in bourgeois society, they will never dissolve
the legal form, the language of private interests in
and through which they appear as law. This is
because the legal form is essentially a commodity
relation, i.e. a relation of private property.
On the other hand, this does not mean that the
legal form cannot be hideously compromised in the
most blatantly obvious manner in the light of the
specific character of the state's demands. Indeed,
the contradiction between the legal form and the
state's demands, the opposition of a language of
equality and a relation of power seeking accomodation
therein; this is precisely what becomes increasingly
apparent and what is naturally to be expected in the
very process of modern legal development. The
material basis of this is the increasingly antithetical
relation of socially organised production (the root
of the increasing mass of state regulations etc.)
and private ownership of the means of production
(whence the form of legality, mediated, of course,
through the form of generalised private ownership
of commodities which arises upon this basis.).
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The legal form and state poller appear as
opposites which need one another: the latter so
that demands in which it is dressed might be given
the form of legality, and the former so that it
doesn't dissolve and revert back to its primordial
existence in the anarchy of generalised commodity
relations. But this opposition is a process, or
rather, this opposition describes what is materially
a deeper underlying antithetical process, which,
with the development of bourgeois society comes
increasingly to the forefront. The material
substratum of the opposition of law and state,
of private law and "public law", of the form of
legality and the "social" demands which are mediated
through the "political" sphere, is the antithesis
of private property (the ground of the legal form)
and the general development of the productive forces
of society (reflected in the increasingly preponderant
"interference" of the state). It is this which belies
the "socialism" of the modern state, the "mixed
economy", and the increasingly mountainous growth
of "public law" to the extent that it appears to
dwarf the relatively simple and uncomplicated body
of private law doctrine into insignificance.
The antithesis of "public law" and private law
does not go away with the increased significance of
the former. It becomes, in fact, more acute. This
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±s so because the ground of this antithesis is that
between social production and private property, which
becomes more acute as capitalism develops the
concentration of the means of production into fewer
and fewer hands. As the means of production become
concentrated into fewer and fewer private hands -
as in the modern multi-national corporation, for
example — the contradiction of social production
and private property becomes more and more acute.
As the large-scale modem enterprise becomes more
grandiose, as it becomes "responsible" for tens of
thousands of jobs, for the production and distribution
of products upon which sometimes the effective
material stability of the entire social edifice
depends, when production in this way becomes
effectively social production, then its ownership
and control on the basis and in the interests of
private proprietorship becomes increasingly obvious
as an irrational integument which no longer corresponds
with the social responsibilities which it has brought
upon itself. The parallel of this in the legal sphere
is that the form of legality embodied in private law
(which has its roots in private ownership) becomes
an increasingly irrational shell in which the growing
manifold of the state's activities seek legal
expression. Let us just clarify this process a little
further.
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Social production, i.e. production for the
needs of society as a whole cannot be guaranteed
on the basis of private ownership of the means of
production. One man with the means of production
as his private property will use that property as
such, as his own and in his own best interests.
His interests are private, not social. Once these
means of production no longer serve his own purposes,
he will discard them regardless of their necessity
for social production as a whole. The tale of the
nationalisation of industries in modern bourgeois
societies corresponds with precisely this principle:
the private proprietors lose interest in their
railways, their mines etc. as soon as they become
unprofitable and they do this quite regardless of
fact that such things are absolutely essential for
social production as a whole (which here means, for
capitalist production as a whole). When essential
industries and services become unworkable in private
hands (notwithstanding the fact that what is "essential"
in this connection appears as a result of "political"
manoevering) the state moves in and thereby guarantees
the continuation of capitalist social production as
a whole. In practice this has meant the state not
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only taking over for example such tilings as railways,
roads, mines, education and health services and
so forth, but has meant the development alongside
this of an enormous state bureaucracy responsible
for the financial and administrative organisation
of such things.
It is not our aim here to go into any detail
in regard of these developments of the modem state.
Our aim is rather to point out that, with the growth
of state regulation in an increasingly large number
of areas of social life, law appears to become
predominantly "public law". Yet, at the same time
the form of legality is still perfectly embodied in
private law. The modern legal form is essentially
a commodity—relation, that is, a relation of private
property in its form as property in exchange. The
legal form, as we have already made clear previously,
makes no distinction between private ownership of
commodities and private ownership of productive means
(the basis of the generalised character of the former
and hence the legal form itself). Legally, the modern
corporative giant, as a private owner of productive
means capable of producing the most astonishing
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quantities of value, is of the same essential
character as one of the hundreds of thousands who
work within it. Consequently, so far as the state
is compelled to "interfere" with this giant, to
remind this essentially private character of his
public responsibilities e.g., to those whom it
employs, or to the environment etc., so far as
the state does these things in specific regard
of taming this egoistic giant, it points explicitly
to the narrowness of a legal form which implicitly
stands on a principle of equality (of giants and
dwarfs) on such matters. Just as. private ownership
of productive means becomes a constraint upon the
social development of production (egoistic disregard
of jobs, environment etc.), so the legal form
becomes a constraint upon the state's attempts to
rectify this imbalance. For, the legal form is
basically only "generally" concerned din so far as
it reflects the generality of private interests.
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(3) "Public lax^" ; the legal form and state
power
(a) So long as there exist, historically, the
elements of generalised commodity production and
exchange, automatically a system of private-law
relations, legal relations as such, become
articulated hand in hand with its development.
The aim, however, in developing these relations as
legal relations, of articulating the already
implicit norms of equivalent exchange, supposes an
authority "independent" of this process capable
of applying those norms to cases in which they
appear to have broken down for one reason or
another. In other words, the legal form only
develops as such i.e. beyond its existence as merely
the "juridical" moment of the exchange relation,
when, at the same time, there is in existence a
form of power that it can join forces with - other¬
wise there would be no point in developing the legal
form as such. For without any power to guarantee
the norms of equivalent exchange, that system of
exchange might just as well be left to its own
devices. The legal form in this latter instance
would exist as nothing more than the "juridical"
moment of the exchange relation. In this way the
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legal form supposes the existence of an authority
independent of itself. We can designate this
authority with the term, "state".
On the other hand, this "state", under the
conditions of generalised commodity production, finds
at hand, so to speak, a definite legal form ready
and waiting to give in return for accomodation, the
blessing of its categories to its (the state's) various
orders. The character of the modern state cannot be
guaged from these general conditions as regards its
specific coloration, but whatever orders it might
come up with, the legal form, in return for its
shelter under the auspices of power, will readily
ornament them with its language of equality. Thus
the demands of state attain their legal character.
Xt is precisely in this way that the commonly-
held belief that, it is specifically its existence
as law which commands obedience to a given rule,
attains its force of conviction. In fact nothing
could be more wrong, for the legal form in essence
has no "power of command" whatsoever. As an
equivalent form, the legal form becomes compromised
as soon as it appears (as it must) in conjunction with
the organised system of state power. This is the
-109-
case even when the legal form is "truest" to its
real inner nature as the "juridical" moment of the
commodity exchange relation, i.e. in private law,
whereupon the legal form acquires the backing of
state power in the regulation of exchange relations
through private actions. Still, the "power of
command" subsists not in law itself but in the
given manifold of political conditions that are
spoken through the law.
When Austin formulated a la Hobbes (but with
none of Hobbes scientific instinct) all law as
command by a sovereign, he was really talking about
anything but law as such. Austin's theory is
specifically a theory of "not" law: the "province"
which he "determined" was an official summary of
the political conditions which the state stands
for - "public law", the demands of the state
1
ornamented in legal style.
The legal form as such, private law, which
reflects the interests of the individual in the
relation of commodity exchange, guarantees in effect
1. "...juristische Stilisierung" - is Pashukanis'
phrase, Allgemeine Rechtslehre, p.145(a).
We shall consider his position in this
connection later on. Austin's theory is
contained in his book, "The Province of
Jurisprudence Determined", a book despised by
contemporary Scottish writers, like Hastie,
for its "commonplace hedonism".
no more than that which is guaranteed in the
"normal" business of exchange. And this amounts
to very little indeed when it is considered that
the "normal" business of exchange, especially in
the modern era, has meant the most tremendous of
social upheavals: colonialism, competition for
markets, trade wars, unemployment, armed conflict
on a world-scale ... In all this the legal form
is a paper tiger without an "independent" authority
behind it. This, moveover, is why jurists, in so
far as they speak properly as jurists, can never
really talk about "order", as it is called, even
though the terms "law" and "order" are commonly
associated. The legal form has nothing to do with
order. Order/disorder are outside the scope of
the legal form, which is strictly a descendent of
the commodity-exchange relation.
The legal form is basically a form of equivalence
and, as such, is the antithesis of the most elementary
facet of power: the domination of one will over
that of another. Thus, strange to relate, the
differentia specifica which makes a thing legal
is that of a form which knoxvs nothing of power.
Power requires that the will of one predominates
over that of another — inequality.
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However, the legal form's raisoxi d'etre as
firstly (logically and historically) the systematic
working-out of the norms implicit in generalised
commodity exchange nrust be something beyond this
alone. That is to say, it supposes a "power"
capable of ensuring those norms which, generally
speaking, already ensure themselves in the majority
of cases. Independently of the legal development
of the exchange relation, of the "abstract individual",
the "subject of a right" and so forth, we know
that the material equivalent form of commodities
of itself enables the "do ut des", "do ut facias",
"facio ut des" etc., in a word, the "juridical"
moment of the exchange act. The point here is
that the purpose of making these conditions
legally explicit must suppose something else if
such a project is not to be an exercise merely for
its own sake: in other words, a "power" is supposed
which is both "independent" of it and at the same
time necessary to it in so far as it is to realise
itself (contradictorily) as such i.e. as law.
To express the point here in a sentence: the
legal form is not a power in itself, but necessarily
makes its way to a centre of power in order to survive.
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Materially it is the movement of private property
(the commodity-form) under the protection of the
state •
Historically, the modern legal form found in
the ancient regime, or rather, in the decaying
ancient regime, a power structure appropriate to
its minimal life—demands. In this way the legal
form, essentially a language of equality, an
articulation of the social equivalent form of
generalised commodity relations, moves under the
auspices of a sphere which it is not, a sphere which
bears a form antithetical to its own (the legal
form's) nature, a sphere which bears the form of
inequality: the "power of command". In this
historical movement, the legal form became merged
into the modern state apparatus as part and parcel
of it, as part of the very process of stripping the
institutions of the ancient regime of their feudal
integument. So established, the new state acquires
in the same breath the new language of law and the
"power of command" now speatcs contradictorily through
the language of equality. If men are equal, how can
some command others? An absolutely impossible
question for previous societies is here turned into
a live issue in the so-called "rule of law".
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The "rule of law", a veritable contradictio
in adjecto, is really rule expressed in the language
of law. Law as such i.e. the legal form, cannot
"rule" for it is basically an equivalent form. If
equality rules, then no one will preponderates over
that of another, in other words, nobody rules; but
if a power is required to enforce such a maxim, by
that very design the maxim is destroyed, for one
will at least must then predominate. And if one is
reminded here of the "possibility" of a "will of
equality", as causa sui, then the reader must also
be reminded of how far Kant got with it and the
reasons for his demise."'
The riddle of the "rule of law", that is, rule
through the language of equality is to be decyphered
thus: the legal form and "power" are opposed to one
another, they are antithetical; but, for its very
existence, the legal form must move into the domain
of "power", it must inhabit the latter otherwise it
would perish, or rather, it would revert back to its
level of subsistence as the "juridical" moment within
the structure of generalised commodity exchange.
1 . cf. part II.
-11 k-
Unlike the snail, the legal form is not born
with its roof on its back; in its pure unadulterated
state it is an equivalent form estranged from the
trappings of power. Its natural course, however, is
to move towards the latter. Ve may picture the
process here as a struggle for survival. The legal
form and "power", being antithetical, must never¬
theless go historically hand in hand. Thus, in the
course of its development, the bourgeois state emerges
hand in hand with the legal form. The legal form
becomes in this respect snail-like, it appears
inseparable from the shelter of power which it comes
to inhabit.
Were the legal form to move from its shell of
power, it would dissolve or, what is the same thing,
it would revert back to its essence, its level of
subsistence as the "juridical" moment of the commodity
exchange relation. On the other hand, as the demands
of the state move progressively against the language
of equality — it is a question of degree here, depending
upon specific historical circumstances - the legal
veneer correspondingly peels away.
(b) The state therefore never dissolves the
legal form, because and so far as it never dissolves
the private ownership of the means of production
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upon which basis the antithesis of law and the state
is premised. On the other hand, history has shown
that the bourgeois state apparatus, under certain
conditions, can make this legal form along with
its developments of equal right and so forth,
look a terrible joke. The example of "Nazi law",
which students of jurisprudence are well enjoined
1
to consider is a case in point. To make the position
quite clear regarding the antithesis and unity of
state power and the legal form, this example may
appropriately be developed here. It may be developed
with the following question: "Is Nazi law really
law?"
A negative answer to this question must be
qualified \vith something to the effect: "..in the
same way that prescriptions originating in the
bourgeois state apparatus generally, regardless
of its political coloration, are not law." But the
qualifications cannot stop here. This qualified
negative answer is still not a full answer, for, in
itself, it does not distinguish from the dichotomy
of "traditional legal theory" , merely that law is
private law and that which issues from the organs
of state, in so far as it cannot be subsumed under
1. Fuller in his "Morality of Law" raises the issue
of "Nazi law" , 'out gets nowhere near to grasping
it. According to him it is purely a technical-
legal question having to do with the absence
of certain "rules".
the strict categories of private law, is something
else, nothing to do with law. What "traditional
legal theorj'", essentially the classic liberal view,
cannot grasp is the unity of the antithesis. All
which is seen here is the antithesis alone and the
state as a "necessary evil" .
Nazi law is not law, in the same way that the
prescriptions of the bourgeois state apparatus,
regardless of its specific political coloration,
in general are not law. This answer is fine — but
only as a beginning. Nazi law takes on the form of
law because the latter, if it is to survive, must
be parasitic upon the power structure which it
finds available. It is a matter of survival that
the legal form inhabits the domain of power, that
it unites xvith it. It is inherently a contradictory
process, and overtly so in the case of Germany under
the third Reich. It is still nevertheless a
contradictory process under "normal" parliamentary
democratic conditions (under liberal democracy —
the legal form's ideal, as it were) where the antithesis
between state power and the legal principle of
equality which its bears upon its breast doesn't
seem so glaringly obvious. The specific political
conditions upon which the legal form is always
parasitic - notwithstanding the "bravery" of judges
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and the legal profession, a quality which, for this
very reason, they are not noted for - are not
something which the language of equality can decide,
for, try as it may, the legal form cannot go against
the grain of its own inherent struggle for survival,
a struggle which automatically seeks shelter under
the umberella of power, independently of the letter's
specific form. Contrary, then, to the traditional
legal view of the antithesis, the Nuremberg laws
appear as law not as some awful anomaly, but as part
and parcel of the very process which the legal form
itself depends upon; power, regardless of its form,
to speak its language of equality. Quite apart
from the criminal law, this is the real process
of the "protection of private property".
"Traditional legal theory" (we shall come to
a proper development of this phrase in part II)
found in the private law form of contract its ideal,
a form in \*rhich independent and equal individual
wills could be brought together without any apparent
coercion on either side. And with this it proceeded
to subsume the state itself under this very form,
it tried to reconcile the antithesis by reducing
public law to private law, by considering power
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under a form of equality. The legal theorist,
Radbruch, expressed the position here thus;
To liberalism, private law is the heart of
all law, with public law as a narrow protective
frame laid around private law... This relative
rank, as between private and public law, which
is assumed by liberalism is expressed in the
ideas of the social contract doctrine. It
involves "a compromise between private law
and public law," (von Ranke) the attempt to
trace super— and subordination din the state
to an agreement between originally coequal
individuals, i.e., to dissolve public law
fictitiously in private law. Liberalism
carried to the extreme, namely," anarchism,
seeks to dissolve public laxv in private law
not only fictitiously but really. By refusing
to recognise any obligation that is not self-
obligation, it makes the social contract
doctrine not only the political theory but
also the principle of organisation of social
living toge ther.
In the next chapter we shall consider in detail some
of the historically more important formulations of
this kind of doctrine. Here attention may be drawn
to certain of Radbruch's words: "Liberalism carried
to the extreme, namely, anarchism...refusing to
recognise any obligation that is not self-obligation",
i.e. refusing to come to terms with power, indeed,
incapable of reconciling the antithesis it holds in
relation to the legal form. Let us reiterate what is
wrong with this view. It is not grasped by Radbruch,
1. G. Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, p.153«> 20th century
legal philosophy series, Vol. IV.
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who says: "Contractual obligation is not suitable
to serve as the basis of the obligation of the law;
quite the contrary, it presupposes the obligation
1
of the law." This merely looks at the reverse
side of the coin and stresses the other end of the
antithesis. Bacon's dictum, "Jus privatum sub tutela
2
juris publici latet" ; an article of the Weimar
constitution, "In economic intercourse, freedom of
3
contract shall prevail in accordance with the laws"
- this is the sort of evidence Radbruch brings in
support of his view that private law cannot be
the basis of law, i.e. the form of law. In other
words, his proof is by assertion. Law "obviously"
requires power, therefore it cannot be an equivalent
form. Thus, the basis of law is power. Again,
recalling the brief points we made in connection
with legal theorists Kelsen and Duguit, this is not
a criticism of the liberal view, or, what is the
same thing, the view of "traditional legal theory".
1. Radbruch, ibid, p.168.
2. "Private law latently subsists under the tutelage
of public law", ibid."p. 152.
3» ibid. p. 172. It is Article 152 of the Reich
constitution of 1919*
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Regarding the liberal view: the legal form, par
excellence private law, is not alien to the power
structure of the bourgeois state in the subjective
sense, that it "despises" it. In the classical
liberal view of the state as a "necessary evil",
the "evil" here is the rhetoric of the "free trader
vulgaris". The important thing is the "necessary",
namely, the fact that the power of the bourgeois
state, whatever its "political" character, is necessary
to the legal form as such, as an equivalent form.
Thus, to return to our example, if "Nazi law" is
not law, the latter is parasitic upon the living
conditions provided by the Fascist state in so far
as it is to retain the platform upon which to speak
its language of equality, i.e. its "commodity"
language — the language of private property.
Thus, it is very important to distinguish from
the view of the law/state dualism which is really
a glorification of trade and money-making via
"contract" as law properly so-called, via the
"harmony" ("anarchy", in Radbruch's terms — it is
the same thing) of equivalent commodity-exchange
relations, to distinguish from this the real operation
of dualism. If the legal form as a relation of
equality is antithetical to "power", that is, to
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the relation of domination and subordination, then
in reality, in bourgeois society, where these forms
come alive as it were, they become united in opposition.
Each needs the other: the bourgeois state needs its
language of equality and the legal form needs power.
In the nineteenth century and the early part of the
twentieth, the liberal free traders, both in England
and on the continent, spoke directly the sentiments
of the legal form. They were all for equality and
free trade and against state intervention. They
sought to realise practically what the legal form
stood for theoretically. In their various performances
they demonstrated precisely the opposite of their
case: to speak the language of freedom and equality,
they stalked the corridors of power. As spokesmen
for the legal form, i.e. private property, they showed
exactly how it must subsist in reality: as a language
of equality spoken within the bourgeois state apparatus.
If these spokesmen had been theoretically correct,
then there would have been no need for them to jockey
for parliamentary seats, to move into influential
committees and so forth; they would have just as
well given their exclusive attention to their various
business interests J
1 . cf. Finer S .E. , in "Studies in the Growth of
19th century Government". More generally,
cf. Halevy, "The Growth of Philosophic
Radicalism".
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Private law is, to use the words of Pashukanis,
"the prototype of the legal form in general." But
even here, where the legal form appears relatively
undisguised in its essential connections with the
"juridical" form of the commodity relation, it is
no longer true to this latter form. That is to
say, as private law it is already "touched" with
an alien spirit of super- and subordination in the
"power" which it supposes in its business of rectifying
private (primarily contractual) relations. Accordingly,
the antithesis of law and state is classically
formulated very early on in bourgeois society, i.e.
before the state even begins to "interfere" with
things hitherto operated under exclusively private
hands. As we have said, we shall look at "traditional
legal theory" proper in this connection din part IX.
Here we may just remark that legal thought subsequent
to the turn of the eighteenth century, whether
"traditionalist" or "positivist", has not got beyond
these classical formulations of the antithesis of
law and state power. Basically, the persistent error
here is of the following nature: the antithesis of
law and state power (which we have called the second
antithesis of law) becomes a mere sublimation of
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the abstract subject (the first antithesis of law,
i.e. the equalisation of individuals as "abstract
individuality") . The state, in other words, becomes
subsumed under the legal form as such, whereupon
this style of thinking becomes an expression (as
distinct from an understanding) of the antithesis
of law and state power. For, this is precisely the
contradictory process, namely, that of shunting
the state's demands, or more formally, the relation
of domination and subordination, into a form which
intrinsically opposes such a relation, which the
second antithesis consists in.1
1 . Legal thinking, since Kant, has done none other
than express this antithesis of law and state.
Disregarding the legal positivists, who simply
declare that a problem doesn't really exist here,
this is true of even the most historically
conscious juristic writers, e.g. Savigny, Puchta,
Ahrens, Friedlander (cf. post, part 3). The
English writers who fall into this latter category,
e.g. Maine, Pollock, Maitland, Dicey express the
law/state dualism vrith great naivety: Dicey, for
instance, believed that the growth of "public law"
was identical with the growth of socialism (which
could not possible be legal) and denounced almost
every act of state intervention over and above Mill's
principle that, "the sole end for which mankind
are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number, is self—protection." Dicey rages
against the "collectivist" developments of his
day: the Old Age Pensions Act, the Trade Disputes
Act, the Education (provision of meals) Act,
the Mines Regulation Act. This "rapid growth of
collectivism. .(demonstrates how) the main current
of legislative opinion..has run vehemently towards
collectivism." — Dicey, Law and Public Opinion etc.,
Introduction (2nd. ed.).
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(c) We have a duty to acknowledge the work of
the legal theorist, or rather, theorist of law,
E.B. Pashukanis, in connection with the things
we have just considered. At the same time there are
some points which may be further clarified.
Firstly: the two antitheses in the process of
modern law. In the presentation of these antitheses,
the first comes first, and the second develops out
of it. They are not logically separate; on the
contrary, each logically supposes the other. To
clarify: the first antithesis is the legal form as
an equivalent form — concretely, as private law, the
persona and so forth. Here it is developed first
and foremost as an opposition of equality and
individuality. Thus the process as described in the
introductory remarks in chapter I, not forgetting its
material elements as laid out in the whole of
chapter two. However, this process so-described,
although it temporarily leaves out of view the
question of power, on no account precludes it
logically. On the contrary, the legal form here
supposes that as such, i.e. as an equivalent form
primarily, it stands in an antithetical position
vis-a—vis the relation of power. The second
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antithesis is therefore a development which springs
directly from the first, with the difference that
the question of power and the legal form is now
directly posed: How is the antithetical power
relation which is supposed both logically and
historically by the very nature of the legal form
to be reconciled with it? All the difficulties
here turn on the word, "reconcile"t For, the
antithesis is real, a historical product, and not
simply an invention of legal theory. Thus, thinking
the thing out does not involve a "reconciliation"
so much as a grasping of the thing as an antithesis,
as a contradictory unity in reality. Ve shall come
back to this. Let us bring Pashukanis into the
picture.
Pashukanis does not talk about the "two antitheses"
in so many words. They are nevertheless both present
in the way he grasps the process of modern law —
indeed, they have to be, for, as we have just remarked,
to consider the first, the legal form as such, as
fundamentally an equivalent form, automatically
posits the second, its antithetical relation with
power as it appears in reality. Pashukanis 1 essay
embodies this dialectic:
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It is perfectly manifest that the logic of
juristic concepts corresponds with the social
relations of a commodity—producing society,
and that it is specifically in these relations,
and not in the permission of the authorities,
that the root of the system of private law
("the prototype of the legal form in general")
must be sought. On the other hand, it is only
in part that the logic of the relationships of
authority and subordination fits into the
system of juristic concepts — wherefore the
juristic understanding of the state can never
become a theory, but will always appear as an
ideological perversion of the facts.
Problems concerning the "two antitheses" are quite
naturally brought together in this statement. In
the first sentence, the commodity-connection of the
legal form is recalled: the riddle of the equivalent
form and its material basis. Essentially, the first
antithesis? But, at the same time, the second
antithesis is expressly supposed in this first
sentence, with the words, "not in the permission
of the authorities". These words mean; not as a
concession on the part of the state; the basis of
law, as fundamentally an equivalent form, is opposed
to the relationships of state power. This latter is
certainly not unimportant, quite the reverse, but
the basis of the legal form must first be sought
elsewhere. The second sentence then passes directly
to a range of problems posed by the second antithesis.
1. Pashukanis, Theory of Law etc., p.149-
(A.R. , p.72) .
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Just as the first antithesis supposes the second,
so the second embodies the first. Juxtaposed with
the problem of the state, in its most elementary
facet as a relationship of domination, the legal
form does not become something else; it remains,
as it was comprehended in the first antithesis, as
an equivalent form, only here it undergoes a further
development. Here, in Pashukanis second sentence,
the legal form remains in reality an equivalent form,
a verity proved by the fact that when the attempt
is made to shunt the relationships of domination and
subordination into it, real contradictions arise:
"wherefore the juristic understanding of the state
can never become a theory."
The proof of the immoveable reality of the law/
power antithesis (so long as bourgeois society
remains) is the confusion of legal thought on the
matter. The point is reiterated by Pashukanis, quite
simply, when he says, after giving a few examples
(e.g. "..a community of Jesuits, where all members
blindly and unprotestingly fulfill the will of the
leader" — notwithstanding that "blindly" might not
express the subjective view of the Jesuit):
-1 28-
One need only ponder such examples thoughtfully
to conclude that the more systematic the development
of the principle of authoritarian regulation
(which excludes the notion of separate autonomous
wills) the less ground there is for the category
law. This is felt with particular keenness in
the sphere of so—called public law. Here legal ^
theory comes up with the most serious difficulties.
And again, illustrating the "field for endless
controversies and of the most impossible confusion":
Law is at the same time a form of external
authoritarian regulation in one aspect, while
in the other it is a form of subjective private
autonomy. In the one case, that which is basic
and essential is the index of unconditional
obligation and coercion from without; in the
other the index of freedom, guaranteed and
acknowledged within certain boundaries. Law
comes forth at one time as a principle of
social organisation, and at another time as
a means for individuals "to be disunited, being
in society". In the one case law, it seems,
completely merges with external authority.
In the other case, law sets itself in opposition
to every sort of external authority which
likewise does not recognise it...
There is no escaping the dualism of law and
power; it is a real historical condition arising
directly from the fact that law subsists basically
as an equivalent form. The only theoretical "escape"
from this dualism is to grasp it as a dualism in
reality. Pashukanis never loses sight of this.
As this dualism inevitably manifests itself as the
1. Pashukanis, ibid., p.15^« (A.R., p.78).
2. ibid., p.150. (A.R., p.73).
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dichotomy of private law (law as such) and "public
law", Pashukanis takes the example of Goichbarg,
who, like certain other legal theorists whom we
mentioned earlier in this same connection, pretends
that the dualism does not exist, or, what is the
same thing, that it can be thought away. Pashukanis
says:
Goichbarg's objections rest on the idea that
the abstractions aforesaid (public law and
private laxv) are not the fruit of historical
development but have simply been excogitated
by jurists. In the meantime, it is this very
antithesis which most typically and specially
characterises the legal form as such. The
division of law into public law and private law
typifies this form both from the logical and
from the historical standpoint. Having declared
that this antithesis simply does not exist,
we are in no way lifted above the "back\vard"
(Goichbarg's term — S.M.) practical jurists
— on the contrary, we shall be constrained to
use the very same formal and scholastic ^
definitions as those wTith which they operate.
The antithesis between "public law" and private law
is an antithesis in reality which is not shifted
one inch by declaring that it does not exist . What
Pashukanis states here is perfectly correct: such
declarations, in so far as they are "reasoned", can
only covertly return to the definition of law as an
equivalent form. They thus move in a circle and end
up with essentially the self-same antithesis which
1. ibid., p.157—8. (A.R., p.82). Goichbarg says:
"The division of law into public law and private
law, which has never turned out happily for the
jurists, enjoys recognition at the present time
only among the most backward jurists..", cited,
ibid.
-1 30-
they Initially sought to remove. Pashukanis adds:
The very concept of public law may thus be
developed only in this, its movement, in which
it is constantly pushing away from private
law as it were, seeking to define itself as the
antithesis of private law, and then returning
once mor^ to private law as to its centre of
gravity.'
In this way the most articulate of legal formalists,
par excellence those who hark back to Kant, end up on
the doorstep of the very antithesis which they try to
escape from. The truth of the matter is that the
antithesis is fundamentally immoveable, so long as
the conditions behind it, in a word, bourgeois
commodity production and exchange, remain. Bourgeois
society is the condition of the antithesis between
private and social interests. As Pashukanis says:
"the real premise for this overcoming of the legal
form and legal ideology is a condition of society
wherein an end has been put to the very contradiction
between the individual interest and the social
2
interest."
Secondly, attention must be drawn towards some
of the problems which arise while comprehending the
antithesis between public and private law as something
rooted in the real conditions of capitalist production
1 . ibid.
2. ibid., p.156. (A.R., p.81).
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and exchange. These particular problems arise from
the tendency to infer the actual conditions of the
antithesis from the general logic of these conditions.
This tendency is a result of the fact that it is
specifically the form of law which is under consider¬
ation, and the state, even when it becomes directly
involved (in the second antithesis) , is still only
considered formally, as an official summary of
"social" or "public" demands entailing the formal
relation of domination and subordination. Pashukanis
illustrates this tendency himself. On one occasion
he notes, for example, that "'Legal' demands issuing
out of the organs of public authority, demands having
no private interest of any sort behind them, are no
more than the facts of political life formulated in
legal diction."1 Again, this recalls the antithesis
between "public law" and private law. Those demands
issuing from the organs of public authority are
"legal" - in inverted commas. Not really law as
such, because they are "power" demands, demands
merely ornamented in legal style ("juristische
Stilisierung") . The surprising thing about this
statement, however, is not this, but certain of the
words which go in expressing it, namely the "no more
1. ibid., p.203 fn. (A.R., p.145).
than" in connection with, "the facts of political life"
These "facts of political life", in their connection
here, can constitute no less than the difference
between a Fascist dictatorship and a tolerant liberal
democracy. Such conditions are not to be under¬
estimated - din any event. Moreover, in the context
of the antithesis between power relationships and the
legal form, such things are certainly not to be left
out of the reckoning. As we remarked earlier, the
legal form can only thrive within the "facts of
political life". Outside this sphere it perishes
and reverts to subsistence level in the commodity—
exchange structure; within this sphere, it becomes
a "contradiction in reality" .
A word about this term, "contradiction in reality
is appropriate here. The antithesis in bourgeois
society between power relationships, whatever their
particular coloration, and the legal form is always
a unity in (actual) reality - even though it is a
contradictory one. The '^contradiction in reality" is
really an expression of the mode in which the thing
in question is to be apprehended in thought, whereas
reality as such, as it is experienced by the senses,
does not, of course, come labelled with nice neat
categories telling us about itself. It needs hardly
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be said that, were this the case, there would be
absolutely no need to think <-
So, the law/power antithesis is brought together
in reality, but in the only way that an antithesis
can be brought together; contradictorily.. In reality,
therefore, the form of legality is always compromised,
sometimes more, sometimes less, depending precisely
upon those "facts of political life."
Pashukanis again furnishes us with a rather
uneasy expression when he writes, "State authority
introduces into the legal structure precision and
stability, but does not create the premises of that
superstructure; these are rooted in the material,
1
that is to say, in production relationships." There
is something not quite right about the expression of
the law/state dualism here. Firstly, there is the
suggestion that state authority, being distinguished
from the legal structure, is somehow independent of
production relationships. And secondly, and what is
in fact the cause of this suggestion, the whole
business of exchange, i.e. the immediate source of
the legal form as an equivalent form, and hence the
very ground of the dualism, is cut out of the reckoning.
Thus, the odd thing about Pashukanis1 statement here
1. ibid., p. 147. (A.R., p.69).
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is that it seeks to express the law/state dualism
while at the same time cutting the basis away from
under it, namely, the dualism of exchange (the
sphere of generalised private interest) and production
(the sphere of particular private interest, where
the social interest becomes problematic). It is
in this latter sphere, in the sphere of production
relationships, that the state's activity is directly
rooted, whereas the legal form has its roots here
indirectly, i.e. mediated through the form of exchange.
By missing this very important distinction, Pashukanis
is led into turning "state authority" into something
apparently independent of the relations of production,
whereas just the reverse is true. For, as we saw
earlier, it is directly production and the conditions
of production under private hands which posits the
state's "interfering" activity, the form of its
authority, as guarantor of social production as a
whole.
It hardly needs be said, given what we have
already acknowledged in connection with Pashukanis'
work, that the above oversights which we have made
use of are not characteristic of the whole. Indeed,
Pashukanis rarely loses sight of the law/state
The truth of this statement is nowadays
brought home daily in the incessant "political
talk about trade, prices, employment,
productivity, wages, profits, balance of
payments, inflation etc., in a word, the
conditions of material production.
"The specific economic form, in which
unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of
the direct producers, determines the
relationship of rulers and ruled, as it
grows directly out of production itself,
and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining
element...It is always the direct relation¬
ship of the owners of the conditions of
production to the direct producers - a
relation always naturally corresponding
to a definite stage in the development
of the methods of labour and thereby its
social productivity — which reveals the
innermost secret, the hidden basis of the
entire social structure, and with it the
political form of the relation of sovereignty
and dependence, in short, the corresponding
specific form of state. This does not
prevent the same economic basis — the same
from the standpoint of its main conditions
- due to innumerable different empirical
circumstances, natural environment, racial
relations, external historical influences
etc., from showing infinite variations
and gradations in appearance, which can
be ascertained only by analysis if the
empirically given circumstances." — Marx,
Capital, Vol. XXI, p.791 -2.
Recent scientific discussion on the
nature of the state rightly takes this
as a point of departure and views the
state as an essentially unmediated
relation of the concrete conditions of
material production. cf. Hirsch, Elements
of a Theory of the Bourgeois State.
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antithesis in. its essential connections « On the
other hand, it is a tendency with the nature of his
enterprise, which is a criticism of the theory of
law, that the "facts of political life", "state
authority", or rather, the theoretical locus of
such conceptions, is disturbingly left out of the
reckoning.
Finally, we are now in a position to present the
schematic outlines of the law/state antithesis * It
is to the sphere of production relations, of the
direct conditions of material production, which
1
specifically "state" activity corresponds. It is
to the sphere of exchange relations, of generalised
private interests, to which the form of legality
corresponds. The dualism of law and state is
therefore fundamentally a dualism of exchange and
production. It develops, as we pointed out earlier,
as a dualism of private and social interests, the
former being generalised in the form of legality,
the latter being particularised as a result of their
falling within the conditions of private ownership
of the means of production. As we saw, it is under
these latter circumstances that the state finds it
increasingly necessary to compromise the free exercise
of private right over property in this particular
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connection, a connection in which, moreover, the
legal form is intrinsically opposed to distinguishing
from private ownership in general, i.e. mere owner¬
ship of commodities.
Still, it might be objected that the mediation
of the form of legality through the sphere of exchange
is, at all events only a mediation^ in other words,
that the legal form does, ultimately, depend upon
material production relationships. The objection
is well—made in so far as it draws attention to the
fact that the legal form is not just a commodity-
relation, but a commodity-relation which is grounded
in a productive system of capital and wage-labour.
All this is very true: but it doesn't dissolve the
antithesis of law and state. It is true that exchange
depends upon production. Production is the basis of
exchange, not the other way around. And in this way
the form of legality ultimately depends upon the
same conditions governing the activity of the state.
But this does not make the law/state dualism much
ado about nothing. On the contrary, when this common
ground comes to the surface, when the conditions of
material production become revealed as the veritable
basis of all things — in times of economic crisis -
the dualism of law and state becomes increasingly
apparent. This is evident from the example which we
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mentioned earlier, the case of legality under the
conditions of the third German Reich. Here the
acuteness of the economic crisis bursts the
antithesis of legality and the state wide open.
All notion of equal standards here goes to the x^rind.
The crisis in production calls for "emergency
measures", which in this case throws up the ugly form
of Nazism,, The complacently "bourgeois" form of
¥eimar legality is essentially smashed to pieces,
but remains gibbering its language of equality under
the auspices of the Fascist state.1
1 . The economic roots of Fascism are generally
seen by liberal historians as merely one of
many "factors" alongside such things as the
"uniqueness" of Hitler's personality etc..
But although Hitler was "uniqne", there was
nevertheless a little bit of Hitler in every
doxm-trodden petty bourgeois, every unemployed
worker, who could envisage no alternative
rescue from the complete and utter ruin brought
about by Germany's unfulfilled need for "normal"
capital accumulation, for markets, for economic
expansion, for "Lebensraum". The secret to the
phenomenon which has both appalled and puzzled
liberal historians with their eclectic tools of
analysis, that the Nazis came to power by
parliamentary democratic means, rests in
precisely this, namely the conditions of
capital accumulation, the conditions of
material production appertaining to Germany
in particular and the West in general from
1919 onwards. cf. Vajda, M., On Fascism;
and Mandel, E., (ed.), Rise of Fascism in
Germany.
-1 38-
The reason why the "common ground" of the state's
activity on the one side and the form of legality
on the other doesn't dissolve their antithesis, is
that this "common ground", i.e. production relation¬
ships, is in its own very nature the seedbed of
antitheses. Production as production is already
at odds with exchange before its products ever come
to market, because these products bear the hidden
markings of labour for which an equivalent has not
been given in return. Exchange, on the other hand,
as we made clear in chapter two, contains just the
opposite thesis.
It is now time to conclude - although the reason
is far from being that enough has been said. But
in this first part we have at least got at the
material elements behind the form of modern legality.
Firstly (in chapter 2), the material elements behind
the (first) antithesis of individuality as such, as
concrete individuality, and equality; that is to
say, the material elements of the generalised1 commodity
structure which lie behind the notion of the abstract
subject. And secondly (here in chapter 3), the
material elements behind the (second) antithesis of
this legal equivalent form and state power, namely,
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the opposition of private and social interests
premised in the opposition of private property in
general, i.e. as generalised commodity-ovmersliip,
and private property in particular, i.e. in regard
of private ownership of the means of production,
whereupon the state becomes increasingly compelled
(in the interest of capitalist production as a
whole) to compromise the narrow shell of egotistical
private interest upon which the form of legality is
based.
As a foreword in regard of part 2s the antitheses
in the process of modern legality are now to be
considered in connection with certain of their modern-
classical expressions. Now this terrain is, indeed,
a considerable distance away from the immediate
conjuncture of events (although perhaps not so far
away as might be imagined), that is to say, the
present social conditions under which the form of
legality makes its typically contradictory appearance.
On the other hand (and this is the only "excuse"
which is offered in the face of this apparently
"escapist" subject-matter) the day when an aspiring
new generation of "legal" thinkers take it upon
themselves to re—think the language of equality may
not be too far away din the distant future, in which
event the kinds of criticisms which we are about to
make will not be entirely in vain.
Part Ii




Modern-Classical Connections of the Equivalent
Form
It was explained in the last section how the
subject-matter of private law hides from view the
abstract form of equivalence upon which it is based.
However, the abstract form, although shifted from
view, is not so far removed since the subject-matter
of private law is largely a matter of contractual
relations anyway. Moreover, it was seen that on
this account, following Pashukanis, private law
thinking achieves its characteristic internal
coherence relative to other branches of "positive"
legal thought. Xn the same kind of way it was
Pashukanis' view that the classical modern "natural-
law" theories achieved their distinguishing marks
of clarity and coherence in the form of discursive
argument. But the way in which he skirts round the
points involved here is interestingly one-sided.
If we leave un—named certain "contractarian"
theorists, we can still say a good deal about them.
It was perfectly sensible that these theorists should
conceive public authority in terms of a contract, for
hidden beneath this notion lay the workings of a new
mechanism committed to reproducing commodity—exchange
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relations on an unprecedented social, scale, a
mechanism at work before their very eyes - for the
first time. Xt is the era of the ascendancy of
capital, the withering of the ancien regime. These
theorists were acutely sensitive to the connection
between exchange relations and public authority
(and no mean feat given the then historical
character of the latter), but nevertheless beheld
this connection in a state of mystery - they
returned to the "state of nature" for the basis
of right.
But how far can these theorists go un-named?
Rousseau, for instance, didn't see the "state of
nature" the same way as Hobbes or Locke, and Kant
is different again. Pashukanis merely talks about
"natural law doctrine", "the natrual-law prejudice"
etc. and so appears to make some rather crude brush¬
strokes over a richly complex history of ideas. He
gives the latter its due simply by pointing out its
N
merits vis a vis the vulgarity of modern legal culture.
Our procedure now will be to see how far this kind
of view takes us.
The "contract" which the social contract theorists
arrived at, whatever the variations of form it took
from one thinker to the next, has this negative quality:
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it was never "properly" connected with the real
equivalent form, the material equivalent form of
generalised commodity-relations already becoming
increasingly apparent in the societies of their
day. It was an idealised form, something which
couldn't be cleansed of the mysteries of historical
"origins". Despite this grey side to their thinking,
however, the remarkable quality of their scientific
spirit can only glitter next to the developments of
more recent legal culture, in which connection,
Pashukanis remarks unceremoniously; "The difference
between the natural lax/ doctrine and the most recent
legal positivism is merely that the former has felt
much more clearly the logical association between
abstract state authority and the abstract subject"^,
by which latter he means the equivalent form of
persons as commodity owners. He goes on; "It (natural
law doctrine) took these relationships of a commodity-
producing society, wrapped up in mystery as they were,
in their necessary connections and so provided a
pattern of argumentation of classical clarity, whereas
the so-called legal positivism, on the contrary, has
2
no realisation even of its onw logical premises."
1 . Pashukanis, Theory of Law etc., p.190.
(Allgemeine Rechtslehre, p. 126)..
2. Pashukanis,ibid.
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There are two points to be noted from Pashukanis'
position as it appears here. The first concerns the
general criticism of more recent legal culture and
the fact that it "has no realisation even of its
own logical premises"; and the second concerns the
"merd* difference of this in comparison with so-called
"natural-law doctrine". Let us take the first point
first; it may be dealt with, here very briefly.
It may appear odd that Pashukanis should talk
of "recent legal positivism" being unaware "of its
own logical premises" when such positivism has been
concerned, more than anything else, with the logical
systematisation of legal norms, with "pure" concepts,
notions and designations of normative structures,
legal rules and so forth. Pashukanis' sense, however,
is to be brought out rather differently. The
premises of which modern legal positivism is unaware
are of a historical character. Hence the logical
categories of which it shows no knowledge are those
which are embodied in historical movement - and to
this extent Pashukanis is perfectly correct. The
positivist war-cry against "metaphysics" is symptomatic
of just this deficiency, because "metaphysics" in
earlier legal thinking (i.e. in so-called "natural law
doctrine") is precisely the expression of a serious
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attempt to come to terras with it. The sheer artlesness
of the "Durkheirnian" legal positivist, Duguit, is
illustrative in this connection. Duguit boldly
declares that, "we have to-day (l) eliminated from
politics the theories of metaphysics," and that,
accordingly, "a statute can no longer be the formulated
command of sovereign power," (by which latter he
presumably means metaphysical constructions thereof).
He then continues in "hard-fact" manner: "A statute
is simply the expression of the individual will of
the men (sic) who make it." "Men", a plurality,
with (it is all very simple) an "individual will".
All we have here in fact is a mere reassertion of
the problem, abstract individuality, from which the
"theories of metaphysics" departed. But Duguit only
sees fit to add, "Beyond that we are in the realm
of fiction", as if the "individual will" of "men"
1
bore no such resemblance.
1. Duguit, L, Law in the Modern State, p.69 et. seq.
For an illustration of his "theory", Duguit tells
us: "In France, for example, statute (which
for Duguit embodies the concept of law) is the
expression of the will of 350 deputies and
200 senators who usually form the majority in
the Chamber and in the Senate." - ibid. If only
Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel etc. had had
M. Duguit to open up their eyes to this powerful
theory of law. This is typical of the school—boy
manner in which positivism "eliminates"
metaphysics. As Duguit being a follower of
Durkheim, the latter's "conscience collective"
bears little resemblance to the former1s
re-statement of it in legal style. cf. Durkheim,
Division of Labour in Society.
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The second point, xdiich is connected with this,
concerns the comparative status of so-called "natural
law doctrine" with these more recent developments
characteristic of modern legal culture. "Natural
law doctrine" apprehends the relationships of a
commodity-producing society (Pashukanis means a
capitalist commodity-producing society) "in their
necessary connections." But what does "natural
law doctrine" really mean? It might appear that
Pashukanis could have Plato and the ancients in
mind, or the Thomists and other Christian scholastics
of the middle-ages. In fact, he has in mind the
bourgeois theorists since the time of Grotius -
which is an important point not to miss:
The natural-laxv school was not only the most
brilliant exponent of bourgeois ideology
during the epoch when the bourgeoisie, coming
forward as a revolutionary class, was formulating
its demands openly and systematically: it was
also the school which furnished the model of
the most profound and distinct understanding of
the legal form.
The context in which he speaks of "natural law
doctrine", he further clarifies with the following
statement:
1. Pashukanis, Theory of Law etc., p. 127
(A-Pv. , p.42) .
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For bourgeois thinking the framework of commodity
production is the eternal and natural framework
of every sort of society and it therefore
declares that abstract state authority is an
appurtenance of society of every sort. The
most naive expression of this was by the
natural law thorists, who, basing their >>,
doctrines concerning authority on the idea of
the communion of independent and equal
personalities, supposed that they were starting
from the principles of human intercourse as
such. They were in reality developing in
different modes the idea of an authority which
binds independent commodity owners as between
themselves. This explains the fundamental
features of this doctrine which come out
perfectly distinctly as early as Grotius.
The primary factors in the market are the
commodity possessors who partake in exchange;
the form of authority appears as something
derivative, something secondary and added from
without to the commodity possessors already at
hand. Accordingly, the natural law theorists
regard authority abstractly and rationalistically
- and not as a phaenomenon emerging historically
and therefore associated with the forces in a
given society. In the intercourse of commodity
owners, the necessity of authoritative constraint
arises where peace has broken down, or where
a contract is not voluntarily fulfilled, wherefore
the natural law doctrine reduces the functions
of authority to merely preserving peace, and
declares the sole destiny of the state to be
an instrumentality of the law. Finally, one
commodity owner finds himself in the market
by the will of another, and all are such by
their common will. For this reason the natural
law doctrine produces a state out of a contract
of separate and isolated individuals.
¥e must see how adequate this type-construction of
"natural law doctrine" is. Pashukanis at least is
convinced that "Here we have the skeleton of the
doctrine, and it permits the most diverse specific
variants depending on the historical setting, the
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political sympa.th.ies, and the dialectic powers of
1
the particular author." The independent variables,
however, (political sympathies, dialectic powers
etc.) are not so easily simplified.
On the one hand we have all the differences
which separate Grotius and Hobbes from Rousseau,
or those which distinguish Rousseau from Kant or
Fichte, not to mention a host of other possible
names, and on the other we have the simplification
that they all harboured "natural law doctrine" and
the specific relations and functions attached thereto.
How this simplification and this manifold of
subtlety, genius and rare stupidity may be united
in the productions of these modern classical figures,
we shall begin to consider in detail shortly. But
first a few more words on this "simplification"
aspect of the problem.
It seems a rather Stoic picture of the modern
history of the analysis of "Political Right" if
the "Robinsonades great and small", as Marx might
put it, are thus made to drown — even the giants
being just submerged under the water along xvith the
1. Pashukanis, ibid., p.188-9 (A.R. p.124-5).
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dwarfs right at the bottom. On the other hand, if
we may simply mention for the moment the names of
Locke and Rousseau, the "contractarian" theorists
had indeed only sensed the connection of law with an
"exchange relation" . They sought the basis of right
in a contractual equivalent form - and they rightly
deviated from the ancients here in specifying this
particular form of equivalence, sensing it in its
2
bourgeois "exchange" character. Yet, giants that
1 . "The Stoics lay down that all who are not at the
highest degree of wisdom are equally frivolous and
vicious, as those who are two inches under water..."
- Pascal, "Thoughts", p.114.
2. The equivalent form at the basis of ancient
Political Right is thought out altogether differently.
"Is there or is there not some one thing in which
all citizens must share, if a state is to exist at
all?" asked Protagoras. Here, for instance, he
gives his more mythical answer: "Zeus therefore,
fearing the total destruction of our race, sent
Hermes to impart to men the qualities of respect
for others and a sense of justice, so as to bring
order into our cities and create a bond of friend¬
ship and union. Hermes asked Zeus in what manner
he was to bestow these gifts on men. 'Shall X
distribute them as the arts were distributed -
that is,, on the principle that one trained doctor
suffices for many laymen, and so with other experts?
Shall I distribute justice and respect for their
felloxvs in this way, or to all alike?' 'To all',
said Zeus. 'Let all have their share. There could
never be cities if only a few shared in these
virtues, as in the arts. Moreover, you must lay it
down as my law that if anyone is incapable of
acquiring his share of these two virtues he shall
be put to death as a plague to the city'." - Plato,
"Protagoras", p.54. We shall have cause to consider
the distinction between the "natural equality" of
the ancients and that of the bourgeois theorists
a little later on.
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they were, they nevertheless beheld the contractual
character of right in connection with the mysteries
of the "state of nature" and society in general
(instead of society in particular) and so forthq
thus, they remain submerged under water.
The exchange relation of the "contractarian"
theorists was haunted with "original" spirits, the
contract they arrived at was not grasped as a
historical result but as history's point of departure.
Subsequent developments after Rousseau, in German
idealism, only mystified matters further (while
clarifying others). Kant's development of the "state
of nature" , rvhere the exchange equivalent found its
ideal resting place, into an "idea of Pure Reason"
only served to obscure the real connections more
2
thoroughly. Previous developments, before .Locke,
on the other hand, appear more naive. The important
facts of the exchange equivalent, as an authority
bringing together independent owners of commodities,
are brought out "clearly and distinctly as early as
Grotius." And, indeed, Grotius reflects with perfect
1. "..not arising historically, but posited by
nature." - Marx, see infra on Rousseau etc..
2. The Kantian emphasis &as in this way achieved an
enormous significance as a pillar and final
bastion of modern European legal culture. It
is thus sufficiently important to warrant separate
consideration later on.
-Im¬
precision the new jurisprudence appropriate to
bourgeois society — in his case a Holland in commercial
ascendency upon the high seas of world trade. In
this connection, it may be added, we find the true
origins of modern jurisprudence - not in Babylon,
or Greece or even Rome and later medieval times,
but in Holland over the turn of the sixteenth century.
But in any of these developments, before Locke
or after Rousseau, in the "freedom of the seas"
on in the ether of "pure reason", the equivalent
form had not been engaged. There is, however, a
strange circularity in the conclusion that every
last one of them thus adhered to "natural law' doctrine".
Pashukanis does them swift justice, which shows itself
in the parallel conclusion that none of them had
discovered what Marx was ordained to reveal, namely,
the class mechanism underlying the bourgeois social
equivalent form.
It transpires that it is all rather too obvious
that the classical bourgeois theorists hadn't
properly engaged the social equivalent form over
which they showed such admirable enthusiasm. But
although it is trivially true that none of them could
find out what Marx could, it is never all—too-obvious
why. The result of this is that we are led into
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believing the classicals to be on a par with the
developments in recent legal culture. Let us
explain this. On reflection it is obviously the
case, for example, that the "contractual" sentiments
of Locke or Rousseau were not quite placed in their
appropriate social conditions - less so in Rousseau
than in Locke (but leaving aside their "dialectic
powers" for the moment). The reason for this,
however, is not that they were in some strange
way "lesser" men than Marx (which allows any number
of vague and base distinctions to hold sway), but
that they couldn't have been expected (except by
someone rather foolish) to have perceived in full
scientific detail the social changes they were
immediately caught tip with. And what are these
social changes? They comprise the quickly eroding
ancien regime, a hitherto unrealised expansion of
productive forces and, therewith, markets, the
growing power of the bourgeoisie, their class
alliances alongside threats of civil war and so
forth. They are conditions which reflect the
nascent character of bourgeois society; and so,
the new social order of equality, of private property
and "freedom of the individual" is naturally somewhat
difficult to see in its fuller developed character:
for such a thing did not then exist. This cannot
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be said of recent modern legal culture, which merely
echoes the old tales of its classical mentors with
a complacency they could never have shared.
The classical theorists are not to be treated
unjustly just because their epigones (and epigones
of these epigones) have been prepared to let almost
two hundred years of history escape their attention.
These classical theorists, from Grotius through
to Kant, attacked the problem of right and the
mysteries of equality with all the scientific
spirit they could muster. Their business was
genuinely with a science of right, and that they
got so far as the "contract", a relation of apparently
isolated individuals somehow brought together by
their mutual interest, that they made, in other
words, a fundamental connection of right with
"exchange", shows just how far they had developed
1
this science. Hence the fact that recent legal
1. The legal historian, Maine, had this to say of
the "contract" theorists: "They had observed the
fact, already striking in their day, that of the
positive rules obeyed by man, the greater part
were created by Contract, the lesser by Imperative
Law". - Ancient Law, p.324. But for some strange
reason Maine does not see fit to enlighten the
reader as to the meaning of this distinction.
Thus what is not "imperative" about "contract"
he does not say. Regardless of this, however, he
felt the pompous need to point out that, "they
(the Contract theorists) were ignorant (sic) or
careless (sic) of the historical relation of
these two constituents of jurisprudence." — ibid.
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thought has not really got any further than these
classical luminaries, and has continued to merely
parrot in the dullest of ways the same difficulties
with which they were faced, is inclined to lead
us to over hasty conclusions about the scientific
achievements embodied in the classical formulations
of right, or "natural" equality and so forth.
Pashukanis is nevertheless perfectly within
his rights to say of natural equality and the
classical modern thinkers who re-thought the
matter, that they hadn't got it right. He says J
In all other relationships, human inequality —
inequality of sex, inequality of class, and
so on - is so glaringly conspicuous as history
stretches before us that we can only marvel, not
at the wealth of arguments that its various
opponents could advance against the doctrine
of natural equality of human beings, but at the
fact that down to Marx, and independently of
Marx, no one concerned himself with the problem
of the historical causes which contributed to
the rise of this natural-law prejudice. For
if over the ages human thought has so stubbornly
returned to the thesis that people are equal
and has worked it out in a thousand and one
modes, it is clear that there must be some ^
objective relationship concealed behind it.
On the other hand, those who harboured "this natural-
law prejudice" were, to the extent they sheltered it,
keeping out at sea precisely to the same extent the
1 . Pashukanis, Theory of Law and Marxism, p.195
(Allgemeine Rechtslehre, p.13^-}»
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objective causes behind it. And, for this reason,
just the converse of Pashukanis1 position might be
asserted, namely, that down to Marx and independently
of Marx, every single one of those modern classical
thinkers of "natural-law prejudice" had been concerned
with, and had contributed towards the revealing of,
the latter's "objective" basis. it is not just a
question, for instance, of Locke having seen less
than Rousseau in regard of "natural right" etc., but,
on this admission, a question of Rousseau having
revealed more than Locke. Whatever the case may be
(and we shall come to such details shortly -for
they are important), it is clear that in Pashukanis'
own terms he is more than overexaggerating when he
declares: "..down to Marx, and independently of Marx,
no one concerned himself with the historical causes
which contributed to the rise of this natural-law
prejudice". For this is precisely what the classical
thinkers of "natural-law prejudice" were concerned
to derive as best they possibly could.
The "Contract" and the "State of
Nature"
... Summary: "Natural" Sympathies.
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The "Contract" and the "State of Nature" ..
Tiie "contract" is really the private-law
contract of a capitalist coinmodit-y-producing society.
But it is more than this. It is the specifically
legal form enmeshed within a configuration of problem
about its "origins"; the problem of the "state of
nature" and the further questions which this poses,
man's position therein and, conversely, his
development through society, the role of culture,
industry and so forth. The solution is the "social
contract". It appears in the classical writers not
as a historical result of their own particular
society, but as something which terminates the "state
of nature" and begins the dawn of civilisation.
Thus the specifically legal form is displaced and
articulated within a strange system of philosophic
reasoning at the centre of which lie this "contract"
and the "state of nature". Thus also, the "natural-
law prejudice". But we have a duty to see how this
sort of thing came about if we are not to forget the
names of Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau — not to
mention Kant, Hegel, St. Simon ... (Marx?).
How great was Rousseau's "natural—law prejudice"
This is a question around which the issues at stake
may be developed. Let us see why.
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Professor Habermas informs us that Hegel must
have possessed a deep fear of the French Revolution,
a fear -which outwardly manifested itself in the
glowing enthusiasm with which he was inclined
1
depict it from time to time. Be that as it may,
Hegel Tvas certainly scronful of the ideas which,
he believed, announced it:
The distinction.. .between what is merely in
common, and what is truly universal, is
strikingly expressed by Rousseau in his
famous "Contrat Social", when he says that
the laws of a state must spring from a
universal will (volonte general), but need
not on that account be the will of all
(volonte de tous). Rousseau would have done
better service towards a theory of the state, ^
if he had always kept this distinction in sight.~
Rousseau hadn't always managed to stop that which
is "merely in common" from becoming the object of
his enquiries. For Hegel it was unthinkable that
the state should be connected with such a base
foundation. The terror, according to Hegel, was
just such a perversion.
But what is this thing "in common"? Xn reality,
it is the force which mysteriously brings together
those isolated and independent commodity owners ("men"
in their mutual interest and benefit - an equivalent
1. c.f. Habermas' discussion of Hegel's Jena lecture
in "Theory and Practice".
2. Hegel, Logic, p.253.
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form, which expresses itself historically in the
juridical form of a contract. However, this
contract is, in Rousseau, transposed to the question
of the foundation of political right, the "state
of nature", the "origins" of society and so forth.
Therefore Rousseau doesn't exactly let his thoughts
lapse to an object "in common" (the "conscience"
of the "all": the equivalent form), but, rather,
lets them drift far too far away from it, to the
dawning of civil society. Xn other words, it was
in a way to Rousseau's merit that he did not do
what Hegel reprimanded him for not doing: for not
making the "concept" of the general will the
substantial element, for not making it a primaeval,
universal will unfolding and realising itself in
its historical and many such moments.
Something so important as a "will" shared by
individuals in common could hardly be "merely"
something in common if it had found its way -to the
"origins" of civil society. The lofty arrogance
which denies this finds its place in classical
German Philosophy, where, admittedly, the "irrational"
elements of Rousseau's social contract had been
perceived, but only because "their" reason (Kant's
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"Pure Reason", Hegel's "Idea" etc.) could not err
in such a way; that is to say, only because Rousseau'
problems had not really been taken up. For Hegel
it was a base exercise to reduce "the union of
individuals in the state to a contract and therefore
to something based on their arbitrary wills, their
opinion, and their capriciously given express consent"
The point, however, is that the "union of individuals"
under the form of a contract is a riddle to be solved
before it can be scorned, and Hegel had not solved
it, for the contract was anything but a matter of
"arbitrary wills" in this connection.
The irrational character of Rousseau's social
contract really comes to this: It is the juridical
form of contract (a definite historical result)
appearing out of place; the rude "abstract individual
a product of the crumbling ancien regime and the rise
of industrial capital, appears as the thing-in—common,
the condition of an "original" contract at the
foundation of society in general - not Rousseau's
particular society (Geneva), but all societies. But
there is more to Rousseau's contract than meets the
eye .
1 . Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 157-
1 . Rousseau, The Social Contract, p„12.
2. Might could not create right for Rousseau.
"The strongest is never strong enough
to bo always the master, unless he
transforms strength into right", - he
says in the "Social Contract", ibid., p.6.
"Right", therefore, is always the master.
If strength were to be the foundation of
right, Rousseau goes on, "As soon as it.
is possible to disobey with impunity,
disobedience is legitimate; and the
strongest being always in the right, the
only thing that matters is to act so as
to become the strongest «> ibid. This
distinction of Rousseau's between might
and right vis a vis Hobbes, Grotius etc.
is well known. What is not so well-
recognised is the fact that Rousseau,
who then of course moves to the idea that
"conventions" create right, forgot that
Hcbbes had also applied the "convention" of the
<»'■ "covenant" to his state of bellum omnium
contra omnes. In other words, the
distinction force/convention is hot air,
like everything else in the "state of
nature" .
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The equivalent form supposed in the juridical
notion of the contract appears in Rousseau's social
contract as a natural endowment giving each and all
the capacity to enter into a contractual arrangement
with themselves (for there is no "other") for the
purpose of establishing nothing less that the state,
law, society itself. It is a strange agreement.
But let us leave this for the moment. The "clauses"
of the social contract may be reduced to one, says
Rousseau: "—the total alienation of each associate,
together x^ith all his rights, to the whole community;
for, ; in the first place, as each gives himself
absolutely, the conditions are the same for all;
and, this being so, no one has any interest in
1
making them burdensome to others." Each associate
"naturally" does this. The grounds for association,
however, are not "force" - that, to Rousseau, entailed
2
a Grotian or a Hobbesian view of man - but the force
of "reason". "Reason", which distinguishes for
Rousseau social man, is pursued back to "natural"
man, man in the "state of nature".
The general point to be made here, hoxvever, is
that the equivalent form cannot be decyphered or
further distinguished on account of this or that
contending view of man's dispositions in the "state
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of nature". Whether or not it was by force of the
Divine, Rational, brutal or otherwise, the "original
compact" could not help but. repulse and turn away
its inner socio-historical character. Even though,
as we shall see, Rousseau made great advances, the
equivalent form of the "abstract individual" was
hardly given a concrete character when it had still
to be thought out (as with Hobbes and Locke) in
a pre-social connection.
Rousseau's social contract is something
conceivable only under conditions of a hitherto
unknown level of commodity production, production of
and for exchange and all the relations embodied
therein. The contract, a reciprocal relation, an
exchange relation bearing an implicit form of
equivalence: this in fact turns on the commodity-
form of property, property as it is immediately
appropriated and alienated, "freely and equally",
in the mutual business of exchange. This is not a
pre-social question; it is essentially bound up
with a specific historical stage in the social
development of commodity production, a state in which
is realised the production and reproduction of
commodity—exchange relations on an increasingly
public scale - and, not least within the sphere of
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"Political Right", the subject-matter of Rousseau's
1
inquiry. Rousseau had got this far: there xs an
equivalent form at the basis of right which may be
conceived under the form of a contract« But he
could never say why this should be so, for he
develops this observation in regard of the
individual in his "natural" state - precisely the
theoretical domain in which the "individual" is
stripped of all his social relations, his
contractual abilities and the like.
The actual ability of a general "all" (the
classical writers were not always so inexact, and
often spoke, more concretely, of the "many" in
the same connection) to enter into a contractual
arrangement is a socio-legal question. Once it is
perceived as such, the forcefulness of the notion
that a "people" may be subsumed under a "natural"
form as equals can also be developed and connected
in with this definite social basis. A uniform
contractual facility shared by the "all" is the
historical result of specifically capitalist social
development. The equivalent form which Rousseau
1. Thus, "The Social Contract, or Principles of
Political Right". Rousseau's title is greeted
by Vergil: "Foederis aequas, Dicaraus leges."
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put in the dress of the social contract cannot be
anything other than a social relation and, as such,
peculiar to a definite social form of equality.
It arises, we have said (Part l) from the character
of property in exchange, a form reproduced on an
ever increasing social scale only under capitalist
conditions of production. The equivalent form of
commodities or property in exchange brings with it
the "abstract individual", a form which the real
individual shares ih common with all others because
and so far as they are bearers of property in
exchange. Thus the actual nature of the contractual
facility at the hands of each in common lies hidden
within the mechanism of generalised commodity
production and exchange. The real equivalent form
at the bottom of modern "Political Right", far
from being an original and natural one, subsists
in generalised commodity exchange, which in turn
passes down into the mechanism of social production
and reproduction of exchange relations.
Rousseau had misplaced his lead on the trail
of the social equivalent form. Instead of talcing
him to the depths of bourgeois society, the form of
the contract took him elsewhere, to a pre-social
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state of affairs. But we must now look at all this
more closely. Few scholars of any note have failed
to notice that Rousseau put the preconditions of
the social contract outside society, that these
conditions have to be oddly construed as subsisting
already in the "reason" of individuals all similarly
thus compelled so far as they are to relinquish
their pre—social condition. On the other hand, few
again of these (philosophers, historians etc., great
and small) have grasped the source of this disturbing
theoretical procedure. Consequently, most have
failed to fully appreciate the problem (and the
"solution") of Jean-Jaques Rousseau.
Rousseau's social contract was a theoretical
"failure". But this "failure" has a right to its
inverted commas. Rousseau's social contract was,
concludes Louis Althusser, an "admirable 'failure'
of an unprecedented theory". The impossibility of
the social contract in the way that Rousseau expressed
it A namely, as something proscribed in a pre—social
state by a distinctly modern legal form — leads
Althusser to conclude, most sympathetically, that
beyond this and the further contradictions which this
leads to, there was only one recourse available to
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Rousseau's genius: "..there is still one recourse,
but one of a different kind, this time, the transfer
of the impossible theoretical solution (the social
contract) into the alternative to theory, literature.
The admirable 'fictional triumph' of an unprecedented
literature: La Nouvelle Heloise, Smile, the Confessions.
That they are unprecedented may not be unconnected
with the admirable 'failure' of an unprecedented
theory: the Social Contract.""' We shall return to
Althusser shortly. But amongst certain authorities
on Rousseau whom we shall find cause to name, we
must bear in mind primarily the finest authority
- Rousseau himself.
1. L. Althusser, "Rousseau: The Social Contract",
in "Politics and History", p.160.
In this essay on Rousseau's Social Contract
Althusser, as the text will make clear, gives
a clear picture of the important issues in
this area. But I take the opportunity here
to point out that this cannot be said of
Althusser's work in general. It is my
opinion that Althusser has earned for himself
the title of the "Kant" of Marxism, and when
we come to discuss Kant later on in this work
(albeit in rather different connection) the
full meaning of this will perhaps be clearer.
But I mean this only in the sense of Kant-the-
defender—of—the—faith, the "epistomelogical"
champion, who made what was "rightful"
identical with Pure Reason: "Rightful" Reason.
Is Althusser's "political" reason (speaking
"epistemologically" of course) anything other
than a surreptitious "back to Kant"? It can
be no other.
cf. Althusser et al., Reading Capital.
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In the second Discourse (on the origin of
inequality etc .) , Rousseau shows us what he thinks
of his predecessors (Grotius, Hobbes, Locke)
and their regard of the "state of nature":
The philosophers, who have inquired into the
foundations of society, have all felt the
necessity of going back to a state of nature;,
but not one of them has got there. Some of
them have not hesitated to ascribe to man, in
such a state, the idea of just and unjust,
without troubling themselves to shoxf that he
must be possessed of such an idea, or that it
could be of any use to him. Others have
spoken of the natural right of every inan to
keep what belongs to him, without explaining
what they meant by "belongs". Others again,
beginning by giving the strong authority over
the weak, proceed directly to the birth of
government, without regar d to the time that
must have elapsed before the meaning of the
words "authority" ^nd "government" could have
existed among men.
"Authority", "government", the "idea of justice"
- these things are entirely bound up with the
conditions of man's social development. And this,
Rousseau recognised, meant the development of human
thought and industry- (agriculture and metallurgy).
How far is this an improvement on the theories of
Hobbes and Locke? Hobbes and Locke, it seems, had
been less acute on these matters than Rousseau.
1. Rousseau, "A Discourse on the subject prepared
by the Academy of Dijon: What is the Origin
of Inequality among Men, and is it Authorised
by Natural Law?", p.171*
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In Hobbes, the covenant of total alienation
appears as a most peculiar application of the
contract—form to a state of war; it is a strange
contract of insurance which the people somehow
take out amongst themselves - against a "nasty,
brutish and short" life. where and bow this comes
about, Hobbes never really saj^s, and to this extent
we may conclude that there is little historical
imagination in his "covenant". Perhaps more clearly
in Locke we find the dawning of a more historically
conscious outlook on the "origins" of right. Here,
human labour is brought on to the scene. The fear
of death, which was all very well, becomes coupled
with the need to protect private property. Man
must have not just his person protected, but that
which is also his, his property in which his .labour
has been incorporated as means to life. In this
way, Locke turned up connections nearer to the heart
of modern right — property, labour. Yet this
"labour" of Locke's still doesn't approach anything
like the concreteness of Rousseau. Instead of the
metallurgy and agriculture which Rousseau talked
of in the Social Contract and the second Discourse,
Locke merely talked of the "mixing of labour" with
the fruits of the earth in a mysterious connection
i.e. in the "state of nature", whence the Holy
Trinity of life, liberty and estate.
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The point is tixat Rousseau's predecessors had
not attended to the distinction between natural and
social man very thoroughly. They had moved all-too-
quickly to the "state of nature" and back again
for "the foundations of society, and "..in speaking
1
of the savage, they described social man." Yet
precisely the same criticism is to be made of
Rousseau that he levels against Iiobbes, Locke etc.
The difference is one of degree, for although
Rousseau's attention is drawn to the futility of
looking back to an "original" state of affairs in
which "modern" categories (of right, authority,
justice etc.) might be found, his own distinction
between the "original" and the "modern" bears the
same uneasiness. That is to say, although Rousseau
is aware of the "natural-law prejtidice" as it
manifests itself in Hobbes, Locke and others, he is
nevertheless himself caught within its clutches.
In Rousseau, that which is a specifically bourgeois
development, the legal form of contract, still finds
its way back to the terminus of the "state of nature"
and the point of departure of civilisation.
1 . Rousseau, ibid., p.171 •
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Accordingly, there is the same problem of the
contract and the "state of nature" in Hobbes, Locke
and Rousseau, even though in all three it is manifest
in differing ways. However, their differing
"dialectic powers" (especially Rousseau's, the raost
advanced) must be revealed fully if the scope cf
the "natural—law prejudice" (if we may continue with
that expression of Pashukanis') and its inner
historical and theoretical determinations are to
b e guaged.
Xn the nature of the modern-classical problem,
there is first the division, "state of nature"/society.
With this appears the question of the relation between
the two. "Man" passes from a "state cf nature" into
civil society. He and his fellows mediate this
passage. This mediation is thought out in Hobbes,
Locke and Rousseau under the form of a contract.
So much for the bare elements.
In Hobbes, it is well-known, men in the "state
of nature", which is a state of war, suddenly,
despairingly, find themselves in agreement: they
"covenant, every one with every one". In this they
give up all their freedom, not to a sovereign "in
exchange" for security etc., but to a sovereign,
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period. That is to say, the sovereign is the
result of the covenant, not a party to it. Hence,
the people have no right to expect anything in
exchange from the sovereign — they have not
contracted with a sovereign - and, with this, we
find the "Hobbesian problem" of absolute power,
the question of limitations etc. Again, we may
mention in passing, no one fails to notice Hobbes1
problem here, yet few have appreciated its precise
causes (the historical causes are generally at best
put merely in the following sort of way: Hobbes
was living during a time of civil war, he was a
"timid" man etc.). The source of the contract or
covenant in Hobbes is pure mystery: IIow are
independent, belligerent individuals suddenly
brought together, xvhat force is at work producing
this strange form, this uniform contract of equal
donation of life and liberty? The answer for Hobbes
is the same one given by Locke and Rousseau (it is
only the clauses of their "contracts" which differ):
the "reason" of "nature". This, of course, turns
on the nature of their reasoning.
We have seen that, according to Rousseau, the
state of nature in Hobbes is ill-observed. So also
in Locke. "Others have spoken of the natural right
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of every man to keep what belongs to him} without
explaining what they meant by 'belongs ' « Others
again, beginning by giving the strong authority over
the weak, proceed directly to the birth of government.."
Hobbes and. Locke denied the state of nature its
non-social character in supposing there the conventions
of civil society, and they denied the social character
of their objects of inquiry (Right, Authority,
Government, Law etc.) their non-natural character
in supposing here that they are founded upon a
natural basis. Denial. "Denegation", says Althusser,
who, moreover, is speaking specifically in connection
with Rousseau. A similar "denegation" eats at the
root of Rousseau's theoretical "discrepancies",
to use another of Althusser's terms J We may take
note of Althusser's points here.
1 . "Discrepancy", is the rendering given by
Brewster, Althusser's translator, of the
French, "declage". According to this
translator: "Xts literal meaning is something
like the state of being 'staggered' or 'out
of step'." note in Althusser, "Rousseau:
The Social Contract", p.113. The translator
also holds the view that "dislocation" would
be a "more mechanical" as distinct from the
"more mental metaphor" in this connection.
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In the categories of" the legal form of contract
there are two parties. They exist independently
of the act of exchange which brings them together,
quite mysteriously, as isolated individuals \n.th
mutual interests. But in Rousseau's social contract
there are no two independent existences coming
together. Here is what Althusser says:
(l)n every contract the two recipient parties
exist prior to and externally to the act of
the contract. In Rousseau's Social Contract,
only the first recipient party conforms to
these conditions. The second recipient party,
escapes them. It does not exist before the
contract. Hence the paradox of the Social
Contract is to bring together two recipient
parties, one of which exists prior to and
externally to the contract, while the other
does not, since it is the product of the
contract itself, or better: its object, its
end .
Rousseau does not escape the theoretical difficulties
which he perceives in his predecessors; he reproduces
them in another form, a form which betrays a deeper
awareness of these difficulties and, with this, a
more sophisticated sense of their source. Here
again is how Althusser describes Rousseau's
difficulties:
The 'peculiarity* of the Social Contract is that
it is an exchange agreement concluded between
two recipient parties (like any other contract),
but one in which the second recipient party
does not pre-exist the contract since it is its
product/
1. Althusser, "Rousseau: The Social Contract", p. 129*
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product. The 'solution' represented by the
contract is thus pre~inscribed in one of the
very conditions of the contract, the second
recipient party, since this is not pre-
existent to the contract. Thus we can observe
in Rousseau's own discourse a discrepancy
within the elements of the contract: between
the theoretical statuses cj>f the first and
second recipient parties.
All this is true of Locke and Hobhes, but in Rousseau
this "discrepancy" yields up the most revealing
limitations. Althusser goes on:
...Rousseau, aware of this discrepancy, cannot
but mask it with the very terms he uses when
he has to note it: in fact he negates this
discrepancy, either by designating the first
recipient party by the name of the second (the
people), or the second by the name of the
first (the individual). Rousseau is lucid,
but he can do no other. He cannot renounce
this discrepancy...That is why when Rousseau
directly encounteres this discrepancy, he
deals with it by denegation: by calling the
first recipient party by the name of the
second one, and the second by the name of
the first. Denegation is repression.
This "discrepancy", which in Althusser's
3
"reading" develops into different stages of
"discrepancies" (Discrepancy i, Discrepancy XX etc.)
and, finally, to the sheer impossibility of a solution,
is a form of repression. It is symptomatic of the
repression of the social equivalent form underlying
1. Althusser, ibid., p.130.
2 . ibid . , p .1 31 •
3. For the kind of emphasis which Althusser gives
to the activity of "reading", see his and
E. Balibar's "Reading Capital", Introduction.
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bourgeois right, the "abstract individual", the
right-bearing unit embodied in the legal form of
contract; that is to say, a repression of their
concrete inner-connections, with the commodity-form,
the mode of production, social classes etc.
The basic fault with Rousseau's social contract
is that it is cast in the most inappropriate of
moulds, the legal form of contract. The result
is that he is led into "designating the first
recipient party by the name of the second (the
people) , or the second by the name of the first
(the individual)." This observation of Althusser's
is very important. But first a few facts. The
"people" is the name of the second party, i.e. the
result of a prior convention in which it does not
exist as such. Thus, in speaking against Grotius,
Rousseau says:
A people, says Grotius, can give itself to a
king. Then, according to Grotius, a people is
a people before it gives itself. The gift is
itself a civil act, and implies public
deliberation. Xt would be better, before
examining the act by which a people gives
itself to a king, to examine that by which it
has become a people; for this act, being
necessarily prior to tijLe other, is the true
foundation of society.
1. Rousseau, "The Social Contract", p.11.
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Grotius naively presupposes a "people" before it
gives itself to a king. But, with equal naivety,
Rousseau does the same, except for the difference
that with him the "people" is presupposed before
it gives itself to itself. In Rousseau, "a people"
must "become a people". The result of the act by
which "a people..has become a people" is "a people",
and the cause thereof, "a people". Tautology.
On the other hand, the "people" (as result) is
also conditional upon, each "individual" : "each
gives himself to all". But that same "individual"
then appears in the result of the act, nay more than
this, as "the" result, where the individual "may
still obey himself alone, and remain as free as
before".^
In Rousseau, the dual result, people/individual,
may arise from a contract between individual and
individual, people and people, individual and people,
people and individual. ¥hat a mess! A people is
1 . ibid., p.12. . From the famous passage where
Rousseau presents the "difficulty": "'The
problem is to find a form of association which
will defend and protect with the whole common
force the person and goods of each associate,
and in which each, while uniting himself with
all, may still obey himself alone, and remain
as free as before.' This is the fundamental
problem of which the Social Contract provides
the solution." — Rousseau, ibid.
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realised through individuals coming together;
individuals are brought together in so far as they
are a people, unanimous etc. This is how silly
the legal form of the exchange agreement looks
when it is forced into contending with the
"principles of political right".
Only in bourgeois societ)1- does the "individual"
appear at the same time as a "public" figure and,
conversely, the "public" symbol as the embodiment
of the "individual". Therefore, the people/individual
debacle in Rousseau is a definite sublimation of the
legal form of contract. For, in the legal form of
contract we find the "abstract individual", the
public/private figure merged into one as the
singular juridical right-bearing unit. It is this
which in Rousseau is displaced and pondered under
the quaint candle-light of eighteenth century Reason.
We cannot modify the theoretical status of the
"natural-law prejudice"; it is the same whether we
pass it over as the mysterious commodity-form hidden
in one way and another by an outmoded impression
of "nature", or whether we. look at its more intricate
movements e.g. in Rousseau. In other words, the
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"natural-law prejudice" is a most finely determined
object, and is to be understood as having nothing
to do with crude historico-theoretical generalisation
despite the fact that on occasion one might find it
convenient to talk simply of modern "natural-la\*r
dogma" as a more or less naieve expression of the
new social order of markets, contracts and money.
Rousseau, of all the modern classical natural-
law writers, elucidates most symptomatically the
theoretical depths to which the contract-form is
incapable of reaching. However, it is surely best
not to get bogged down in questions about Rousseau's
"originality" here. It is important not to get
lost in a strange and increasingly irreconcilable
"history of ideas" (which ail-too greedily turns
itself into a scholastic exercise of no consequence,
into an object reminiscent of Benda's "Trahison Des
Clercs"). "Why, indeed, compare Rousseau with Hobbes
and Locke — instead of, say, Hobbes with Descartes
and Spinoza? Thus, for instance, Spinoza had
perceived the theoretical dualism of Hobbes in a
way certainly no more reprehensible than Rousseau.
On the other hand, it might be added, Rousseau
wasn't exactly the spiritual recluse "fearlessly"
Spinoza and Rousseau are both compared
with Hobbes in the following passage of
Leo Strauss' "Natural Right and History"
(p.272): "His (Hobbes1) notion of the
whole required, however, as Spinoza had
indicated, that the dualism of the natural
world and the world of man, be reduced
to the monism of the natural world or that
the transition from the state of nature
to civil society, or man's revolt against
nature, be understood as a natural process.
Hobbes had concealed from himself this
necessity, partly because he erroneously
assumed that presocial man is already a
rational being, a being capable of making
contracts (instead of "partly", Strauss
would have done better to say, "precisely"
— but any sound notion of the tyranny of
the legal form is understandably alien
to this recent natural-lawyer). The
transition from the state of nature to
civil society therefore coincided for
him with the conclusion of the social
contract. But Rousseau was forced by
his realisation of the necessary implications
of Hobbes' premises to conceive of that
transition as consisting in, or at least
decisively prepared by, a natural process;
man's leaving the state of nature, his
embarking on the venture of civilisation,
is due not to a good or bad use of his
freedom or to essential necessity but to
mechanical causation or to a series of
natural accidents." "Essential necessity",
"mechancial causation", "use of freedom",
"natural accidents" - Strauss, in other
words, finds it difficult to express the
way in which Rousseau overcame the discrepancy
that he (Rousseau) had noted in Kobbes .
Appropriate references regarding Spinoza's
criticism of Hobbes are given by Strauss,
ibid. But see generally B. de Spinoza,
"Ethics, Proved in Geometrical Order"
(Everyman). Regarding the Geometry of
Hobbes; In 1629, according to Plamenatz,
Hobbes, on a visit to the Continent,
"discovered and 'fell in love' with geometry,
and came to believe that true knowledge in
every sphere is to be gained by the method
of geometer". - Hobbes, "Leviathan",
Introduced by J. Plamenatz, p..3. It is
said/
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putting geometrically forth his moral objections to
1
Hob'oes' fearful geometry .... and so forth. To get
to the point: "comparison", "originality" must not
be encouraged entry into the issues at stake here,
they cannot in themselves have any theoretical
importance. They cannot, because they thrive on the
fact that "there is no comparison". As soon as
"comparison" begins to take over, everything begins
to get mysterious, for the opposing thesis going
hand in hand with such a project is that "distinctness",
"originality", "genius" etc. are incomparable. Paced
with the infinite barrenness of this same/difference
opposition (for in itself the distinction brings
literal3.y anything into play) , it is no accident
that the "history of ideas" at its best develops the
symptoms of blind obsession for biographic detail
spiced with vulgar journalistic intimacy.
Accordingly our purpose rests neither with the
"difference" nor the "sameness" of Rousseau's work
("compared" with Hobbes, Locke etc.), but rather with
"sameness and difference" taken together, whenever
and in so far as there is cause to speak of one or
the other. Thus it is to be hoped that within the
(note 1 cont.)
that Hobbes, at one time believed he had managed
to "square the circle", much to his subsequent
embarrasment. Theoretically, the impossible
squaring of the circle, resembles the equally
impossible "squaring" of the legal form of
contract with the foundations of society.
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foregoing comments neither "sameness" or "difference"
is unduly accentuated in connection with the ideas
of Rousseau, and that what is "different" in Rousseau
expresses at the same time something which is to be
found in Hobbes, Locke etc. also, and conversely,
what is the "same" is, at the same time, expressed
differently - in other words, that the distinction
same/different is reduced to indifference and
appropriately left behind to cover the void space
it is forever doomed to peer into.
Let us illustrate what is meant by this same/
difference business another way. If one is stressed,
the other is understressed - they must, consequently,
be held in mind together. If we make too much of
Rousseau's dialectic powers, we forget that they
were contained by the "natural-law prejudice"; if
we fail to give due regard to his acute powers of
observation, we run the risk of overstating the
"sameness" within the manifold of natural—law doctrine.
Let us, in lieu of a summary, consider in this
connection Lucio Colletti's essay: "Rousseau as
Critic of 'Civil Society'".^
1 . In L. Colletti, "From Rousseau to Lenin",
p. 143 et. seq.
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It is not such, a novelty as Colletti makes out
that Rousseau had dialectics embedded in his criticisms
1
of civil society. However, the distinctness and
acuteness of some of Rousseau's points leads
Colletti into wanting to distinguish him "from" the
tradition of natural-law thinking. A good deal
hangs on this word "from". Rousseau can certainly
be distinguished from Hobbes, from Locke, from Grotius;
but he can only be distinguished "within" the natural-
law tradition. Here we have a case of "difference"
1. Compare Engels, "Anti-Duhring", p.159-61. A
text which Colletti sees fit not to mention in
this connection. "Outside philosophy in
the restricted sense, the French nevertheless
prodoced masterpieces of dialectic. ¥e need
only call to mind Diderot's 'Le Neveu de Rameau'
and Rousseau's 'Discourse sur 1'origine et les
fonderaents de 1'inegalite parmi les homines'."
writes Engels in the Introduction to this work.
Apart from the fact that this shows that at
least one of the founding-fathers of Marxism
(we shall come to the other in the text) was
aware of Rousseau's fine critical faculties,
there are other reasons why Colletti is displeased
with this work of Engels. In this connection
compare Colletti's remarks on the development
of Marxist philosophy in his Introduction to
the Pelican edition of Marx's "Early writings".
The issues are too involved to deal with here.
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ignorir.g "sameness", or, rather, seem to have. We
seem to have a case of disproportion. The distinctness
and often astonishing penetration of Rousseau's
thinking leads Colletti~into occasionally putting
Rousseau far too far outside the context of the
natural-law tradition. In so far as Colletti does
this, he must overexaggerate Rousseau's connections
elsewhere.
Accordingly, "(o)ne point that is embarrasing
and hard to explain in this whole affair", Colletti's
affair with Rousseau, "is that in spite of the fact
of his debt to Rousseau, Marx never gave any
1
inclination of being remotely aware of it." Without
documenting the context of Colletti's statement,
there immediately appears a yawning gulf to be
bridged over a typically uncertain "history of ideas"
here - namely, where a "debt" is unacknowledged by
Marx to a thinker who came before Hegel, St. Simon,
Fourier (not to mention Feuerbach, Proudhon etc.),
and before classical Political Economy (we sha.ll come
to this), Smith, Ricardo etc.
1. Colletti, "Rousseau as Critic..etc.", p.187-
Marx, Grundrisse, p.83. My friend, Neil
MacCormick, to whom X o\<r& a great deal
in connection with, much of this work,
takes exception, in particular, to Marx'
view of Smith as it is expressed here,
namely, that the latter "begins" \irith
the "individual and isolated hunter and
fisherman". The basis of the objection
is that Smith does not postulate the
individual or isolated hunter and
fisherman, but rather, "nations of
hunters", having their own characteristi
social structure. The point is well-
made only in so far as one is prepared
to ignore the extent to which Smith
actually managed to distinguish the
characteristic social structure of
"nations of hunters" from that of
bourgeois nations. Marx's point, of
course, is that he didn't manage to do
this, that is, not scientifically at
any rate, and.that, consequently, many
of Smith's economic categories have the
quality of being applicable to all forms
of society, with nothing theoretically
preventing this "naturalistic" error.
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Here is a quote from Marx's Grundrisse which
Colletti makes use of in his argument;
The individual and isolated hunter and
fisherman, with, whom Smith and*Ricardo
begin, belongs among the unimaginative
conceits of the eighteenth-century
Robinsonades, which in no way expresses
merely a reaction against over-sophistication
and a return to a misunderstood natural life,
as cultural historians imagine. (just) as
little (does) Rousseau's contrat social,
which brings naturally independent autonomous
subjects into relation and connection by
contract, rest on such naturalism. This
is a semblance, the merely aesthetic semblance,
of the Robinsonades great and small. Xt is,
rather, the anticipation of "civil society",
in preparation since the sixteenth century
and making giant strides forward towards
maturity in the eighteenth. In this society
of free competition, the individual appears
detached from the natural bonds etc. which
in earlier historical periods make him the
accessory of a definite and limited human
conglomerate. Smith and Ricardo still stand
with both feet on the shoulders of these
eighteenth-century j^rophets, in whose
imaginations this eighteenth-century individual
— the product on the one side of the dissolution
of the feudal forms of society, on the other
side of the new forces of production developed
since the sixteenth century — appears as an
ideal, whose existence they project into the
past. Not as a historic result but as history's
point of departure. As the Natural Individual
appropriate to their notion of human nature,
not arising historically, but posited by nature.
The thing which Colletti takes exception to here is
the assimilation of Rousseau within this natural-law
tradition i.e. that mode of thinking which places
the 'Abstract individual", the historical product of
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the social development of commodity production and
exchange, in a pre-social connection, in a "natural"
state of affairs. According to Colletti, this
"rather remarkable passage" of Marx's, which, he
rightly observes, "recalls the real historical
roots (the development of commodity production and
the resulting configuration of all social relations
as 'contractual' or 'exchange relations) of the
'independent' individual of eighteenth-century
natural-law theory", this passage does Rousseau
an injustice. However, what precisely this injustice
amounts to Colletti finds difficult to say. For
some reason Marx's view of Rousseau is so clearly
"conditioned" that "it is a fact that it acted as
a retarding factor until Marxists reached the point
2
of being able to re-examine Rousseau's thought."
In the passage quoted, Marx refers to Rousseau
once, merely in passing. He writes (it is so roughly
penned down that we need parentheses): "(lust) as
little (does) Rousseau's contrat social, which
brings naturally independent autonomous subjects
into relation and connection by contract, rest on
such naturalism." What on earth is wrong with this?
1. Colletti, "Rousseau as Critic..etc.", p.189-
2. ibid.
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Marx was not writing an essay on Rousseau (he begins
with Smith and Ricardo - a point we shall come to
in a moment). Moreover, just in this tiny sentence
Marx does more justice to Rousseau than those who,
following Voltaire, believed Rousseau to represent
"a reaction against over-sophistication" and a desire
to "return to a misunderstood natural life". This
naturalism is a "semblance", a peculiar domain in
which the contract (the individual in "this"
society of free competition etc.) is systematically
displaced. Something so displaced is simultaneously
something repressed, namely, the significance of
exchange, contract, the market, money, commodities
etc. in "this" society. Rousseau is not unaware
- the bourgeois character of Geneva, politicians
who spoke of "nothing but trade and money" (2nd
Discourse) - but this is exactly what makes this
naturalism more than for anybody else "his" problem.
In that one small sentence, Marx's brief mention of
Rousseau could not be more supremely appropriate.
Colletti's point is therefore quite hollow.
But what are Colletti's reasons for Marx's
"conditioned" view of Rousseau, a view which has
"acted as a retarding factor"? The "retarding factor"
is presumably cne which acts to restrict a fuller
-1 84-
appreciation of Rousseau's work. Colletti can
only be vague in his essay:
One possible explanation (of Marx's "misinter¬
pretation" of Rousseau - Colletti is folloxving
on not from the instance in the Grundrisse, but
an equally inappropriate one in Marx's much
earlier "On the Jewish Question". See below.)
..could perhaps be found in the interpretation
of Rousseau current in Germany at the time
when Marx's thought was formed. Hegel, for
example, gave the Contract an essentially
natural-law interpretation. Rousseau, to him,
is a theorist tpf "atomistic" liberal
individual!sm.
1 . ibid., p.188. cf. Marx, "On the Jewish Question",
in Early Writings, p.234. Here Marx merely
quotes a passage from Rousseau's Social Contract
and declares that "Rousseau's description of
the abstraction of the political man is a good
one". According to Colletti Marx "misrepresents"
here "a fundamental passage from the Contract
on the 'de-naturalisation' that society must
carry out on man to transform him from a mere
'natural' man into a truly 'social' being", ibid.
The Rousseau passage is as follows: "Whoever
dares to undertake the founding of a people's
institutions must feel himself capable of
changing, so to speak, human nature, of
transforming each individual, who in himself
is a complete and solitary whole, into a part
of a greater whole from which he somehow receives
his life and his being, of substituting a
partial and moral existence for physical and
independent existence. He must take man's
own powers away from him and substitute for
them alien ones which he can only use with the
assistance of others." Marx doesn't "misrepresent"
Rousseau at all by saying that this "description
of the abstraction of• political man is a good
one", nor when he adds after he has quoted it
certain vague Feuerbachian conclusions about
emancipation of the human world, man becoming
a "species-being" in real social life etc. All
Marx can "misrepresent" here is his own later,
more rigorous views over these latter questions.
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¥ith this, Marx's "misrepresentation" of Rousseau
is turned into that of Hegel, who saw Rousseau as
"a theorist of 'atomistic' liberal individualism"
and viewed the Contract as "an essentially natural-
law interpretation". Back to Hegel I The terms
used here to describe Hegel's view are worth scrutiny:
Rousseau is "a theorist of 'atomistic' liberal
indivisualism"; his Contract is "an essentially
natural-law inperpretation". This is interesting
because firstly, it is a true statement of Hegel's
view and secondly, it is also a true statement of
Marx's view. But it is true of them both for very
different reasons. We have just considered Marx's
view of Rousseau and the Contract, perfectly contained
in the quotation from his Grundrisse. And, we
mentioned at the very beginning Hegel's view. So,
the point at issue here can be made briefly. Marx
connected Rousseau's "'atomistic' liberal individualism",
his "essentially natural-law interpretation" or,
to return to onr previous phrase which we retained
from Pashuicanis, his "natural-law prejudice", in
with the commodity structure of bourgeois society,
which furnishes the real answer to his (Rousseau's)
problem, Hegel, on the other hand, merely scorned
these things in Rousseau because they did not live
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up to the logical demands of the speculative Idea.
The furthest which Hegel got with the "natural-law
prejudice" is finely expressed in his "Philosophy
of Right" when he says of those theories of law
and of the state that give these a basis in terms
of "positive divine right, or contract, custom etc.":
"So far as the authority of any existing state has
anything to do with (such) reasons (i.e. 'positive
divine right', 'contract' etc.), these reasons are
culled from the forms of law authoritative within
1
it". But Kegel never actually got beneath those
"forms of law" and, in particular, the modern legal
form whence the "reasons" he attacks derive. For
him this "getting beneath" is not a question of
looking at the mechanisms of "this" society, but
instead a matter of the "truly universal" surpassing
2
its finitude in e.g. Rousseau's "general will".
1 . Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p.ljjb. This is
one of the many instances where Hegel "overreaches"
himself in thought, as Marx used to say;
where, in other words, Hegel gets the subject-
matter critically laid bare in spite of himself
i.e. in spite of his idealist deduction of it.
2. "..if you say 'the will is universal, the will
determines itself', the words you use to
describe the will presuppose it to be a subject
or substratum from the start." Hegel, ibid.,
p24. Unfortunately, however, not a "subject
or substratum" of the Idea.
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¥e need not pursue this particular line of
argument any further. On no account does Colletti
enhance our appreciation of Rousseau's "originality"
by talking on the one hand of Marx's "debt" to
Rousseau and on the other, Marx's "misrepresentation"'
of him (supposedly symptomatic of an unacknowledged
"debt"). Rousseau's "originality" if it is to mean
anything can never consist in him having surmounted
natural-law doctrine, it can only refer to the way
in which he made use of it. Not Rousseau as "Marx",
but Rousseau as Rousseau. Rousseau as "Marx"f is
Colletti's way of saying, "Rousseau outside natural-
law doctrine". Since the latter is impossible,
Colletti's roundabout gestures in the direction of
the former are all doomed. Let us take one final
example.
In the Marx passage in the Grundrisse, cited
earlier, Smith and Ricardo are mentioned in connection
with the eighteenth century "individual" - the product
of the disintegration of the feudal order and the
corresponding social development of commodity
production and exchange relations, wherein the
individual appears isolated, independent etc. - an
"individual" as yet clothed in mystery. However,
Smith and Ricardo "still stand with both feet on
-188-
1
the shoulders of the eighteexith-century prophets".
The important words here, for our present purposes,
are "on the shoulders". They see further than those
upon whose philosophical shoulders they stand.
Their vision is directed towards the economic basis
of society and its inner workings. In this way
Rousseau is theoretically "backward" compared with
Smith. Gblletti doesn't set about assimilating
Rousseau to Marx by rejecting this, bu^, in a
roundabout way, be accepting this fact.
So far as Policital Economy is concerned,
Rousseau was behind Smith and the Physiocrats. The
"backward and backward—looking character of Rousseau's
economic views is beyond question", says Colletti.
He continues: "In a fragment relating to the Social
Contract he (Rousseau) even went so far as to state
that 'in everything depending upon human industry,
it is essential to be able to proscribe every machine
and every invention which might shorten labour,
reduce the number of xvorkers and produce the same
2
result with less trouble'." Wherever this "fragment"
1. Marx, op. cit. p.83»
2. Coiletti, "Rousseau as Critic..etc.", p.162.
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comes from (Colletti doesn't give a reference),
it is not unassociated with the following, which
appears in the second Discourse: "If he had had
an axe, would he have been able with his naked
arm to break so large a branch from a tree? If
he had had a sling would he have been able to
throw a stone with so great velocity? If he had
had a ladder, would he have been so nimble in
climbing a tree? If he had had a horse, would he
1
have been himself so swift of foot?" In any case,
the "fragment", even if it doesn't quite come forward
so naively as this, is certainly "backward-looking".
In this "fragment" Rousseau is far and away from
being a critic of the bourgeois social order,
unless, of course, it harbours in some way a
disguised sense of the fundamental contradiction
of capitalist social development, namely, that the
increased productivity of labour which goes hand in
hand with the increased application of machinery and
equipment does not go to the full benefit of the
workers, that in fact, any benefit which does accrue
to the latter under such circumstances is only
relative to an always proportionally greater benefit
1. Rousseau, Second Discourse, p.164.
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constantly accumulating in the hands of their
employers. But nothing of the kind is in Rousseau's
mind. And Colletti is quite correct to emphasise
that Rousseau is well behind Smith and the Physiocrats
on this score, the latter, appreciating as they did
the progressive side of capitalist social development,
the massive development of productive forces which
1
it ushers forth. But Colletti is quite mistaken
if he thinks that this can be turned into a little
"theme" connecting Rousseau up x^ith Marx, if he
thinks that Rousseau's more "naturalistic" approach
can be assimilated to the kind of criticism which
1 . Smith's observations on the progressive aspects
of the division of labour which accompanies
on an ever increasing scale capitalist social
development, wera often tempered when he came
to consider the lot falling to the labourer
in all this. On the other hand, his guileless
comparisons xcith. the noble savage, neither
factually nor theoretically appropriate,
sustained his enthusiasm. Thus: "Compared,
indeed, x^ith the more extravagant luxury of
the great, his (the labourer's) accomodation
must no doubt appear simple and easy; and yet
it may be true, perhaps, that the accomodation
of a European prince does not ahfays so much
exceed that of an industrious and frugal
peasant as the accomodation of the latter exceeds
that of many an African king, the absolute
master of the lives and liberties of ten
thousand naked savages." - Wealth of Nations,
p. 11 7 .
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Marx brought to bear on Smith, the Physiocrats,
Ricardo etc. He puts it this way: "Rousseau's
insensitivity to the phenomenon of 'development'
(chez Smith, for example - S.M.) sharpens his
dramatic perception of the new 'social inequality'
which is emerging and prevents him from seeing the
progressive significance of the rise of industrial
capitalism and the concomitant rise of bourgeois
1
'civil society'". What is Colletti leading to?
The "progressive significance of the rise of
industrial capitalism..etc." means the same as
the word "development" (which appears in quotes);
so it is a superfluous addition. The sentence can
be reduced to: "Rousseau's insensitivity to the
phenomenon of 'development' sharpens his dramatic
perception of the new 'social inequality' which is
emerging." Xt is this "sharpened dramatic perception
which Marx borrows from Rousseau. What a vague resul
Why not borrowed from St. Simon, or Fourier or even
Proudhon? Colletti concludes: "Marx, who inherited
the analysis of 'economic development' worked out
by Smith, and that of 'social inequality' developed
1. Colletti, "Rousseau as Critic..etc.", p.162.
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above all in France, unified and combined these
1
two arguments." The imjjortant words here are,
"developed above all in France", for it is no
longer Rousseau, it is post-revolutionary French
Socialism — another matter altogether.
1. ibid. All this conclusion amounts to is an
underhand mention of two of the famous and
well—known "three historical components of
Marxism" — German Philosophy, French Socialism
and English Political Economy — it proves
nothing of Rousseau as "Marx" or Rousseau
outside natural—law protocol and other such
one-sided attachments to his "originality".
And here the irresistable pun begs due
forgiveness:
Marxist Philosophy - Beware of the
'Return' of Jean-Jaques Rousseau I
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Summary; "Natural" sympathies.
It would be unnecessary to dwell any further
upon the consequences which flow from the specious
notion of "originality" goind hand in hand with
the attempt to turn Rousseau into a thinker outside
1
his time. The fact that Rousseau's inquiries were
circumscribed by eighteenth century "naturalism"
is ineradicable. Consequently, his "originality",
if we must speak of such things, comes within the
vicious circle thus described - not outside of it,
but in the ingenious attempts to break through it.
Of course, the theoretical tools appropriate for
the success of these attempts were unavailable to
him, but, more than this, they were necessarily
beyond his reach. This is precisely why it is most
appropriate to concentrate upon Rousseau rather
than Hobbes or Locke (both giants in their own
right nevertheless), for his development beyond
these (that he saw the barrenness of their naturalism
etc.) makes him the "freest" of the modern classical
1. "..in general, one has to acknowledge that it
is impossible, even for the greatest and most
prophetic mind, to transcend the historical
limitations and causes of his own time" says
Colletti, p.193 ibid, at the end of his essay.
This conclusion would have been less feeble
had "one" acknowledged it "in particular"
instead of "in general".
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thinkers and, in this way, the finest illustration
of the necessity and inescapability of (modern
classical) natural-law dogma. Freedom and necessity
here correspond with difference and sameness; terms
which we mentioned in a similar connection earlier.
Neither side of the opposition can be stressed
independently of the other without getting into a
muddle, in which connection we notice philosophers
(who are supposed to know all about Hegel) making
just this sort of mistake. But we have already
taken sufficient note of this sort of thing.
Xt was theoretically impossible for the classical
writers to transcend the naturalism within which
their endeavours were constrained. Rousseau, our
prime example, shows this quite clearly; the
freest of the classical minds cannot escape it.
We must now say why this apparently well-known fact
is so significant, why we have given it so much
(but really not enough) attention. A theoretical
impossibility: xvhat does this mean? We have already
answered this question with the example of Rousseau's
difficulties, but let us briefly look again.
Rousseau had noticed the defects in the naturalism
of Hobbes and Locke. On account of their naturalism,
Hobbes and Locke had not found a solution to the
problem of right, its foundation and basis etc.
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But who else could Rousseau consult, had anyone
else advanced the science any further? Where else
could Rousseau go? Excepting the final recourse
to literature, noted by Althusser, all Rousseau
could do was to stay with them, to keep essentially
within the naturalist problematic. The attempt to
go backwards, as it were, to get the required depth,
that is, Rousseau's return to the ancients, could
not help hiin. "I shall suppose myself in the
Lyceum of Athens, repeating the lessons of my
masters, with Plato and Xenocrates for judges, and
1
the whole human race for aiidience" , he writes in
1. Rousseau, "A Discourse..etc.", p.162. The
connection between Rousseau and the ancients
is mentioned neither by Althusser nor Colletti,
op. cit. It is well-noted, however, by another
Rousseau acliolar, Leo Strauss, whom we shall
have cause to mention in this coimection very
shortly. As the latter notes, Rousseau follows
Montesquieu in the view that virtue is the
principle of democracy, since it is inseparable
from equality — a view which was not shared
by the ancients. cf. Strauss, "Natural Right
and History", p. 256; on Montesquieu, cf.
Hegel, "Philosophy of Right", p.177 et. seq.
This distinction between ancients and moderns
is important for the fact that it corresponds
with the differing material bases of their
respective societies. The "virtue" with which
the ancients wrestled ceaslessly had nothing
to do with the form of equality which the
early bourgeois theorists held in such high
esteem, for ancient society was based upon
slavery. For this reason, Rousseau's appeal
to his "masters" in this respect is all the
more obviously a doomed escape route from the
overbearing naturalism of his eighteenth century
predecessors.
-1 96-
the second Discourse, forgetting that his problem
(the origin of inequality, hence also equality),
in the terms in which he posed it, would have been
utterly inconceivable for these particular judges.
Bourgeois equality and its contradictions, the true
historical essence of Rousseau's problem, begin to
appear 011I3'' in the eighteenth century - a considerable
distance from the problems of virtue, knowledge etc.
as they were posed over three hundred years before
Chris t.
A theoretical impossibility: twist and turn
as he may, Rousseau cannot escape its clutches.
Definite historical conditions proscribed it: the
fact of the dawning of bourgeois civilisation in
its most progressive phase, the mere beginnings of
the subsumption of all social relations under the
form of equivalent exchange. Full-fledged bourgeois
right is as yet still immature, still just on the
horizon, still weighed down and clouded over with
the remains of the ancien regime — still finding
its highest scientific expression within the confines
of naturalism. Two hundred years after Rousseau
it is a gross understatement to say that these
conditions no longer obtain. Rousseau's naturalism
is completely justified by the conditions of his time,
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but even by the turn of the eighteenth century,
in the post-Revolutionary era, it can no longer
\
be sustained - not even a la Rousseau. New moves
have to be made; Saint-Simon has "great things"
to do, as he reputedly had his valet remind him
1
every morning upon waking; and, by the time
Marx's discoveries appear on the scene in the
latter part of the nineteenth century, bourgeois
society is perceived in its fullest and most mature
form, and naturalism, having lost all its credibility,
is finally and completely surpassed. All this, it
may be added, developed quite in keeping with the
(necessarily thwarted) scientific spirit of Jean—
Jaques Rousseau.
Thus, it transpires how important it is to see
clearly the historico-theoretical conditions of
classical-modern natural-law. Nothing could be
more alien to the spirit of Rousseau than to
imitate his problem two hundred years later on.
Thus, one "sympathetic" Rousseau scholar, Leo Strauss,
incredible though it seems, still shows no notion of
the significance of Political Economy, let alo3ie
1 . cf. Henri de Saint-Simon, "Social Organisation,
the Science of Man and other writings". The
anecdote appears on the first page of
Markham1s introduction to this edition.
1 . cf. Strauss, "Natural Right and History".
Naturally, with this glowing and spirited
performance Strauss has achieved the
desired reputation for "returning" to
natural—law. Strauss revives, as Stammler
did in the tTwenties , the late nineteenth
century "neo-critical" view of law, which,
being of Kantian stamp, contains formally
the same sort of naturalist problem \\rhich
is to be found in Rousseau. It may be
noted here that the sort of opposition
which Strauss puts up against Weber in
the second chapter of his book is not
accidental given Weber's generally more
acute historical sense and the threat
which this equally "neo-critical" scheme
poses for any felt need to restore the
authority of something which, by definition,
we do not know. Whereas the Kantian
"thing-in—itself" appears more cautiously
in Weber as something which historical
inquiry cannot reach, in Strauss it is
something which such inquiry emphatically
must not reach. The difference is a question
of the degree of emphasis placed upon a
problem which for both is entirely of
their own making. The extent of this
difference can be guaged from the hard
raps over the knuckles which Weber gave
to Staramler in his day - a translation
of this polemic by M. Albrow appears in
the British Journal of Law and Society
(Winter 1975). So far as Strauss is
concerned, his position is made abundantly
clear (or unclear, depending upon which
way we look at it) when he writes: "to
understand the problem of natural right,
one must start, not from the 'scientific'
understanding of political things but
from their 'natural' understanding, i.e.,
from the way in which they present them¬
selves in political life, in action, when
the}r are our business, when we have to
make decisions." ibid. p.81 . Empathy, not
science; the mysteries of the "moral"
decision rather than the conditions under
which it must be turned into a mystery -
but, we shall see, there are finer and
more historically justified moralists than
Leo Strauss to whom we may pay our attention
in this connection. Alongside Strauss, compare also
Ravls, A Theory of Justice; Dabin, General
Theory of Law, and Stammler, Theory of Justice.
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the criticism of it, in the understanding of
natural right. It is as if Saint-Simon, Fourier,
Hegel, Smith, Ricardo, not to mention Marx, had
not existed. Strauss, in fact, is almost an imitator
of Rousseau. That which was symptomatic in Rousseau
of an attempt to get out of natural-law and its
contradictor]'- results, is taken up by Strauss in
an attempt to return to it. The flight to antiquity
1
in Strauss, however, is supplemented with the Bible.
That "natural" sympathies can be sustained two
hundred years after Rousseau, can only mean that
the mysteries of the contract-form, the legal, form,
have been systematically sustained also — independently
of their scientific disclosure. How has this been
possible? After Rousseau, how has such a thing
been possible without the glaring theoretical
embarrassment that goes hand in hand with it,
when the contract, the state of nature and so forth
have been so widely and well-recognised for their
contradictory nature? The truth of the matter is
that the inner character of this naturalism, its
historico-theoretical conditions and so on, have
not been widely and well-recognised. The pretence
to the contrary is in fact a guileless conceit of
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rnodern legal culture supported, however, by a
tremendously important development in the modern
history of ideas, a development which finds its
1
purest expression in the philosophy of Kant.
After Kant the form of legal culture is fixed
by the limits of "pure reason", which, in fact,
is nothing much more than a cleverly disguised mode
of sustaining those same discrepancies which we
observed in the naturalism of Rousseau and his
seventeenth and eighteenth century predecessors.
But we shall come to illustrate this in detail
shortly.
Immediately after Rousseau, the contract-form
is elevated by Kant into an idea of pure reason.
In philosophy, Kant represents an enormous advance.
But, so far as the legal form was concerned, this
development represented a step backwards, a further
mystification of it, a movement further away from
the concrete conditions of capitalist social
reproduction directly behind it. In this way,
Kant made a backward step under the guise of a
forward step, under the cloak of a theoretical
advance which supposedly "eradicated" the theoretical
discrepancies so "obvious" in Rousseau. Nothing
1 . Symptomatic here is the wide acclaim given to
modern writers such as Stammler, Strauss and, in
America, Rawls' Theory of Justice. The conditions
of their "Kantianism" will be considered in
general infra .
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could have been a more convenient development than
this for the ideological requirements of subsequent
legal culture . With the blessing of Reason (pure
and unadulterated), the legal form could safely
remain a mystery - right up to the present day, and
in spite of the fact that this mystery was gradually
decyphered in the nineteenth century. Thus, it is
no surprise that Kant has become the lodestar of
modern legal culture and still remains the highpoint
of its reflective capabilities. And for this reason
we are obliged to continue our survey of the
equivalent form and its modern classical connections
with a more detailed observation of the Kantian
philosophy and its social connections with the
form of right.
Before we do this, it is appropriate to
recapitulate in a few words our primary aim in
considering these classical connections of the
legal equivalent form. It is, first and foremost,
the aim of showing conclusively that this equivalent
form is, in relation to these classical thinkers
and their foraulations, the same equivalent form
which we revealed in the earlier part of this work
as subsisting within the commodity structure of
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specifically bourgeois society. In relation to
Rousseau and others, whom we have considered in
this respect, we have always supposed this to be
the case, namely, that the same equivalent form
subsists in (obviously) very different ways in the
real mechanism of bourgeois society and in the
"ideal" discourses which they bequeathed to us.
In the case of Rousseau, for example, we have
always supposed this to be the case at the same
time that we tried to show it. If a little
indulgence may be permitted, the results here
seem to be immoveable: the real equivalent form
furnishes the key to Rousseau and his immediate
predecessors and, moreover, without doing any
injustice to, or performing any vulgar reduction
upon, the greatness and unrepeatable quality of
their endeavours. For those who, for reasons less
worthy than they are wont to admit, are inclined to
think otherwise this point must be made clear.
Fe can pay the classical thinkers all the due
respect owed to their "originality", "genius" etc.
precisely on this account; in other words, we can
know and appreciate the depth and significance of
the things they knew precisely because we are
prepared to engage them with things which they did
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not and could not know. As with Rousseau et al.,
the Kantian development and its connections with
the equivalent form may be similarly appreciated,
'out this, however, takes on a different appearance
and historical significance. To this we must now
turn.
Part II
Ch. 3. The Theory of Law as Pure Reason
... The Cognitive Faculty. "Rightful"
Cognition and the "Science of Right".
•Comical Niaiserie Allemande".
... Further Considerations .
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The Theory of* Law as Pure Reason
At the beginning of his "institutions of
Private Law", Karl Renner remarks that the Kantian
conception of the legal world "as a lawful order
of actions which in general resembles the natural
order," is a conception that is "based on a very
narrow abstraction derived from a society of private
owners connected solel}r by competition and contract."
This is all very well, but Renner omits to explain
why precisely this connection is to be accepted.
Unwittingly, he furnishes us with the clue to this
omission himself.
Kant's definition of right', which Renner also
provides, runs as follows: "Right, therefore,
comprehends the whole of the conditions under which
the voluntary actions of any one person can be
harmonised in reality with the voluntary actions
of every other person, according to a universal
2
law of freedom."" Now it seems quite clear from
this that the harmonising "in reality" of "the
voluntary actions of any one person...with the
voluntary actions of every, other person", the actual
1. Renner, The Institutions of Private Law and
their Social function, p.46.
2. Kant, Philosophy of Law, p.45 (trans. Hastie).
If the treatment of Renner here seems
unusually harsh in connection with an
apparently minor oversight, it is to be
pointed out that Renner's entire work
is thoroughly saturated with such over¬
sights. On the point in question, the
German original reads: "..dieses Philosophen
ist hangrieflich der ideologische
Ueberbau der einfachen ¥arenproduktion."
- p.2, Die Rechtsinstitute des Privaterechts
etc. Having thus criticised Kant's
definition of lavv, it is no surprise to
discover that Renner proceeds in his
enterprise with a definition that is of
essentially the same character. "Thus
Renner puts at the foundation of his
definition of law the concept of an
imperative addressed to the individual
by society (considered as a person). This
artless conceit seems to him a perfectly
adequate exploration of the past, present,
and future of legal institutions."
- Pashukanis, Theory of Law etc., p. 117—8
(A.R., p.28). The definitions of Kant
and Renner only appear to be different,
but a moment's reflection shows that it
is the same riddle of "abstract individ¬
uality" which is contained in each.
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reality in which the Kantian conviction subsists,
is a condition furnished by specifically bourgeois
society, where, as in no other previous historical
period, each for the first time relates to "all"
on an equal legal footing. But this is not at all
clear to Renner, for he adds: "It is clear that
this kind of philosophical dogma (i.e. Kant's)
is the ideological superstructure upon a system
of simple commodity production." With this little
word "simple", Renner demonstrates that he has not
grasped the connection at all. The Romans and,
much earlier, the Phoenicians, the ancient Greeks
etc. all had systems of simple commodity production,
and in none of these cases could each relate to "all"
on an equal legal footing and thus provide the "in
reality" at the roots of a specifically Kantian
1
"kind of philosophical dogma."
The modern lagal form (and abstract philosophical
expressions thereof) arises not on the basis of mere
commodity production, but, specifically, on the basis
of capitalist commodity production. Gnly under
conditions of capitalist commodity production do the
mass of producers move freely to market, exchange
their power to create and augment capital-value in
return for a wage, which is in turn divided into
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further exchanges in the market for goods and
services, and so on; that is to say, only under
such conditions do the mass of people (the "all"
reflects the rhetorical enthusiasm of the classical
thinkers) acquire a common legal personality, provided
by this very generalisation of commodity-exchange
relations, whereupon it appears, for the first time,
that "the voluntary actions of any one person can
be harmonised in reality with the voluntary actions
of every other."
Kant's definition of law, for all its apparent
universality, is quite clearly particular and amounts
to little more than an affirmation of a historically
definite status quo. On the other hand, Kant's
significance does not lie with the fact that he
produced an "ideological" definition of law; it
doesn't require one of the greatest philosophers
of all time to do that. His significance lies in
the way in which he arrived at his conclusions;
he found for them a basis in pure reason. And, so
far as modern critics are prepared to ignore the
details of Kant's reasoning here, they ignore at the
same time the ultimate theoretical defence of modern
legal thought.
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Nov; it might be objected that if Kant's
definition of law is false, that is, if his
consideration of the form of law sub specie aeterni
is self-evidently contradictory (which it is, because
the truth of its conditions is provided only in
specifically bourgeois society) , then the premises
behind this result must also be similarly defective,
and therefore once the conclusion has been shown to
be false, to do the same in regard of the premises
is superfluous. Such an objection would be ill-
considered, for it is precisely the failure to look
into the reasons behind such notions of law which
effects the continual repetition of the same
mistakes. The history of modern reflective legal
thought, since Kant, is the testimony of just this . ^
By reflective legal thought, we are to understand
legal thought in its broadest sense, i.e.
inclusive of all those fragmented episodes of
legal self-reflection in other disciplines
that have considered law, to some extent,
within their territory It is in this way
that we find cause to consider writers such as
Weber, Renner, Maine and so forth under the
auspices of reflective legal thought. On the
basis of similar connections, Gurvitch considers
Weber and Rennar, amongst others, as "European
founders" of the "Sociology of Law". For no
other reason than that it allows him to displai'-
the extent of his reading, Gurvitch turns this
arbitrary "specialisation" into something which
began with the ancients, proceeded through the
Middle Ages and arrived fully—fledged on his
own doorstep. of. Gurvitch, G., The Sociology
of Law.
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In Kant's definition of law we observe that,
"the voluntary actions of any one person can be
harmonised, in reality with the voluntary actions
of ever}' other person"; in other words, an equivalent
form of persons. This comes about, according to
Kant, as a result of a "universal law of freedom",
which figures as the solution providing the connecting
link of each with all. This "solution" is really
just an expression of abstract individuality, the
mere form under which apparently isolated individuals
are brought together as equals. Of course, the
material substratum underlying this form consists
in an equal standard that is furnished uniquely
by bourgeois conditions of commodity production.
But Kant did not ask the question, how does society
produce this result? He asked, instead, how does
the individual produce it? And his answer, to put
it simply, was that the subject found within himself
a "faculty" enabling him to realise, in an enlightened
fashion, his universal (equal) nature. In the case
of law, the faculty reconciling the antithesis of
individuality and equality.is the faculty of will.
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Righ^; , in the Kantian scheme of things, is
therefore a question that has to do with the faculty
of will. But what does this mean? First of all,
it falls \\rithin the sphere of what Kant called the
Practical Reason. "The Practical Reason," said
Ilegel, "is understood by Kant to mean a thinking
will, i.e. a will that determines itself according
•to general laws.." But if we are to accept this,
we need to know why it is that the will should be
so-described, we need to know, in other words, what
those "general laws" are. And Hegel goes on to
ask, appropriately, "¥hat, then, is to serve as the
la%>r which the Practical Reason embraces and obeys,
and as the criterion in its act of self—determination?"
The basis of the Practical Reason is Pure Reason.
Hegel thus adds, "There is no rule at hand but that
2
given by the abstract identity of the understanding."
In other words, if we want to know the reasons why
the will is accredited with the quality of self-
deterninacy (which in Kant becomes the principle
of law: thus, "Right, therefore, comprehends the
whole of the conditions..(etc.)..according to a






another Kantian faculty, the faculty that has to
do rnth this "abstract identity of the understanding",
namely, the faculty of pure cognition. Right is
an idea of Pure Reason. Therefore, to understand
the reasoning behind the notion of right as conformable
with "a universal law of freedom" we must look at
the cognitive faculty which deduces it as such.
Before we do this, it might be wondered why
it is necessary to take Kant at his work even this
far, for it is evident that he is on the wrong-
track to begin with in considering the form of law
under the auspices of a faculty of will, i.e. a
faculty belonging to an individual thinking-subject.
This seeins to be clear in so far as the form of law
does not concern individuality as such, but rather,
a definite social form of individuality, one in
which, moreover, individuality as sach readily
becomes its opposite, as something characteristic
of the mass of people, whereupon the individual
appears as a legal subject and shows thereby that
the matter in question is not one of individual!ty
at all but just the opposite. On the other hand,
this negation of individuality in the principle of
right (as equality) is precisely what Kant managed
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to express in terms of individuality as such. He
did this by turning individuality as such into
individuality with "faculties". Therefore, the
proper criticism of Kant is not that he made
individuality the basis of law, but that he made
individuality in possession of "faculties" the
basis of law.
The Cognitive Faculty
The faculty of pure cognition in Kant figures
as a mode of reconciling the dualism of the subjective
with the objective. With this, it immediately
appears that we have the theoretical parallel of
the dualism in the practical sphere of law, namely,
the dualism of individuality and the equivalent
(objective) form of right which finds expression
as "abstract individuality". Kant's entire
philosophy, as a natter of fact, is played out
on the various themes of a basic dualism of the
subjective and the objective, and the characteristic
solution of this dualism, that the subject finds
within himself a "faculty" for coming to terms \^ith
the object—world appears in all the principal subject-
areas over which Kant casts his net. Thus, in the
three principal areas of cognition, will and emotion,
the subject finds himself in possession of a "faculty"
-21 1 -
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of cognition, will and so forth. Kant 1 s philosophy
is therefore appropriately called "subjective
idealism" and its consequent associations with the
theme of "abstract individuality" (subjective
idealism means individuality which is abstracted,
equalised under the form of a theoretical construct)
have made it into a veritable legal world-view.
But we have to answer the question of how the
faculty of pure cognition justifies considering
the form of law as a matter of will, as a "universal
law of freedom", i.e. as self-determinate will.
Basically, the faculty of pure cognition enables
this because it enables us, in the final reckoning,
to say anything we like - and have grounds for it
in nothing less than pure reason! The faculty of
cognition, in other words, doesn't escape the age-
old philosophical sin of relativism (scepticism,
agnosticism - "no knowledge").
1 . Although Kant wrote many other tilings besides,
his philosophy may be considered as falling
into three principal Critiques: of Pure Reason,
of Practical Reason, and of Judgement. They
correspond with what Kant understood to be the
principal faculties of the human soul,
respectively: cognition, will and emotion.
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The cognitive faculty has this negative
character because Kant makes it always conditional
upon the activity of a subject-mind alone. Once
this is the case, there remains nothing to prevent
the Kantian faculty from merely standing in for
the following kind of utterance: I know such and
such to be true because I have thought it. Of
course, the "I" doing the thinking, in Kant, is
not any old "X", but specifically an "I" making
use of his faculty of synthetic judgement a priori.
This, however, doesn't make a great deal of difference.
But we have a duty to get a proper sense of this
apparent trivialisation of Kant.
Kant asked, how are synthetic judgements a
priori possible? He asked, in other words, how-
do we know tilings other than through the mere
formalities of logical inference (the principle
of identity) and the principle of non-contradiction?
Really, how is knowledge possible? - since Kant
rightly grasped that this was a process of synthesis,
quite distinct from merely analytic judgement and
involving the connection of contraries. The
synthetic judgement means that the given predicate
is not already cogitated in the subject. Kant's
answer was simply that "we" connect these contraries.
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Gn the other hand, it involved Kant in a most
astonishing- feat of philosophical profundity to say
just this. How are synthetic judgements a priori
possible? Kant reduced the connection of contraries
implicit in the notion of the synthetic judgement
to a question of how "we" connect them, and therefore
to a dualism of the thinking-subject on the one
hand and the object of cognition on the other. He
therefore ruled out at the very outset the possibility
that the synthetic unity must be found in the objects
of cognition themselves, regardless of how "we"
may or may not judge them, because he reconciled
the subject/object dualism on the side of the
subject alone.
It is not beside the point to illustrate briefly
how Kant expounded his subjective process of objective
cognition. Clearly this subjective/objective dualism
is its dominant feature. Thus, objectively present
in all the phenomena of experience are what Kant
called the categories of the pure understanding.
These latter fall into four principal divisions:
of quantity, of quality, of relation, and of
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modality. Still, these categories are also
subjective - for all their objectiveness. This
is so because the condition in which we receive
them, even as such, i.e. even as they appear in
Kant's theory of pure reason, independently of
their presence in a synthetic judgement proper
(in mathematics for example), is always sensuous.
The categories themselves, therefore, have to be
transcendentally deduced, that is, deduced by
means of our faculty for pure cognition. Xn other
words, the categories have to be deduced by means
of a process in which they themselves figure as
elements of that process, or, to put it another
way, the transcendental deduction of these elements
supposes that these elements themselves are arrived
at through the process which they seek to define,
namely, the process of pure cognition. In Kant,
1. In Kant, the categories of the pure under¬
standing are set out thus: of quantity (unity,
plurality, totality); of quality (reality,
negation, limitation); of relation (substance
and accident, cause and effect, reciprocity);
of modality (possibility/impossibility,
existence/zion-existence , necessity/contingency ) .
cf. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 60-68.
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our faculty for pure cognition must determine
1
itself as it were. And for him this process can
only cone about as a condition of the pure elements
in our sense experience.
Apart from the pure categories of the under¬
standing, the other chief elements in the process
of pure cognition are, according to Kant, the pure
elements of sense, namely, space and time. But,
just as the objective categories of the under¬
standing are nevertheless subjective, so the
subjective categories of sense are objective.
This subjective/objective dualism is supposed at
the outset by Kant to be the essence of pure
cognition and it is present throughout the entire
journey through the labyrinths of the Critique of
Pure Reason. The condition in which we receive all
our knowledge of the world is that it comes to us
alone through "our" senses. The purest possible
elements of our sense experience are, Kant says,
1. "Kant asked himself: how are synthetic judgements
a priori possible? - and what, really, did he
answer? 'By means of a faculty'... But is
that an answer? An explanation? or is it not
rather merely a repitition of the question?"
- Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p.23-^»
And Hegel had said, with the same thing in mind,
"True, indeed, the forms of thought should be
subjected to a scrutiny before they are used:
yet what is this scrutiny but ipso facto a
cognition?" - Logic, p.?1 ■
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space and. time. Considering that these elements
are ours and ours alone and do not belong in any
part to the objects of our cognition, they are
subjective; they belong to the thinking-subject
and Kant considers them as categories of cm Aesthetic.
On the other hand, supposing that we do make
synthetic judgements a priori, the.n the pure elements
of sense being the condition under which they are
necessarily made, must, in the best sense of the
word, be objective. '
Thus Kant has two sets of categories, the
aesthetic categories of sense and the logical
categories of the understanding. Using these he
develops the principles of pure cognition and Kant
believed that with these he had developed the
principles at the foundation of all other cognition.
But there is no need to go into any further detail.
The principles of the pure understanding developed
by Kant still bear the marks of the subjective/
objective dualism posited at the onset as definitive
of the problem of pure cognition; they are therefore,
in Kant's terms, general a priori connecting conceptions
(connecting subject with object) premised in the
pure ideality of space and time (which are subjective
and ideal at the same time and hence come forward
in this way as the only possible connective).
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Fhat did Kant prove with, all this? He proved,
really, that which he supposed as a condition of
him proving: it at the outset, namely, that synthetic
judgements a priori are possible. A superfluous
exercise it would seem, since scientific kno\KLedge
wasn't exactly non-existent in Kant's day. Hegel
put Kant's achievement in this respect in the
following way:
Still, though the categories, such as unity,
or cause and effect, are strictly within the
province of thought, it by no means follows
that they must be ours merely and not also the
characteristics of objects. Kant however
confines them to a subject-mind, and his
philosophy may be styled subjective idealism;
for he held that both the form and matter of
knowledge are due to the "Ego" or knowing
subject, the form to our thought, the matter
to our sensations.
If we look at the content only of
this subjective idealism, there is indeed
nothing to object to. It might at first
sight be imagined, that objects would lose
their reality, when their unity was trans¬
ferred to the subject. But neither we nor
the objects would have anything to gain by
the mere fact that they possessed being.
The main point is not, that they are, but
what they are, ajjid whether or not their
content is true.
By confining the conditions of knowledge of things
to a subject, all Kant allowed on the side of the
object, the thing known, was the mere condition of
its existence. Effectively therefore, Kant had
said of any given object of knowledge, that it exists.
1 . Hegel, Logic, p.76.
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But what seems more astonishing to the modern mind
is the fact that Kant claimed for this demonstration
the limits to the entire human understanding. Por
the unfortunate object of cognition, all it can do
is exist (on its own accord) - everything else
about it is conditioned by "us" and we can know
it to exist in no other connection than that which
is so conditioned. ¥e cannot know the "thing—in-itself"
said Kant, we cannot know noumena, only phenomena.'
"The main point is not that they (the objects
to be known) are, but what they are.." says Hegel.
In other words, the object under consideration is
certainly not to be considered onl}^ as something
which exists - that is an automatic supposition and
point of departure the moment an object comes within
the realm of consciousness - but rather as something
which exists in a certain connection. However, in
so far as Kant figured as Hegel's object of criticism
here, the latter didn't exactly practice his preaching.
He did not, in other words, ponder the connections
in which Kantianism figured as an object of knowledge
1 . "There is definitely no difference in principle
between phenomena and the thing-in—itself,
and there cannot be any such difference. The
only difference is between that which is
known and that which is not yet known. And
philosophical inventions of specific boundaries
between the one and the other... is the sheerest
nonsense, Schrulle, crotchet, fantasy."
— Lenin, Materialism etc., p.8b.
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except as something existing within his (Hegel's)
consciousness. The same is true of nineteenth
century criticism of Kant in general and therefore,
as we shall see, of Marx. And because of this, it
is generally true of twentieth century criticism
of Kant: the criticism of Kant here has for the
most part consisted in the parroting of Hegel and
Marx. But these things we shall come to later.
First we must bring Kant and his "science of right"
back into the picture now that we are in a position
to appreciate the "science" that is in it.
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"Rightful" cognition and the "science of right"
Quite apart from the "science of right", it
should, be apparent that the faculty which gives it
its "scientific" character is itself, in a way,
"rightful". Kant already supposes that we are in
possession of the facult}^ for making synthetic
judgements; his aim therefore becomes one of
showing the "rightful" limits under which this
faculty is operative. What is the rightful
character of this possession of ours? asks Kant,
and the frequent analogies which he draws with the
character of juristic thought throughout the
Critique of Pure Reason are for this reason not
accidental. But supposing that we already have
in our possession the faculty enabling us to make
synthetic judgements a priori, and supposing in
particular, in Kant's case, that this faculty is
being employed rightfully, before these rightful
limits have been expounded, brings with it an error.
It is the error of supposing that you know before
you know. The particular circumstances of this in
Kant we have already demonstrated in pointing out
how he had to make transcendental deductions of the
pure elements in the cognitive process, how, in other
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words, he had to suppose the full and effective
use of the faculty for pure cognition in order
to arrive "rightfully" at the essential elements
of that process. In this way even the pure
categories of the understanding have as their condition
(in being deduced a priori) their ineradicable
mediation through an aesthetic. But that all
knowledge must be limited by the subject in such
a way always remains as a point of departure, as
a supposition which must seal itself off from
questioning. This error in Kant of believing the
rightfulness of his answer as a conditinn of
giving his answer is the principle of juristic
reasoning par excellence. From the scientific
standpoint it is, as Hegel remarked, the error
of Scholasticus - who resolved not to venture into
the water until he had learned how to swim.
Now a "science of right" might seem superfluous
once a "juristic science" had been developed, that
is, once Kant had developed the "rightful" conditions
under which all things are known. On the other
hand, it might be observed, that right exists in
particular, as distinct from being a mode of knowing
the world in general, and that Kant would not have
been outside of himself to have looked at some of
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these particulars. But Kant onlj^ considered right
in general. Effectively therefore he applied a
legal view of the world (if we may refer to his
theory of knowledge in this way) to a legal viex/
of the world (as object). This latter we have
already considered in Kant's definition of law;
it is the testimony of (bourgeois) law as the
riddle of "abstract individuality". Accordingly,,
Kant got a mirror-effect. He applied subjective
idealism, the idealisation of subjectivity, wliich
is to say, its complete and utter reduction to the•
1
pure ideality of space and time, he applied this
to "abstract individuality", to its closest material
expression - the form of bourgeois law. It was
therefore without a great deal of effort that Kant
managed to declare right to be an idea of pure
reason, because secretly and all along the idea of
pure reason had been the purest, cleanest—possible,
unadulterated expression of right, the notion of
what is "rightful" masquerading as a theory of
knowledge. Right is an idea of pure reason because
1 . "Let us get rid of a prejudice here:
idealisation does not consist, as is conmionly
believed, in a subtracting or deducting of the
petty and secondary. A tremendous expulsion
of the principal features rather is the decisive
thing, so that thereupon the others too
disappear." - Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols
(Kant especially), p.72.
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pure reason is a sublimated expression of the form
of right - "abstract individuality" as subjective
idealism. Right is an idea of pure reason: an
effortless deduction. Kant didn't need to say
anything at all abotit law as such (as object) in
order to arrive at this conclusion because this
conclusion is implicit in the mode of thinking.
Of course Kant does say things about right
(as object). He says, for instance, that right
accords with "a universal law of freedom". But
this is already cogitated in the subject, as Kant
would say. In other words, it is already posited
as an identity with pure reason. Let us demonstrate
this. Pure reason considers that it is the form
of the subject (as thinking-subject) which furnishes
the absolute limits upon our understanding. It
is always expressed therefore as a subject/object
dualism, with the subject doing the reconciling.
The subject must find within himself the faculty
whereupon the objective world falls within his
grasp. We know that this must be so., otherwise
there could be no knowledge of the world. So Kant,
thinking that this alone is the condition under
which things become known, sets out to investigate
the limitations of this faculty. But to do this
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properly he must use this very faculty himself,
and not only this, he must suppose that he uses it
according to the specific rules of pure cognition
which he thereby hopes to deduce. Thus the
juristic poise. Pure reason must determine its
own limits. Causa sui. Similarly, the form of
right accords with "a universal law of freedom".
Freedom means self-caused. Right is therefore
causa sui. Iience the identity of right and pure
reason.
The Kantian "science of right" is merely the
theory of pure reason in the so-called "practical"
sphere - a mirror-image of itself. Right and pure
reason can parade as either. This is precisely what
Kant shows. But this is not because pure reason
lays down the rule of right, as Kant said: it is
rather an effect of pure reason as a sublimated
form of right. This is proved further by the fact
that whenever Kant begins to speak of anything
resembling right in concrete, i.e. independently of
right as a mirror-effect of pure reason, pure
reason has absolutely nothing original to say.
Kith none of Rousseau's flair, Kant talks lamely
of the decisions of state only being justified on
the grounds of universal assent, "and therefore (?)
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by means of a contract." And further, of the
sovereign will effecting commands to his subjects,
as citizens, "only because (?) he represents the
1
general will." How pure reason manages to come
up with these results rather than some other set
of generalisations, Kant never says. But pure
reason in any case doesn't say anything about
anything in particular.
1. On another occasion Kant says that the people,
however, "cannot and must not (l) judge
otherwise than the head of the state for the
time being (?) ma3r will." - which is most un—
Rousseau-like. These quotations from Kant
are cited in Gierke (Natural Law etc., pp. 1 3^ »
329, 35^) who, as an admirer of the Historical
School of Law, was most upset that he couldn't
find anything resembling the German "volksgeist"
in Kant's scheme. He says: "3y pressing his
distinction between homo phaenomenon and homo
noumenon, and by making the individual co-operate
in the creation of the general will 'only in
his pure humanity' as homo noumenon — i.e.
only in so far as 'pure reason, which lays down
the rule of right', displays itself in him
- Kant really eliminates personality from his
scheme..He loses any conception of a living
'Subject' of the common sphere.." — ibid.,
p.135- Whereas the "'Subject' of the common
sphere" (merely another expression for the
abstract subject) was purely formal, "empty",
"dead" in Kan£, the Historical School and its
followers, instead of doing the decent thing
by burying it with due respect etc., sought
to bring it alive again. We shall have cause
to mention the Historical School of Law in
a little more detail post.
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"Comical Niaiserie AHemailde"
Why did Kant base his synthetic judgements
a priori on a subject-mind? To answer that it was
because he was, essentially, a pious eld moraliser ,
and needed "scientific" reasons for his moral-
preaching, is an answer that has a good deal of
historical sense to recommend it. But this is a
historical judgement on Kant, after Kant, It is
a judgement that sees only Kant's agnosticism.
It is a judgement which, in a rather self-satisfied
manner, points to the consequences of being a Kantian
long after Kant himself is dead and buried. How
would these critics have fared had they lived in
the eighteenth century? How properly conscious of
history are these historically-conscious (they come
primarily from the Marxist carjip) criticisms?
Kant's agnosticism is an invention of the
nineteenth century. In other words, to make our
knowledge of the world conditional upon idealised
subjectivity alone is not a mode of not-believing
in the possibility of knowledge in the eighteenth
century. Just the opposite. The Kantian limits
upon the human understanding faithfully reflect the
conditions of the possibility of knowledge as
knowledge (of "man" at any rate) then existed, in
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the eighteenth centur}r. Kant's belief is not "no
knowledge" (so that he can say what he likes in
regard of how we ought to behave and pretend that
his preservations are, in the best sense of the
word, objective); just the reverse, his belief is
in knowledge, because knowledge in the eighteenth
century has precisely the kinds of limits set to
it which Kant claimed. As we saw with Rousseau,
the limit to his inquiries into Political Right
is the "abstract individual", and Kant can do no
other than express this limit as a theoretical
condition; he therefore says no more than Rousseau.
The properly historical point is that Kant
was a true and honest believer in knowledge, and
expressed faithfully the conditions of the
possibility of that knowledge, but that by the
end of the nineteenth century this knowledge has
become "no knowledge". Kant does not deliberately
and conspiratorally turn himself into an agnostic;
the growth of knowledge in the nineteenth century
gives him the appearance of having done so. To
call Kant an agnostic is a conceit cf the nineteenth
century. It is therefore a conceit which is reflected
in Marxism. It is a conceit which is reflected
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perfectly by Nietzsche, who stands on the threshold
of the twentieth century as Kant had stood on the
threshold of the nineteenth. "Comical niaiserie
Allenande," said Nietzsche of Kant:
The spectacle of the Tartuffery of old Kant,
equally stiff and decent, with which he
entices us into the dialectic by-ways that
lead - raore correctly mislead - to his
"categorical imperative", makes us fastidious
ones smile, we who find no small amusement in
spying out the subtle pricks of old moralists
and ethical preachers.
This is a profoundly just testimony, not to Kan^,
but to the tremendous distance traversed throughout
the nineteenth century on the road to our knowledge
of "man". Kant is no impostor to the eighteenth
century, quite the reverse; but the "Kantian" is
already quite definitely, with absolutely no doubt,
an anachronism by the end of the nineteenth century.
The conditions of the possibility of knowledge
have changed radically. No longer is our knowledge
limited by "our" faculties, by idealised subjectivity;
this has become merely the theoretical expression
of "abstract individuality", the juridical form of
appearance of bourgeois man, man as an owner of
commodities and money. Kant becomes merely a legal
philosopher. And "the modern legal philosopher becomes
a "Kantian".
1. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p.10
(trans. Levy).
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It is therefore not true to say that Kant was
an agnostic, that his transcendental subjectivism
was subjectivisim nonetheless and in this way denied
the possibility of knowledge. This is what
Kantianism became: it is not what Kantianism was.
Kant did not deny the possibility of knowledge
(this has become such a trite and hackneyed phrase
in modern epistemolog}r); he affirmed the theoretical
conditions of classical knowledge and in so doing
denied the possibility of knowledge outside of this
field. He therefore denied not knowledge, but
specifically modern knowledge. This, we shall see,
has important implications for the development of
modern legal culture.
It is also to be pointed out here that the
notion of Kant the agnostic finds its counterpart
in the notion of Kant the "ideologist". This too
is a conceit which is realised specifically in the
nineteenth century and, in particular, by Marx.
The epistemological configuration mapped out by
Kant is that of eighteenth century knowledge of
"man". There is no doubt that it is an expression
of bourgeois man, or, more specifically, man as a
contradictory "abstract individual" , as the personifi
form of property in exchange; a condition which is
Marx, German Ideology, The criticism to
be made against Marx is of the kind which,
says, metaphysician heal theyself - which
is precisely the arduous struggle of which
the German Ideology is symptomatic from
the standpoint of Marx's intellectual
development as a whole. For this reason,
Althusser calls the German Ideology a
"transitional" text, pre-dating as it
does Marx's "mature" work in Capital.
The particular quotation from the
German Ideology which is taken here
appears also in Lukacs introduction to
his bo ok on Hegel (p.xxiv), but according
to him the quotation somehow shows that,
"Here Marx has discovered and brilliantly
formulated one of the chief reasons why
philosophy had to develop in the direction
of idealism in Germany." (ibid). But
even if lukacs had chosen a more appropriate
quotation to illustrate the view which
he puts forward here, it is just this
view, which is reflected in the German
Ideology and which is uncritically
reproduced by Lukacs, which is defective.
That philosophy "had to" develop in
such and such a way is nothing more than
an ex post facto generalisation of the
facts from the standpoint of a historicity
which those facts themselves could not
possible possess.
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nade possible only where commodity-relations dominate
social intercourse, namely, where capitalist
production has fixed its roots. But this notion
of the "ideological expression" only becomes
possible as a condition of nineteenth century
knowledge of "man", wherefore it becomes equally
historically determinate and equally susceptable
to ideological distortion when it is cast over its
pre-history. For this reason, Marx's "transitional"
work, the German Ideology, doesn't escape the same
criticisms which it levels against others. In his
criticism of Kant's thought, for example, Marx
finds merely the pure expression of "real class
interests". Kant, he says:
separated this theoretical expression from
the interests it expressed, made the materially
inspired determinations of the will of the
French bourgeoisie into pure self-determination
of the "free will", of will in and for itself,
of human will as such, and so he transformed the
will into a set of puyely ideological concepts
and moral postulates.
In the same way that Kant was no agnostic, he was
no transformer of the will "into a set of purely
ideological concepts and moral postulates". Marx
is here quite oblivious to the fact that the conditions
for him saying this are rather different from those
under which Kant gave expression to "human will as
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such." By tiie time Marx comes to write the German
Ideology, "human will as such" has become something
altogether new; not merely a common will (hence
an abstracted "individual" will as it appears in
Kant), but a common will that has become premised
in a conflict of class interests, and therefore
in the hegemony of one particular class will.
This condition just does not exist in Kant's time.
The condition of Kant having "transformed the will
into a set of purely ideological concepts and moral
postulates" does not exist for Kant because it does
not exist historically; it only appears that this
is what Kant did when the conditions for him doing
it become a reality. To "criticise" Kant in this
way is therefore to engage in the typically
"ideological" procedure of shunting one particular
reality back into its pre-kistory. Only by the
turn of the eighteenth century does the polarisation
of bourgeois and proletarian class interests become
a feature of bourgeois society. The characteristic
feature of bourgeois historical development before
this is a condition just the reverse of this
polarisation. It is, as Marx knew full-well, the
era of bourgeois revolution, and therefore of unity
of interest between bourgeoisie and masses against
the landed classes, the Church, the aristocracy etc.
That which becomes "ideological" in the
nineteenth century is certainly, in general, the
kind of knowledge of social man which is conceivable
within the limited space described by the epistorno-
logical boundaries of subjective idealism. But in
the eighteenth century is it something quite
different. Kant didn't think for one minute that
he was doing anything other than setting limits
to the human understanding under the form of
abstract subjectivity. He didn't "need" to believe
in it, as Nietzsche said, that is to say, he wasn't
on the defensive; more simply, he believed in it.
Subjective idealism described the form of knowledge
of man in the eighteenth century and, as Kant said,
though this knowledge is grounded in the form of
the subject, it is also, in the best sense of the
word, objective. Throughout the course of the
nineteenth century, however, this "best sense of
the xrord" becomes this no longer.
Now it is not our aim to chart the developments
in the growth of knowledge which bring this change
about. Our aim is to clarify what happens to the
"science of right" in all this. In the eighteenth
century it has the same status as the knowledge of
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social man in general, since the general configuration
of knowledge of social man (as political, economic,
religious, legal etc.) is limited as a whole by the
kinds of epistemological barriers that are expressed
in Kant. In the nineteenth century, this set-up is
1
completely shattered - nothing remains the same.
In particular, the "science of right" doesn't
remain the same. Yet this is the one subject-area
which more than any other appears not to change.
The theory of law still remains limited by the
mysteries of "abstract individuality", whereas
subject-areas hitherto constrained under this
classical yoke are completely opened up, or rather,
subject-areas that had hitherto not even been
defined are discovered which situate the older
fragmented commentaries having bearing upon their
subject-matters in a new, more rigorous frame of
scientific reference. In fact, this is what happens
1 . It is in this connection that Foucault remarks,
"Before the end of the eighteenth century man
did not exist..He is quite a recent creature,
which the demiurge of knowledge fabricated
with its own hands less than two hundred years
ago: but he has grown old so quickly that
it has been only too easy to imagine that he
has been waiting for thousands of years in the
darkness for that moment of illumination in
which he would finally be known" - The Order
of Things, p.308.
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properly to the old "science of right", namely,
it is developed outside the boundaries of what is
apparently the legal sphere. The problem that it
had hitherto confronted, the riddle of "abstract
individuality" which organised the manifold
of its speculations, becomes properly defined
within the sphere of Political Economy. "Abstract
individuality" becomes the form of individuality
that is bound up with the problem of commodity
exchange, value and production. On the other
hand, the old "science of right", as such, doesn't
go out of circulation; in fact, it gets a positive
boost in this connection because once the "science"
has been taken out of it, once the ground has
collapsed from under it, it can only survive in
this, its old form, as legal "science". What
was the "science of right" in the eighteenth century,
is, by the end of the nineteenth, legal "science".




Hart gave expression to the theoretical conditions
of classical thought, that is, a mode of representative
thought which begins to be eclipsed around the turn
of the eighteenth century.' In the generality of
his summary, Kant gives expression in particular
to a "rightful" mode of thinking and, not surprisingly,
the form of right becomes identical with pure reason.
The Contract becomes an idea of pure reason; an
impossibility is made theoretically legitimate. In
fact all the "sins" of classical thought are washed
clean through Kant's discovery of a subjective
faculty capable of delivering synthetic judgements
a priori.
1 . Hence the verity in Hegel's well-known line
that Biilosophy always appears on the scene
too late and, like Minerva's owl, spreads its
wings only at dusk. - Preface, Philosophy of
Right. Classical thought as a mode of
representational thought which is systematically
shattered throughout the course of the
nineteenth century is the dominant theme of
Foucault's study in "The Order of Things".
The analysis of wealth gives way to Political
Economy, Natural History to Biology, General
Grammar to Philology. Foucault's is an
"encyclopaedic" study of these fascinating
metamorphos es.
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True, Kant did not want to cleanse all "sins",
far from it - only his own. And as "Kantianisin"
inevitably became an excuse for the shallowest
forms of utilitarianism, it is strange that no-one
has recognised a perversion of language here.
There are sins and sins. Yet poor old Kant the
agnostic has been made to take the blame for them
all, thereby condoning the entitlement of the legal-
utilitarian scribblers to their preferred description
- the "Kantian" . The term "Kantian" has become a
term in the vocabulary of the most appalling pseudo-
critical scholarship. A most appropriate example
here concerns the legal theorist, Kelsen. He is
called a "Kantian". Let us see how good a
description this is.
According to Kelsen, "The science of law
endeavours to comprehend its object 'legally',
1
namely from the point of view of the law." This
4
at least is honest, if we overlook the rather
pathetic inverted commas around the word "legally" .
In other words, Kelsen at least has the decency not
to expand upon this "legally" with the addition,
"namely from the point of view of science". But
elsewhere throughout his "Pure Theory of Law" Kelsen
1 . Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, p.70.
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time and again shows no such restraint and repeatedly
declares his efforts to be conformable with the
utmost scientific rigour. The "Pure Theory of Law"
is apparently a latter-day "Law as Pure Reason".
However, whereas in Kant's day the idea of law as
pure reason was, in the best sense of the word, an
objective consideration of law, in Kelsen's case
it is just the reverse: Kelsen's "Pure Theory of
La.w" is objective in the worst possible sense of
the word. The "Science of law" a la Kelsen is
anything but a science. Comprehending its object
"from the point of view of the law", Kelsen's
theory leads, not unnaturally, to a mere extension
of the legal principle. Kelsen's theory is therefore
"more" impartial, "more"dispassionate, "more" formal
- more typically legal.
Kelsen's theory, therefore, never says, "you
ought". This is its "scientific" condition.
Instead of "you ought", which is a prescriptive
statement, it gives the descriptive counterpart;
it says, instead, "legal norm". This profound
transformation from the prescriptive to the
descriptive category becomes the crucial turning-
point from la\>r as such to legal science. This is
because the descriptive statement, unlike the
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prescriptive one, can be either "true" or "false".
In this way the given classification of the given
"legal norm" (because it is firstly either a legal
norm or not a legal norm, and secondly either falls
or does not fall within the said classification)
is rendered unto the delights of analytic treatment.
This analytic treatment amounts to the classification
and systematic organisation of "legal norms" according
to the principles of the analytic statement. The
principles of the analytic statement are that they
may be organised according to the rules of identity
and non-contradiction.
Kelsen is therefore a representative of analytic
Jurisprudence. There is nothing at all "Kantian"
about it. To call Kelsen a "Kantian" overlooks
everything which distinguishes Kant in the history
of Philosophy, namely, the transcendental logic,
the theory of the synthetic statement. The analytic
statement and the principles thereof (Kant, incidentally,
calls the principle of non-contradiction, the principle
of contradiction) were for Kant old-hat. Kant 1s
concern was with the synthetic statement, the
statement in which is expressed the principles of
scientific knowledge, the statement in which the
object is not already cogitated, as he would say,
in the given subject. The application of the mules
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of the mere analytic statement to "legal norms",
indeed, attests to the fact that nothing new is
to be x^roduced in regard of this subject (the
"legal norm"), which, in this way, figures
logically also as object. In other words, such a
procedure is logically the mode of contemplating
nothing else other than that which is posited
within the limited, horizon of the subject as such.
Accordingly, the grand conclusion of analytic
Jurisprudence can never be anything other than,
law equals law - in Kelsen's case, a "basic norm"
as "basic norm". Again, utterly different from
the causa sui at the roots of the Kantian identity
of law and pure reason, which is grounded in a
synthetic unity of subject with object.
But if modern criticism has missed the distinction
between the synthetic and the analytic, so basic
to Kant's enterprise, it is perhax>s even more
astonishing that it has not been disturbed by the
imperishable gulf which separates the ethics of
Kant from those of the "Kantian". The ethics of
a Kelsen are "no : ethics", i.e. utilitarian ethics.
Utilitarian ethics are the natural ethics of modern
"ethical neutrality", a phrase which, contrary to
popular prejudice, has nothing to do Xvrith Kant.
Schwegler in his "History of" Philosophy"
says: "The moral purism of Kant - that is,
his anxiety to purge the motives of" action
from all the greeds of sense - ends thus in
rigorism, or the gloomy view that duty can'
only be reluctantly perfonned." p. 235*
This exaggerationj he adds, was poetically
captured by Schiller:
Willing serve I my friends all, 'out
do it, alas, with affection;
And so gnaws me my heart, that I'm
not virtuous yet -
Help, then, but this, there is none:
you must strive with might to contempt
them,
and with horror perform what the law
may enjoin.
Naturally, the Christian spirit gave Kant's
denial of the flesh (so rigorous as to
amount to the denial of life) a ready and
willing ear. The Rev. Henry Calderwood,
for instance, in his introduction to Kant's
"Metaphysic of Ethics" is full of praise
for the "(m)oral, or practical part" of
Kant's philosophy; it brings with it, he
says, "high positive results." For this
reason, he believed that it should be
considered in isolation from the "^i}ntellectual,
or theoretic part" otherwise it would be
tainted with an essentially sceptical deduction;
The credit owed to the preception, in Scotch
Philosophy generally, of such things as Kant's
scepticism, is due in a large part to the
work of J. Hutchinson-Stirling. The
English understanding of such things (around
the turn of the nineteenth century) was,
by comparison, truly backward.
In this latter connection it may be
noted here that the general significance
of appreciating properly the issues of
Kant and "Kantianism" in their relation
to legal culture is still much less likely
to be grasped by the Anglo-American legal
mind (if such an expression is permissable).
An English translation of Kant 1s "Science
of Right" by W. Hastie (a Scot, be it rioted)




Again, a strange perversion of language has taken
hold here (which is as much the result of Marxian
narrowness as it is of bourgeois decadence). Kant,
far from being "ethically neutral", was completely
and utterly "ethically convinced". Kant without
the "categorical imperative" is no longer Kant, and
so far as the ethics of "ethical neutrality" were
concerned, he loathed and despised all forms of
utilitarian opportunism. Post-Kantian "ethical
neturality" corresponds with what Kant would have
called merely a "maxim of volition", which under no




"Here is Austin's estimate of Kant's
"Science of Right": 'A treatise darkened by a
philosophy which, 1 own, is my aversion, but
abounding, I must needs admit, with traces
of rare sagacity..etc . etc.' And here is his
account of German Jurists generally: 'It is
really lamentable that the instructive and
admirable books which many of the German
Jurists have certainly produced, should be
redered inaccessible .. by the thick coat of
obscuring jargon with which they have wantonly
incrusted their necessarily difficult science'
... So long as such statements passed as
philosophical criticism there was no possibility
for a genuine Philosophy of Law in England.
Austin, notwithstanding his English reputation,
is entirely ignored by the German Jurists..
Dr. Hutchinson-Stirling has dealt with Austin's
commonplace Hedonism in a severe way, yet not
too severely, in his 'Lectures on the Philosophy
of law'." — p.xxiv.
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"Ethical neutrality" is "Kantian" in the sane
way that the use of merely the principles of the
analytic statement is "Kantian", the Kantian
philosophy as such figures not at all. But if the
"Kantian" element is merely a name which has been
appropriated on behalf of these principles, it is
clear that they must stand for something else.
They are, in fact, the principles of modern legal
ideology and to confound them with the old "science
of right", the old identity of right and reason, is
a perversion of the facts.
The modern identity of right and reason proceeds
merely through "ethically neutral" abstraction.
Abstraction here means systematically dissolving
the object supposedly under consideration. It
begins with the concrete tiling and abstracts the
most general characteristics from it and in so
doing progressively disregards the factors distinguishing
it from other things. In this, it becomes a process
increasingly indifferent to the object supposedly
Under consideration: increasingly "ethically neutral".
The "ethical" is clearly a.superfluous addition here,
because the aim of the process as such is ultimate
neutrality in regard to everything. This, as we
have already mentioned, is definitive of the analytic
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principle, namely to say absolutely nothing about
the world which isn't already said. Its aim is to
add zero to the object under consideration. Por
instance, the analytic principle will say, "Socrates
is a man". Far from concerning itself with. Socrates,
with what he wrote, where he travelled, Athenian
culture and his popular role within it etc. etc.,
it dissolves him altogether. In the same way, the
analytic principle will say, "Right consists in
the application of rules". The object winder
consideration is immediately thrown out of the
window, all that remains now are "rules" and the
problem then becomes one of trying to re-find the
object again amidst school rules, the rules of
1
cricket, football, moral rules etc. etc.
Certainly, this is not "Kantianism", it is
"positivism". Many will agree with this. But
very few will know the difference. This is because
the many \nLll inevitably fail to notice the peculiar
nature of the special "thought-sins" which Kant
washed clean through his discovery of a subjective
faculty capable of delivering synthetic judgements
a priori. They will think this leads to "no knowledge"
1 . cf. Hart, The Concept of Law.
just as does the analytic principle. And they
will be reinforced in their convictions because a
good old washing-powder, as efficient as that which
Kant discovered, doesn't go out of circulation.
Capital manufactures its cultural achievements over
and over again, but what will escape their notice
is the condition upon which it does this - that
increasingly less "labour-time" is embodied in the
final product. The historical result; "Kantianism"
is "positivism".
The identity of "Kantianism" and "positivism"
is a historical result, not a theoretical one.
Theoretically, therefore, it is to be grasped as
a historical result. The process which we have
generally attempted to observe is a historical
bifurcation of the old "science of right", the old
identity of right and reason. What happens here is
that the "science of right" is, on the one hand,
dissolved into a problematic which comes to be
occupied by the science of Political Economy, and
on the other hand, and on this account, begins an
ideological flight into "Kantianism". These two
completely antithetical developments are descended
from a unity to which neither can return, a unity
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articulated in the Kantian identity of right and
reason. Both, in completely opposing ways, claim
succession; one by uniting right with reason in
the theory of capitalist production (viz. by deducing
the reason which is embodied in the form of right as
essentially "economic" reason), and the other by
merely clinging to the family name. Both these
developments naturally pervert the old identity of
right and reason; the former by consigning it to
an ideology comparable with the latter, and the
latter by vulgarising it beyond recognition.
In the Kantian (no inverted commas) identity
of right and reason is to be observed the final
sublimation of the old "natural-law prejudice",
Thereafter its course is one of disintegration;
a rigorous re-formulation within the domain of
Political Economy on the one hand, and a debasement
at the hands of legal culture on the other. As
we have already remarked, this radical re-formulation
of the conditions of the problem is :not entirely
blameless in the process under which the old solutions
become debased — not unnaturally., since this re¬
formulation is, at the same time, a mode of putting
the old solutions into scientific disrepute. But
these old solutions have a rather special integrity
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which is all-too-easily forgotten as their scientific
disrepute (which is not in question) slips into a
neglectful shorthand expression with the word
"ideology", whereupon the actual debasement of the
old solutions, which in general consists in a
rudely eclectic parroting of them in what has
become a wholly inappropriate context, becomes
identified trader the same auspices.
So perhaps now that we have escaped from some
of the more obviously restrictive confines of
"bourgeois ideology" \<re can claim to understand
the language of equaLity a little better. For
this latter is what the "old solutions" amount to.
The Contract of Rousseau, the Reason of Kant:
solutions to the antithesis of one with all, the
subject with the object, the individual with right,
solutions which seek to reconcile the dualism on
the side of the subject, which appear therefore in
the form of "abstract individuality". It is "man"
therefore who "wills" the conditions under which
he becomes equalised under the form of right. Yet
"man" here is already abstracted as a presupposition.
In "man" we already have an abstraction, a unit of
equality. we have a language of equality. But more
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than this, ve have a language of equality working
in respect to a real object. The equivalent unit
actuates itself in the form "subject of a right".
Therefore there is no question of a dominantly
religious element in this language (obvious in
Rousseau even if Kant presents some serious doubts).
The object of equality is not posited in the nether¬
world; equality as a matter of right is not equality
in the eyes of a redeemer. And for this reason a
connective becomes possible between the old
solutions, the immensely rich language which they
articulated on the side of the subject, and the new
developments of the equivalent form on the side
of the object, the development of the analysis of
exchange, commodities and human labour, production
and, finally, the Critique of Political Economy.
Part III
Post—Classical Reproduction of Legal Culture:
Ch. 1 . Tiie Example of the Historical School
of Law.
Law, Natural and Positive.
... Further Considerations'.
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Post-Classical Reproduction of Legal Culture
The Example of the Historical School of Law
No amount of legal thought can get beyond
"rightful" thought, and that is why, once we have
understood Kant, we have understood the finite
limits of bourgeois legal culture. It may be
objected that there are others besides the Kantian
theory of "rightful" thought. This is true, but
it is not an objection. Only the Kantian limits
are (legally speaking of course) in the best sense
of the word, objective. And, indeed, there is no
post-Kantian example in modern legal culture of
thought ever reaching beyond the limits imposed
by "rightful" thought, i.e. the Kantian identity
of right and reason. As an example of this we may
consider the school of law which considered itself
to have got beyond Kant, the Historical School of
Law.
Against the Hobbesian "bellum omnium.." man,
according to Puchta, is endowed with the sense of
right. "This sense", he says:
is., destined to guard the condition of
equality among men, by reducing their individual
inequalities under that which belongs equally
to all, namely, personality as the possible
will/
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wi 11 of all, and by thus setting limits to
the impulse and tendency of the individual
to refer and subject others to himself. The
function of equalisation is effectuated by
the individual being led to recogiij.se others
as possessing rights like his own„
Here we have merely another re-statement of the
antithesis of individuality and equality. Right
becomes the form under which individuals are made
equal, a result of the individual "being led"
thereto. The result is presupposed in the sense
of the individual: subjective idealism.
But Puchta is of the Historical School and
therefore, unlike Kant, he must bring the principle
of the abstract subject to "life"; he must
demonstrate its historical existence. And here it
becomes tied up with a second principle, the
principle of arranging its "development" amidst
circumstances in which it never existed. Thus,
when confronted with the historical development of
law in Roman times, for instance, where the principle
of the abstract subject is openly contradicted by
the institution of slavery, Puchta and the Historical
School declare that here we have right as such, but
as yet unrealised. In other words the principle of
right is there (because they say so) but the
1 . Puchta, Outlines of Jurisprudence, p.22.
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historical evidence doesn't show it because History
is still working on it and hasn't quite got it
ready. (The jus gentium, of course, is pointed
to as ample evidence that Roman history was getting
on with the job). And so:
The principle of right has gradually unfolded
itself to greater purity and clearness by
laying aside, at stage after stpge of its
history, the accidental developments which
have covered and obscured it.
For Puchta, a mere trifle such as slavery, the
material basis of the whole of Roman civilisation,
is just another "accidental development" concealing
the purity of the principle of right . "What is
displayed here (pace Karl Popper) is the true
poverty of historicism.
According to the principle of right, "(t)he
function of equalisation is effectuated by the
individual being led to recognise others as
possessing rights like his own." This, clearly, is
the principle of bourgeois right; the "individual"
(already an abstraction) recognises in others
"rights like his own" . The principle of right here
is therefore not just an equivalent form, but an
equal equivalent form: bourgeois law. And without
supposing the equivalent form as general in this way,
there is no sense in talking of the "person" as
1 . Puchta, ibid.
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the bearer of a right, as the abstract unit of
of right as such. There is no such thing as the
"person" as a right-bearing unit in pre-bourgeois
society.
But for the Historical School the "person" is
the principle of right sub specie aeterni. "Relation¬
ships of right are relations of persons to one
another", says Puchta.^ "Every jural relation
consists in the relation of one person to another
2
person," says Savigny. The person is the unit
of equality, the embodiment of the principle of
right. But as such, as "person", he is abstract
- thinkable because real (as bourgeois law) but
not real because thinkable alone. "Personality is
a common characteristic which is thinkable as
subsisting equally in the most different individual
circumstances., it is just the prominent manifestation
of the principle of equality,"^ Puchta says, but
with no notion as to why it is "thinkable" as "the
principle of equality" and form of right, even when
it is expressly negated by his "historical" sense.
1. Puchta, ibid., p.67«
2. Savigny, System of Modern Roman Law, Bk. 11 , p.1 .
3. Puchta, Outlines etc., p.68.
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The interesting thing about the Historical
School is how their "historical" sense becomes
accommodated, within the language of equality,
because it would appear that the sligutest
tincture of the historical would naturally move
the abstract subject from its Kantian basis in
"our" thought to something subsisting as a quality
of the object of thought. In other \\rords, it is
reasonable to think that a little historical
erudition would be sufficient to shift the question
from right being considered under the form of
abstract subjectivity to the conditions under which
it is possible to consider the form of right in
such a way. Where, for instance, is the impersonal
form of the subject apparent in Roman law, in feudal
law? The Historical School merely said here, the
principle of right, i.e. of the abstract subject,
is "gradually unfolding".
The language of equality speaks of "man", the
"person", the "subject of a right" etc. without
addition. But nowhere else other than in bourgeois
society can these terms be connected as such with
the form of law, because it is only bourgeois law
which admits of such categories, which does not need
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to ask, which, "person"? Preedman, slave, lord,
vassal etc.? On the other hand, bourgeois law
does make distinctions regarding "persons" and
this enabled the Historical School (and legal
theorists before and since) to blur the essential
distinction, namely, that the distinctions in
regard of "persons" in bourgeois law (e.g. adult¬
hood, sanity) are not of the same order. Puchta,
for example, believed that he was talking of right
in general when he said:
...the manifoldness of the propositions of
right, are related to the fact that by the
principle of right, the conditions of
inequality in human life have to be subjected
to the principle of equality, without,
however, being abolished by it. The formation
of right thus arises out of the continual
antagonism of unequal relations, and continual
subjection of them to the control of right.
From this process the various institutions
of right arise.
But the antithesis between individuality and equality
which is expressed here is the peculiar condition
of bourgeois right, and the "continual antagonism"
between the two is the process at the roots of the
"manifoldness of the propositions of (bourgeois)
right". ^
1. Puchta, ibid., p.45.
2. ante. Pt. X, Ch. j, where this process is
illustrated in its proper connection.
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The language of equality, the language of the
antithesis of individuality and equality, of the
abstract subject, the "person" etc. — this is the
language of the Historical School. They scorn
Kantian formalism yet remain fixed precisely within
the boundaries which it defined - one "hundred years
after Kant. Here is another example of the
"historical" language of the Historical School.
"If in the examination of the jural relation,"
writes Savigny, "we remove by abstraction, all its
specific content, there remains over as a common
nature, the united life of a plurality of men..,"
in other xvords, an abstract subject. Again, a
specifically bourgeois condition innocently expressed
in the fact that the plurality which is united in
the jural relation figures merely as "men", subjects
already abstracted. But Savigny goes on, "¥e might
naturally be led to stop short at this abstract
conception of a plurality and regard law as its
discovery... but such an accidental meeting of an
undefined multitude is a conception both arbitrary
1
and entirely wanting in truth.." Savigny is aware,,
in other words, of the circularity of a language in
which the abstract subject is always supposed. How
1 . Savigny, System of Modern Roman haw, Bk. 1 , p. 12.
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to get beneath, it? What is this abstract subject?
Savigny's answer is well-known; it is the "spirit"
of the people, the "volksgeist", an answer which
left the question as much a mystery as if he had
completely left it alone. Accordingly the simple
idea of "custom" became for Savigny the means for
observing the life-blood of law, as the manifold
1
bringing the abstract subject to life.
1. For those who are led to believe that Savigny1s
ideas may be freely associated with those of
Hegel, the following is noteworthy; "The
supposition that it is customary law, on the
strength of its character as custom, which
possesses the privilege of having become part
of life is a delusion, since the valid laws
of a nation do not cease to be its customs
by being written and codified - and besides,
it is as a rule precisely those versed in the
deadest of topics and the deadest of thoughts
who talk nowadays of 'life' and of 'becoming
part of life'." - Hegel, Philosophy of Right,
p.13Hegel attacked those who believed
custom to be the "badge" of law (as Savigny
put it) because he was wholeheartedly in
favour of the codification of the laws. To
deny a nation the right to codify its laws
%*ras for Hegel tantamount to tyranny, since it
meant that the laws would be less accessible
to the public and analogous to the act of
Dionysius the Tyrant, who hung the laws so
high that they could not be read clearly.
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Nothing could be a more erroneous assessment
of the Historical School than the following which
is given by Gierke:
In Germany the theory of Natural Law disappears
before the new world of ideas introduced by
the Historical School. It was the achievement
of that School to transcend, at last, the old
dichotomy of law into natural and positive.
Regarding law as a unity, and conceiving it
as a positive result and living expression
of the common consciousness of an organic
community, the thinkers of the Historical
School refused to content themselves with
merely continuing to emphasise one or the
other side of the old antithesis - they
sought to aciaieye a synthesis of both in
a higher unicy .
The theory of natural—law "disappears" at the hands
of the intellectual achievements of the Historical
School of Law. On the contrary, the Historical
School, if it did anything at all, brought the
theory of natural-law back to life. It merely
re-articulated the old "natural-law prejudice"
in a "historical" manner. It did absolutely
nothing to break through the mysteries of the
abstract subject, and this despite the fact that
the conditions in which these mysteries had
hitherto been beheld no longer held sway. In
place of the abstract subject it nerely coined
another expression with precisely the same
theoretical content: "common consciousness".
1 . Gierke, Johannes Althusius, in Natural Law
etc . . p.223.
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Or, to use Gierke's expression, "living expression
of the common consciousness of an organic community".
How an inorganic community could be attributed
with the form of consciousness is something which
we may ignore; but the turn of phrase is not'eworthy.
"Life," "consciousness", "living", "organic" - the
Historical School (of which Gierke himself is
effectively a latter-day representative) were
desperately concerned to force "life" into the old
abstract subject, into the old "natural-law prejudice".
Gierke himself repeatedly informs us that the "group -
parson" (sic. abstract subject) is "real", concrete,
actual etc. and again and again delights in the
stylistically distasteful expression, "real-group-
person" . ^
1. Gierke's extraordinary enthusiasm over the
existence of "real-group-persons" was something
which he enjoined people to prove for themselves:
"In our ordinary daily life any effort of
attentive introspection will suffice to convince
us of these spiritual forces. But there are
times when the spirit of the community reveals
itself to us with an elemental power, in an
almost visible shape, filling and mastering
our inward being to such an extent that we are
hardly any longer conscious of our individual
existence, as such. Here, in Berlin, in the
Unter den Linden, I lived through such an hour
of consecration on the 15th July, in the year
1870." - the day of the famous Ems telegram,
cited, p.ixix, Gierke, Natural Law etc.
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Law, natural and positive.
As for the Historical School having "transcend(ed
at last, the old dichotomy of law into natural and
positive," there are a whole mass of common errors
concealed here and now is as good a time as any to
consider them. Xn the first place, the "transcendence
of the "old dichotomy" refers to a development which
takes place quite independently of what the
Historical School may or may not have said, and
so far as the Historical School gave expression
to this development they really added nothing to
what is already clearly apparent in Grotius,
Puffendorf or Hobbes two hundred years earlier,
namely, that "natural-law" had become "positive".
Secondly, it is not really at all the "old dichotomy"
which is "transcended" here (the condition of the
"old dichotomy" was that it could not be "transcended"
but rather a question that has to do with the
emergence of an entirely new form of law giving
rise to the appearance that "natural" and "positive"
law are collapsable.
The "old dichotomy" of natural and positive
law is a characteristic feature of medieval political
circumstances. But it may be considered older than
this; a dichotomy of natural and positive law is
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clearly evident in ancient and Roman times, but
again it is of an altogether different nature from
the dualism as it subsisted later on in later Roman
and medieval political thought. Natural law in
general, however, embodies the principle of
equality. Thus it becomes apparent why, in the
bourgeois era, the dualism disappears and the
theory of natural law becomes identical with the
theory of law as such, for here the principle of general
equality becomes the indicium of positive law.
But tills has nothing to do with the realisation
of the Christian principle on earth, the principle
with which natural-law was associated in medieval
times, nor, indeed, with the Stoic principle, with
which natural-law was associated in ancient and
earlier Roman times. More mundanely, it has to
do with the development of capitalist commodity
production and the equal relations of generalised
commodity-ownership which it ushers forth.
Let us give a schematic picture of the historic
metamorphoses of the so—called "old dichotomy" —
it is a veritable fountain of errors in legal
historiography.1
1 . cf. Friedrich, Philosophy of Law in Historical
Perspective; D'Sntreves, Natural Law, for the
circumventions of these problems.
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Firstly^: natural-law according to the Stoic
view. The equality principle here is that all men
are naturally equal, which means neither equality
only in the eyes of God (as distinct from the world,
which is the pinLnciple of medieval natural-law) ,
nor equality in the eyes of the law (bourgeois
natural-law). Its meaning is specifically ancient.
For example, the "Republic" of Zeno, the founder
of the Stoic sect, is summarised by Plutarch as
aiming singly at this:
that neither in cities noi" in towns should we
live under laws distinct one from another,
but that we should look upon all men in general
to be our fellow-countrymen and citizens,
observing one manner of living and one kind
of order, like a flock feeding together with
equal right in one common pasture.
This is utterly un-Christian. The Stoics were
concerned exclusively with "this world" and were
pan-theistic (God and the world being identical).
This is also, needless to add, utterly mi-bourgeois.
But the important point here is that such a doctrine
is completely antithetical to the positive laws
of antiquity: "Neither in cities nor in towns
should be live under laws "distinct one from another" .
A doctrine symptomatic of the ruin of the city-states. But
1 . Plutarch, morals, Vol. 1 , "Of the Fortune or
Virtue of Alexander the Great".
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as Greece becomes a province of Rome and as
Diogenes takes Stoicism to Rome, the antithesis
is no less acute. Roman law is still Roman law.
The Roman jurists, accordingly, could have
nothing to do with natural law. Bven in regard
of the "law of nations" it could only mean confusions
For Gaius jus gentium and ius naturale are the
same thing: the law which nature has instilled
into all nations. But other jurists who
mention the matter, who are later, commonly
distinguish, pointing out that slavery is
iuris gentium, contrary to ius naturale (contra
naturam) . Ulpian goes further and identifies
ius naturale with instinct, and Justinian
adopts the views of (paius and Ulpian as if
they were the same."
1. Buckland, Roman Law, p.53* Buckland, however,
has no understanding of the dualism in question,
for he adds: "Accordingly it has been maintained
that, for the age of Hadrian and before, there
was no difference, but that in the late classical
age the two ideas began to be distinguished
and the distinction became a standing part of
medieveal political thought." - ibid. As
shown in the text, just the reverse is true.
That there was "no difference" up to around
the time of Hadrian means really that the
jurists pre-Hadrian had not troubled themselves
with the issue of natural-law, i.e. not because
there was "no difference" between this (which
still had strong connotations with Stoicism)
and the law as such, but because the dichotomy
was glaringly absolute. That "in the late
classical age the two ideas began to be
distinguished" is symptomatic of their coming
together in a new form, so requiring distinction,
especially along the lines of "rendering unto
Caesar..etc." (positive law) and unto God that
which is His (natural law).
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The identification of natural-law with the jus
gentium, the legal-forra which grew up because and
so far as commerce and trade had become the imperial
rule, is rather like a distorted premonition of the
bourgeois synthesis. But in general the Roman
jurists were utterly unconcerned with the natural-law
principle in anything resembling the true Stoic
sense. To have attempted any involvement of such a
principle with their law would have marked their
complete ignorance of the latter - and only a
lunatic would Tyrant to assert that the Roman jurists
were ignorant of Roman law. Such are the conditions
of the dualism of natural and positive laxir in these
early times. Basically it is a dualism of the
principle of human equality (for this world) and
the institution of slavery.
But slavery can accomodate Christian natural-law:
the principle of equality in the eyes of a God
separated off from the world, from life, from every¬
thing. For all their severe austerity, the Stoics
had never "denied" after the fashion of a "kingdom
not of this world", quite the reverse. But the
"kingdom not of this world", music to the ears of
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Pilate, negates completely the conditions of the
1
"old dichotomy". This new "old dichotomy" is
1. Perhaps a few words of explanation are required
here in regard of the "music to the ears of a
Pilate". The original scene runs as follows:
"Pilate therefore entered again into the judgement
hall and called Jesus, and said unto him, 'Art thou
king of the Jews?1 Jesus answered him, "Sayest
thou this of thyself, or did others tell it thee
of me?' Pilate answered, "Am I a Jew? Thine own
nation and the chief priests delivered thee unto
me: what hast thou done?' Jesus answered, 'My
kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were
of this world, then would my servants fight, that
I should not be delivered to the Jews: but now
is my kingdom not from hence.' Pilate therefore
said unto him, 'Art thou a king then?' Jesus
answered, 'Thou sayest that X am a king. To this
end was I born and for this cause came I into
the world, that I should bear witness to the
truth. Everyone that is of the truth heareth
my voice.' Pilate sayeth unto him, 'What is
truth?'" - John 18, 33* According to Hegel,
Pilate asked the question, "What is truth?" with
the air* of a man who had settled accounts in that
quarter long ago (Logic, p.27). The reason
for what Hegel considered an apparently complacent
gesture here is that Pilate didn't need to know
any more. As soon as he heard the words, "My
kingdom is not of this world", he was happy - no
threat to the Roman imperium here. 'Art thou a
king then?' he goes on to ask, in an amused kind
of way, to which Jesus replies, "Thou sayest
that I am a king." Pilate, of course, had said no
such thing; he was merely teasing out what was to
him a rather irrelevant notion of kingship.
Compare Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy, p.273 et . seq.
I cannot resist quoting Nietzsche in this
connection, who says, "Bo X still have to add
that in the entire New Testament there is only
one solitary figure whom one is obliged to
respect? Pilate, the Roman governor. To take
a Jewish affair seriously - he cannot persuade
himself to do that...The nobel scorn of a Roman
before whom an impudent misuse of the word 'truth'
was carried on has enriched the New Testament with
the only expression which possesses value — which
is its criticism, its annihilation even - "What is
truth?'" (Anti-Christ, p.162). cf. generally
Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity.
The original independence of Christ from politics,
of course, became subsequently a basis for the
political harnessing of Christianity.
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something else again. Really it is no longer a
dichotomy, but a synthesis - a synthesis which
is the result of a principle of equality that is
capable of living in harmony with every conceivable
form of worldly human degradation. The historical
conditions of this particular "old dichotomy" are
characteristically feudal and date roughly from
around the eclipse of the Roman imperium to the
dawning in the West of bourgeois civilisation.
The "old dichotomy" in the Middle Ages is
therefore grounded in a synthesis of Christianity
with the feudal order, of prelate with prince.
And because this is so, there arises the continual
need to distinguish one from the other: natural
law from positive law, the justification from the
beastly act. But the justification only offers
"redemption" on the condition of "sin", and
similarly the brutal "positive" laws of the prince
may only be executed on condition that they are
"justified" . The finest expression of the mutually
parasitic character of Christian theology and feudal
petty absolutism, which finds for it a basis in
"higher reason", is achieved in Thomist scholasticism.
But, of course, this "higher reason" is still
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Christian theological reason, for all the respect
which is paid to Aristotle. However, our aim is
not to go into these matters in any detail, but
merely to draw a very schematic outline of the
historical conditions of the "old dichotomy" of
natural and positive law.
Finally, we come to the "old dichotomy" in
the bourgeois era. No longer is the principle of
human equality in the eyes of a God who is
independent of the world a sufficient reason for
the form of law. And yet, for all appearances,
bourgeois law is more "Christian", or rather, more
positively "Christian" than feudal law. But at
the same time the historic appearance of bourgeois
law coincides with the eclipse of Christian
theological natural-law dogma, that is, just at a
time when one would reasonably expect it to have
become more convincing. Still, there should really
be no surprise, since Christianity has always been
consistent in this: it has never sought positive
evidence in "this" world, only negative evidence,
only the "bad" things, man's corruption, his greed,
his "sin", his misfortune (old age, sickness etc.),
that is to say, evidence conducive to "faith" in
a world somewhere (psychologically speaking, anywhere)
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else. Accordingly, it is an entirely new principle
of equality which is expressed by "natural-law"
in the bourgeois era. It is the principle of law
as such.
By way of recognition of this radical break
with Christian natural-law, vulgar historiography
observes the "transcendence" of the "old dichotomy",
the "secularisation" of natural-law, the appearance
of "positive" natural-law and so on and so forth.
From all that we have said about bourgeois "natural-
law", the "natural-law prejudice", its conditions
and limitations, the mode of its articulation and
variations within that mode, it is clear that such
expressions are completely and utterly inadequate,
if not false. Such expressions are commonplace in
modern legal historiography and as a general rule,
wherever they appear, it is a "'positive' natural-
lawyer" himself who is speaking, namely, an empty
vessel. For, really, there is no such thing as
"secular" or "positive" natural-law, or the process
of the "secularisation" of natural-law (as it is
called). It is not the "same" object which undergoes
a supposed cleansing of theological dogma in this
connection. Subtract theology from scholasticism
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and one is left, perhaps (it is not an entirely-
rigorous proposition), with a few propositions
from Aristotle. But in any event, one would
certainly not have Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Hume,
Rousseau etc. etc. amongst a host whom the modern
legal historiographer artlessly subsumes under a
process of "secularisation" of natural-law.
On the more material side of things, (medieval)
natural—law, as that which is supposedly "secularised",
figures and can only figure as itself, i.e. as
natural-law; the expression of the conditions of
the feudal order, the unity of theology with the
form of law, the form of political rule. The form
of law here is heterogeneous, unequal, enmeshed
in priviledge and vested interest, often brutal
and barbaric; hence, it is inextricably bound up
with the Christian "promise", with "justification".
This is the essence of natural-law. "Secularised"
it becomes naked barbarism. "Secularised"
theoretically, that is, taking it in its finest
and most reasoned sense (in Aquinas), this barbarism
is displaced in a sublimated flight back to the
refuge of the ancients. Aquinas subconsciously
seeks refuge with his "philosopher", as the
scholastics called him (Aristotle); a profound
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testimony that his theology is inadequate, that
it is indissolubly mixed with the miserable
conditions of the feudal order.
The "secularisation" of natural-law, if such
a thing is to be sensible, must refer to its stated
object, namely, the conditions of the feudal order.
If we do this, we learn a little about the
character of the feudal order; we learn that
without religion it is barbaric and that with
religion this barbarism is "justified". But for
all this we learn absolutely nothing about bourgeois
"natural-law". The modern legal historiographers
who think otherwise, who move freely from the Stoics
to Aquinas, to Kant and literally all over the
place, displaying their erudition in the process,
commit themselves to a conclusion that they would
be appalled to admit; that the modern classical
position in regard of the theory of law reflects
the historical emergence of pre-feudal barbarism.
This at least is the proximate conclusion which may
be ascribed to those who believe the modern classical
thinkers to be "secularisers" of natural-law.
The bourgeois era ushers in nothing at all
resembling the "secularisation" of natural-law, and
nor therefore is it the "old dichotomy" which is
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reconciled here. The "old dichotomy" was already
reconciled, transcended and united as a condition
of the feudal order of things. Natural law was
not in the least bit independent of positive law
in feudal times; each was absolutely conditional
upon the other. What comes to be articulated in
classical thought is therefore an altogether
different unity: not God and the world (as an
antithesis), but man and man - individual and
individual, the principle of general equality as




Let us return to the "example" of the
Historical School of Law. The error of historicism,
of distorting both past and present by reading
back the superficial appearances of the latter
into a past in which they never existed, is not a
distinction which is peculiar to the Historical
School of Law. The Historical School just presents
a "good example". The superficiality which is
read back into bygone times is the form of the
abstract subject. This the Historical School
considers to be the historical form of law in
general. But in previous periods it is constrained
by various circumstances: this "it" can only
figure therefore in the principle of natural-law
in medieval times (as distinct from the "positive"
law). However, the Historical School considered
it to be their good fortune to be living at a time
when "the" principle of right had been fully
unfolded; no longer is "it" (it never occurred
to them that "it" might be something rather different)
confined to the world beyond. Here "it" was on
their doorsteps: the abstract subject, no longer
there by the grace of the Holy Spirit, but here
in the "real", "live", "organic" etc. form of the
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"Volksgeist". Thus the Historical School's
"transcendence" of the "old dichotomy": a
circumspect way of saying that G-od becomes the
Fatherland. Vulgar, belated (late nineteenth
century) German bourgeois nationalism. "One school
of thought that legitimises the infamy of today
with the infamy of yesterday," said Marx, "(is)
the historical school of law - this school would
have invented German history were it not itself
1
an invention of that history."
But just as theoretically disreputable are the
schools of legal thought which appear later - and
not merely in Germany. Nothing is changed when
the "Volksgeist" is made even more "positive",
when it is turned into the "common purposes" of
the Interest School of Jurisprudence, or the
"socially organised purposes" of the French legal
theorist, Duguit (who in this connection plagiarises
the sociological positivism of Durkheim), or the
aspirations of the petty bourgeois "Ego" of the
latter-day followers of Bentham in England. All
these are merely modes of inflating with the most
unspeakable theoretical rubbish the same old abstract
subject long since eclipsed at the twilight of
classical thought.
1. Marx, Early Writings, p.245.
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Since the Germans are useful in the provision
of "good examples", let us bring the story into
the twentieth century with the post-Historical
School developments in the theory of law. Clearly,
with the turn of the nineteenth century, the idea
of the "Volksgeist" begins to look a little specious,
"a little too close to natural-law after all", the
legal thinkers began to say. Spirit still meant
spirit when all said and done, and with this the
search began for something a little more "positive"
with which to re-vitalise the skeletal frame of the
abstract subject. On the other hand, this frame
wasn't exactly bare - theoretically perhaps, but
not empirically. It may not have been "spiritual",
but it was still the "living expression of the
common consciousness of an organic community". A
scientific-sounding phrase like this didn't need
to go into the dustbin. But what was this "common
consciousness"? In other words, again the question,
what is the abstract subject? Gierke had persisted
that it was "real", a "real-group-person" and, after
his little experience in the Unter'den Linden,
decided that its secret rested finally in an appeal
to the "spirit" of natural-law (the "old dichotomy"
1
wasn't dead after all). And this rule did not
1. Gierke, Natural Law etc. cf. ante.
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change, that is to say, the answer to the question
of the abstract subject remained that "we" must
determine it to our own judicious satisfaction.
The legal theorist, Ihering, baptised this as
the "teleological method", whereupon the Interest
School of Jurisprudence established its foundations.
With the "teleological method", a method
distinguished by its built-in facility for first
deciding, quite arbitrarily, upon a given result
before the historical "evidence" is adjusted
accordingly, the errors of the old Historical
School were shamelessly and openly declared as a
principle of Jurisprudence. "Ihering was originally
a conceptualist", says Heck, the principal exponent
of the Jurisprudence of Interests, but, "(h)e
turned from a Saul into a Paul. He advanced the
following principle: Law is not created by concepts
but by interests...Therefore Ihering is justly
recognised as the founder of the Teleological
School and consequently the Jurisprudence of Interests."
The notion of the "conceptualist" here refers to
the legal theorist who applies the analytic principles
of logical thought to the legal form, who is doomed
therefore to saying nothing more about law in particular
1 . P. Heck, in 20th century legal Philosopiiy,
Vol. 2., p.35.
cf. Toering, Law as a Means to an End.
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than literally any other set of propositions about
1
the world. Accordingly, there is a measure of
sense in this "conversion" of Ihering1s. But what
is the hallucination (Heck's analogy is fitting)
in this instance? "Law is not created by concepts
but by interests." This seems quite the reverse
of a hallucination, almost a materialist principle
in fact. But what is really expressed here is an
extremely vulgar dichotomy of "concepts" and
"interests". ¥hat is meant is that "concepts" (and
not merely those of the "conceptualists") are
irrelevant in the Interest School's view of law.
Simply because "law is not created by concepts"
(it hardly needs be said) it by no means follows
that our understanding of law is not thus created.
But the "teleological method" sees law as the
expression of "common purposes" or "interests"
and, not being able to get to the bottom of this
(which is just yet another term for the form of
the abstract subject), its exponents artlessly
declared that these "interests" were something
to be determined by them alone - after the manner
of the judge's determination of the "public interest".
1 . cf. ante, the discussion of analytic principles
in connection with "Kantianism".
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The Interest School draws out in a "positive"
manner (that is, an "unashamed" manner) the
inevitably anti-scientific stance of modern
jurisprudence. In this is to be observed a
characteristic repulsion of any scientific solution
to the riddle of the abstract subject. The old
Historical School, for example, had said that it
was the "living expression of the common
consciousness" of the community. Subsequent
legal thinking can say no more; it can only turn
in on itself: the "common consciousness" becomes
a matter which it must decide purely on its own
account . It is not resolved as an object, but
quite arbitrarily as a subject pretending to think
it as an object. Law is to be determined as a
moment of the community in which it finds its
expression, the Historical School had said, yet
on the other hand it became a matter for legal
thought to decide the true content of this relation.
Law is thus posited as both object of inquiry and
"solution" to the problems posed therein. Legal
thought becomes a playground for the duplication
over and over again, in a manifold variety of ways,
the "Kantian" and historicist errors.
-275-
Xn the case of the Interest School, "rightful"
thought becomes "teleological" thought: "we"
decide upon the form of law, "we" interpret the
abstract subject, the "common purposes" inscribed
therein - not as an object in itself, but as
something which is exclusively "for us". Binder,
a "Hegelian" supporter of the Interest School
observes its essentially juridical character when
he says:
Let us grant that the Jurisprudence of
Interests has progressed beyond the most
narrow positivism in so far as it has
rediscovered the teleological element of
law. Nevertheless Stammler's saying applies
to it, that he who maintains that the "just¬
ness" of law must be measured by its appropriate¬
ness to the end persued, "has not thought
(the matter) through". For the question of
whether something is an appropriate means for
this or that purpose has fundamentally
nothing to do^xvith the question of whether this
means is law.
¥e may just take the opportunity to further observe
that neither the "Hegelian", Binder, nor the "Kantian",
Stanimler, were capable of "thinking the matter
through". The form of law for both of these
involved (again) nothing else but a re-formulation
1. Binder, J., in 20th century Legal Philosophy,
Vol. 2, p.301 .
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of the mysteries of the abstract subject. Staramler
merely re-asserted the "natural-law prejudice" in
deference to its classical origins, symptomaticaily
pointing out that contemporary developments in
legal theory had in no way surmounted the "solutions"
1
of nearly two hundred years earlier. Binder, on
the other hand, simply parroted Hegelian terminology
in considering the form of law as a unity of
universal and particular will. In this there is
nothing more than yet another circumspect expression
of the abstract subject, namely, as the equalisation
of a host of particular wills under the form of one
which is in common - all of which goes to show
the truth of the statement with which we began
this section: no amount of legal thought gets
beyond the limits of "rightful" thought, the
limits of thought itself as abstract subjectivity
— proscribed by Kant in the eighteenth century.
1 . cf. Stammler, Theory of Justice.
Legal Sociology...
a. The Return of the "Contract":
the "free" contract.
b. "Origins" and the Legal Form.







The Return of the "Contract"; t.he "free" contract
1 . In legal sociology are reproduced the errors
of" the old "Contract": pre-posited at the dam of
civilisation (Rousseau) and considered in this
as conformable with reason itself (Kant). They
are reproduced, however, in connection with a more
"positive" contract - the "free" contract.
The "free" contract is, in the common phrase,
a "bourgeois" notion. In. other words it is a
notion which cannot properly be applied in general
(to Rome or the Middle Ages for example); it
expresses a definite legal content and consequently,
corresponds specifically xvith capitalist social
development of production and exchange. The "free"
contract is essentially bound up not with the
historically general existence of commodity exchange,
but with the historically specific existence of
generalised commodity exchange - a distinction
which is systematically overlooked in legal
sociology.
Once the "free" contract is considered
independently of bourgeois society, its definition
becomes impossible. Of course, there is no need
to be dogmatic about the issue; it is not impossible
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to say of a contract juris gentium, for example,
that "X freely contracts with Y". But if this is
an instance of the "free" contract, one of its
conditions becomes that neither X nor Y are slaves,
which is to say, that the existence of slavery
is supposed. Further, the form of property in
exchange around which contracts juris gentium
became articulated is not merely this, not merely
the commodity-form, but the commodity-form because
and so far as it had been developed under slavery.
In this way freedom of contract becomes conditional
upon slavery - which is definitely not what those
who liberally apply the notion in this way wish
to conclude. Max ¥eber, for example, applies the
notion, freedom of contract, to pre-capitalist
social formations. What does that turn the "free"
contract into? It turns it into something which
is utterly indifferent to both the nature of the
contracting agents and the subject-matter over
which the agreement is made. The subject—matter
of the agreement may be res mancipi, feudal labour-
service or gilt-edged stock, and by subsuming all
and sundry in this way under the development of
freedom of contract (which is what Weber does) any
differentiation of the thing on historical grounds
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becomes impossible. Xn other words, the "free"
contract becomes impossible to define: the "free"
contract remains the "free" contract. But we shall
look at ¥eber more closely in this connection shortly.
The historical ground of the "free" contract
is only bourgeois society, where commodities, money,
labour-power all circulate "freely", without any
apparent compulsion. There is no knout hanging
over the wage-slave, no feudal lord with all his
overtly coercive appurtenances weighing in the
balance with the wage-labourer 1 s inclination to
perform "labour-service" for his subsistence. The
mass of people here move "freely" to market, "freely"
contract with their employers in return for a wage
which in turn becomes divided into numerous "free"
contracts in the purchase and sale of wage—goods,
and the product of labour, in the hands of the
capitalist, is converted via innumerable "free"
contracts into money which in turn divides into
further such contracts in the replacement of
equipment, purchase of raw materials, re-purchase
of labour-power etc. etc. not forgetting the
capitalist's own expenditure upon the luxuries which
his "enterprise" has earned him. Only in these
circumstances is the abstract right-bearing unit
of the "free" contract generated. Only here is the
contractual agent "free". "Free" because equal:
no apparent compulsion on either side whether the
agents concerned are building societies, Trades
Unions, John Does, Richard Roes, Assorted Fabrics
and so on and so forth.
Yet given all this, it is possible that one
(a persistent formalist perhaps) would still want
to say that the Roman citizen, for instance, was a
"free" contractual agent and that the slave, being
an exception, is analogous to the infant or the
idiot, who are exceptions to the rule in modern
times. However, in that case one is also committed
to the view that infancy, idiocy etc. furnishes
the material basis of the bourgeois social edifice,
for the slave in Roman times was anything but a
"technical" exception from "free and equal" legal
personality. The "free" contract on closer
examination cannot possibly be merely a form;
form always supposes content, even when posited as
mere form. And for this reason the "free" contract
cannot possibly be arbitrarily ascribed its content.
It already has a content, so to speak, and it is
quite erroneous to have it pre—posited merely as
a form, in antiquity for instance, and from there
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have it "develop" through history, taking an
increasingly large proportion of society under its
auspices. This is the error of historicism. It
is the error of Max Feber - which is nevertheless
precisely the same error made by the man who,
supposing his understanding of money, labour, raw
materials etc. applied under all circumstances,
sailed from England equipped with a plentiful supply
of such things only to find when he got to his
Crusoesque destination that he had forgotten to
take with him the capitalist mode of production.
His "free" wage-labourers deserted him. Similarly
the "free" contract deserts the legal historian
and sociologist when he looks for its "origins"
outside the conditions of capitalist social
production and exchange. But we must now look at
the "free" contract in a little more detail.
2. The "free" contract supposes the commodity-
form of property. Let us see how. The notion of
"freedom" appertaining to the act of exchange means
that there is an absence of compulsion on either
side of this act. But how does this come about?
How is it that the contracting agent is supposed
"free"? — especially as it is patently obvious,
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for example, that if a worker does not "freely"
sell his labour-power on the market, ceteris
paribus he will starve. "Freedom" here is merely
a reflection of the equivalent form of exchange in
which the contracting parties are equal because
and so far as they are owners of commodities. As
equals, neither of the contracting parties exercises
any compulsion over the other; thus they are "free".
The "free" contract arises on the basis of the
commodity—form of property.
Hegel, interestingly enough, deduced this
relation the other way around; the commodity—form
of property becomes a result of the contract.
He says;
The two wills and their agreement in the
contract are as an internal state of mind
different from its (the contract's)
realisation in the performance. The
comparatively "ideal" utterance (of the
contract) in the stipulation contains the
actual surrender (I) of a property by the
one, its changing hands, and its acceptance
by the other will...Thus in the stipulation
we have the substantial being of the contract
standing out in distinction from its real
utterance in the performance, which is
brought down to a mere sequel. In this way
there is put into the thing or performance
a distinction between its immediate specific
quality (its use-value) and its substantial
being or value, meaning by value the quantitative
terms into which the qualitative feature has
been/
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been translated. One piece of property is
thus made comparable with another, and may
be made equivalent to a thing which is (in
quality) wholly heterogeneous. It is thus
treated in general ^ts an abstract , universal
thing or commodity.
Of course the stipulation does not contain "the
actual surrender of (the) property". It certainly
takes an imagination to see in the formal stipulation
2
the "actual" transfer of property; this is only
1. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, p.245- The brackets
are mine. Everything here is made an effect
of "Mind", i.e. Hegel's rnind.
2. The stipulation is the contract as such, i.e.
as it exists legally. Hegel perhaps had in
mind the Roman stipulatio, which as a form of
contract was contained perfectly simply in the
use of the words: "Dare spondes?" — "Spondeo".
Historically it amounted to a simplification
of the older more cumbersome and ritualistic
forms of nexum and mancipatio . It came into
being during the most important period in the
development of Roman law, viz. the period
of the Republic, when great conquests were
laying the foundations of the Empire . The
corresponding growth of commerce and trade
facilitated by efficient political administration
revolutionised the older Roman legal forms.
- "The obligation created by the words,
Dare Spondes? Spondeo, is peculiar to Roman
citizens. The others - Promittisne? Promitto;
Fidejubesne? Fidejubeo, etc. - belong to
the jus gentium, and therefore hold good
between all men, whether Roman citizens or
aliens." - Gaius, Institutes, 111 , 93;
cf. Justinian, Institutes, 111, 15-
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what Is relevant from the legal standpoint. But
what Hegel adds to this legal view, which sees
only "two wills and their agreement", is an
important logical condition which arises therefrom,
namely, that the tilings exchanged are reduced to
a common form, the commodity-form. On the other
hand, the commodity—form is not the effect of the
contract, that is, something resulting from the
contract as such, i.e. as "two \irills . < ." etc., but
rather the commodity-form is the condition of the
contract .
What makes it possible for the mutual alienation
and appropriation of property to be conceived as
a "free" contract, as a free act of will, is a
preparedness to subsume whatever is exchanged
under the commodity—form. But the commodity—form
is so because and so far as production is production
for exchange and because and so far as human labour
has become homogeneous social labour. The conception
of the "free" contract, of two mutually independent,
yet equal wills forming an agreement is therefore
similarly conditioned.
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At this stage it is not beside the point to
recapitulate upon the proper "actual" conditions
of the commodity-form of property. In bourgeois
society the commodity-form of property is a
relation of capital and wage-labour. Wage-labour
assumes the commodity-form of labour-power which
like all commodities is alienated and appropriated
in exchange. But this is not all. The "substantial
being" of labour-power is hardly as property in
exchange, which, following Hegel, is supposedly
contained as such merely in the formal utterance
of the contract . Labour-power subsists far more
"substantially" in the labour-process. Labour-
power, the ability to create, re-create and expand
value, is alienated by the worker and appropriated
by the capitalist who consumes it in effectuating
that ability with his (the capitalist's) means
of production (machinery, land, raw materials etc.).
The product of the labour-process which is thus
set in motion, i.e. the goods produced as a result
of the given productive operation, which represent
an augmented value in relation to the value
initially laid out and used up in the productive
process, belong to the capitalist. Labour-power is
"substantially" appropriated therefore not in the
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contract but in the labour-process. It is
appropriated here for a given duration. Consequently,
it is not immediately apparent that anything
"substantial" has been given up, as in the case
of alienation, and appropriation of bread, wool,
books etc. - the labourer's commodity is still
captive in his own being at the end of the working
day. Still, if nothing had been alienated in this
instance, there would be no product at the end of
the labour-process, no bread, wool, books or
anything. What actually happens is that flesh,
bone, brain and muscle, in their operation, have
been given up and transferred to the subject of
labour and have become materialised in the product
- a product which is owned by another. "Labour
has incorporated itself with its subject: the
former is materialised, the latter transformed.
That which in the labourer appeared as movement,
now appears in the product as a fixed quality.
1
The blacksmith forges and the product is a forging."
It is only here, in the form of the commodity-
product, where the legal form again picks up the
thread, so to speak; where the form of property
1. Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p.176.
"Will" again determines the form of
property for Hegel in the case of landed
property, in which connection Marx says,
"Nothing could be more comical. «.Accordin
to this, man as an individual must endow
his will with reality as the soul of
external nature, and therefore must take
possession of this nature .and make it
his private px^operty. If this were the
destiny of the 'individual 1 , of man as
an individual, it would follow that
ever}- human being must be a landowner,
in order to become a real individual.
Free private ownership of land, a very
recent product, is, according to Hegel,
not a definite social relation, but a
relation of man as an individual to
'nature', an absolute right of man to
appropriate all tilings.." - Capital,
Vol. 111, p.616—7«
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again becomes undifferentiated from the form in
which it began the productive operation, i.e. the
commodity—form. In other words, the legal form,
since it only supposes the form of property as
property in exchange, since it expresses one true
thing and gently declines to recognise anything
else, misses entirely the particular form (here,
the capital-form) by which commodities are produced
and re-produced over and over again. The legal
form therefore systematically declines to look
into itself, as it were; it stops at the commodity-
form, it begins at the commodity-form - it is the
commodity-form, as abstract subject, as "free"
contractual agent and the numerous developments
and determinations thereof.
The contract, according to Hegel, supposes
the commodity-form of property. But in this it
supposes a great deal more, because the commodity-
form is conditional upon the development of
homogeneous social labour - which is properly
realised only in bourgeois societ}'-. Hegel's
view of contract, as the meeting of free independent
wills, is therefore particular, not absolute J
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3. Let us now look at the position of Max Weber
in regard of the "free" contract, "Freedom of
contract", according to Weber, "exists exactly
to the extent to which such autonomy is recognised
1
by the legal order." If by this it is meant that
"freedom of contract" is a specifically legal notion,
that it exists because and so far as it figures as
a legal category, then there is nothing to object
to. But what are the conditions of this existence?
Somehow it appears connected with "the market",
i.e. the sphere of property in exchange, for Weber
adds :
There exists, of course, an intimate connection
between the expansion of the market and the
expanding measure of contractual freedom or,
in other words, the scope of arrangements
which are guaranteed as valid by the legal
order or, in again different terms, the
relative significance within the total legal
order of those rules which authorise such
transactional dispositions .
Again, there appears to be nothing to object to in
this statement. A slight suspicion creeps in,
however, when we look more closely at what is being
said about the apparently historical connection
between "the market" and this legal notion of the
"free" contract. In fact, nothing is being said in
1 . Weber, Law in Economy and Society, p.100.
2. ibid.
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this respect; there is nothing to prevent the
coimection between "the market" and the "free"
contract from being supposed at any time after
Mammon or, to be precise, at any time Tvhere "the
market" is in existence. "The market" appears
amidst the most varied of social conditions: it
is developed under slavery in ancient times, it
becomes the basis of merchant capital in the later
Middle Ages, it is developed par excellence., becomes
the dominant relation between man and man, under
capital and wage-labour in the modern era. But
the "free" contract becomes a notion characteristic
of the latter conditions alone. Not so for Weber:
the "intimate connection" between "the market"
and the "free" contract is between two things which
"expand". Their connection is purely quantitative;
one "expands", so does the other. Hence the use
of the merely quantitative terms; "expanding measure"
"scope of arrangements", "relative significance";
the mere expression of magnitude here suspends
over and over again (regardless of the "in other
words", and "again different terms") the nature of
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the connection, the thing to be defined.
Weber, in fact, makes the assumption that
since the "free" contract is a legal notion, we
may only understand it legally. Weber is therefore
at least consistent this far, since he also
systematically prevents himself from defining the
thing. If the legal form "freedom of contract"
is "intimately connected" with "the market", if
the "free" contract is a specifically legal
connection of the commodity-exchange relation,
then something must make it so. This "something",
as we have made clear elsewhere, consists in the
specific form of commodity exchange, namely, its
generalised form, which is a condition provided only
where social production is exclusively production
for exchange, where production is capitalist
production. These are the conditions of the "free"
1 . "Mathematics usually define magnitude as what
can be increased or diminished. This definition
has the defect of containing the thing to be
defined over again: but it may serve to show
that the category of magnitude is explicitly
understood to be changeable and indifferent,
so that, in spite of its being altered by an
increased extension or intension, the thing
doe3 not cease to be; a house, for example,
remains a house, and red remains red." —
Hegel, Logic, p.159-
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contract as a legal form. The "free" contract is
not something which "expands" alongside the general
historical "growth" of commodity or "market"
relationships. This is only so once bourgeois
conditions have become established; and in any
case, even if this proviso is admitted (which
it isn't in Weber), the crude quantitative terms
in which the connection is expressed still throw it
beyond the boundaries of cognition. What is the
connection between the legal form and "the expansion
of the market"? An "expanding" legal form, says
Weber - "the expanding measure of contractual freedom"'.
Tiie connection is quantitative, which is to say,
the connection exists. But if two things grow
together, "expand" together, become "significant",
"important" etc. together, we need to know not
that this is so, but why this is so. Accordingly,
as Weber persists with these terms the inner
connections of the legal form become self—evidently
beyond his grasp.
Weber's apparent grasp of the economic connections
of the legal form is therefore only this, a mere
semblance. Thus,
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The present-day significance (sic) of contract
is primarily the result of the high degree
to which our economic system is market-
oriented and of the role played by money.
The increased importance (sic) of the private
law of contract in general is thus the legal
reflex o^ the market orientation of our
economy."
And furtherj
The exact extent to which the total amount of
"freedom" within a given legal community is
increased (sic) depends entirely upon the
concrete economic order an^ especially upon
the property distribution/"*
The "free" contract is pre-posited wherever "the
market" has existed. But the "free" contract, like
the commodity—form of property ("the market") which
is contained in it as a premise, depends upon definite
socio-economic relations. Thus, if it is to be
found in differing historical periods (which is
what Weber commits himself to saying), then those
self-same socio-economic relations must prevail
in them all - which is clearly not the case.
Indeed, Weber himself is forced into recognising
this as he approaches more concretely certain
differing historical "contents" which he has initially
and uncritically subsumed under the form of the
"free" contract. Hence,
1 . Weber, Law etc., p.105.
2 . ibid . , p .1 89 •
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That extensive contractual freedom which
generally obtains to-day has, of course,
not always existed; and even where freedom
of contract did exist, it did not always
prevail in the spheres in which it prevails
to-day. Freedom of contract once existed
indeed in spheres in which it is no longer
prevalent or in whiiph it is far less prevalent
than it used to be.
Here even the mere quantitative connection of the
"free" contract with "the market" disappears from
the scene. As Weber develops his narrative more
concretely in looking at historically differing
kinds of social relations, e.g. in early Roman times,
this economic connection of the legal form slips
out of sight - precisely because the "developed":
idea he has of it is uniquely a product of bourgeois
society and is no longer appropriate, not even as
a barren underived quantitative relation. Accordingly,
the "voluntary agreement" becomes posited historically
as the "status" contract, which becomes gradually
and through the ages the "purposive" contract.
This historically is the "development" of "freedom
of contract".
"In accordance with this fundamental trans¬
formation of the voluntary agreement,11 says Weber,
1 . ibid., p . 101 .
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"we shall call the more primitive type status
contract1 and that which is peculiar to the
exchange or market economy 'purposive contract'."'
That which is "peculiar to the exchange or market
economy" is, of course, the "voluntary agreement",
i.e. the "free" contract. Nothing is added by
calling it "purposive". But it is an absolute
impossibility for this same thing to undergo a
"fundamental transformation" from its existence
as "status" contract. Indeed if anything undergoes
a "fundamental transformation", it is no longer
that which it was. The "voluntary agreement" is
"fundamentally transformed" from itself into itself;
the error of historicism. What the "voluntary
agreement" is remains completely and utterly elusive.
Let us summarise Weber's errors. First error:
the "free" contract is merely a quantitative relation
of "the market economy"; as one "increases" in
"significance", "expands", becomes "important" etc.,
so does the other. Logically therefore the "free"
contract is posited wherever the rudiments of "the
market economy" are in evidence, i.e. anywhere where
1 . ibid . , p .1 05 •
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mail has emerged from the forests and has begun to
exchange his products with his fellow-men. Second
error, a compound error of the first: the "free"
contract is not in evidence as a category of legal
thinking in these circumstances. Uven in Justinian
one will look in vain for the "free" contract.
Thus the "free" contract, since it is erroneously
pre-posited as something which must exist merely
with "the market economy" (regardless of its form),
must be considered to exist in such circumstances
not as itself, but as something else. The "free"
contract becomes the "voluntary agreement", a
guileless change of expression for the same thing.
A form of voluntary agreement becomes the "status"
contract. The "status" contract becomes a general
category inclusive of every conceivable form of
primitive agreement characteristic of pre-bourgeois
social formations. The "free" contract disappears
completely - because it was never really made an
object of thought at the outset.
4. The quantitative connection between "the
market economy" and the legal form of the "free"
contract counts merely as an empirical observation.
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Theoretically it has the status of a merely
analytic proposition: thus the commodity-form,
the form of property simply in exchange ("the
market economy") is already supposed in the notion
of the "free" contract - already cogitated in the
subject, as Kant might say. But property is
not merely property in exchange, and so something
else is also supposed in the "free" contract. Xn
other words, to suppose property in exchange is
to suppose property in another connection, a
connection in which propert}' in exchange is itself
produced as such; property in the sphere of
production.
Under bourgeois conditions the commodity-form
of property is the capital-form as it pertains to
the sphere of circulation. But as such it belies
itself; it does not come stamped with these
particular origins. The sphere of circulation
of commodities in fact appears quite alien to its
real nature, i.e. the mechanism which works it.
The commodity-form belies its capital-form in which
labour-power is systematically exploited in the
production thereof. "<(T)b.e capitalist," says Marx,
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"again and again appropriates, without equivalent,
a portion of the previously materialised labour
of others, and exchanges it for a greater quantity
of living labour." Thus the process of capital
accumulation. Marx continues:
At first the rights of property seemed to us
to be based, on a man's own labour. At least,
some such assumption was necessary since only
commodity-owners with equal rights confronted
each other, and the sole means by which a man.
could become possessed of the commodities of
others, was by alienating his own commodities;
and these could be replaced by labour alone.
Now, however, property turns out to be the
right, on the part of the capitalist, to
appropriate the unpaid labour of others or
its product, and to be the impossibility, on
the part of the labourer, of appropriating
his own product. The separation (from labour)
(of property) lias become tne necessary consequence
of a law £hat apparently originated in their
identity.
It is in precisely this way that the legal form of
the "free" contract or "voluntary agreement" also
becomes more fully developed as its opposite -
compelled disagreement. The "free" contract is the
legal expression of these same "commodity-owners
with equal rights (who) confronted each other...",
but its necessary consequence becomes the containment
of disagreement.
1. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1., p. 5^-7 •
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Perhaps a few words about this "containment
of disagreement" are necessary. Firstly, it is
to be emphasised that our dealing with the "free"
contract is a dealing with a form of modern law,
that is to say, not as the law of contract as a
specific branch of legal doctrine, but as an
abstraction of the form of law as a whole, as a
historically more "positive" expression of the
role played by the old social contract (which didn't
need to be "positive" since, unlike this, it conformed
with the scientific protocols of its day).
Secondly, the "containment of disagreement" which
this passes into, therefore, is a containment in
general - not a reconciliation of an individual
breach of contract, but a containment of class
divisions within society as a whole. The "free"
contract is an abstract expression of legal language
as a whole, a category within the legal language of
equality. It therefore operates in the same contra¬
dictory way as this language generally, namely, under
the auspices of power (as outlined in Pt. I,
Chapter 111). In speaking "freedom", therefore,
the law's aim is just the opposite - constraint,
not for freedom's sake, but for the sake of the
property relations which it belies as a theoretically
personified embellishment of the commodity-form
of property.
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5. The merely empirical connection of the form
of law with "the market" is very much "old hat11 .
It is to be observed in Carlyle, for example, who
saw the new equality of law ushered in and proclaimed
by the French and other less dramatic bourgeois
revolutions as coincidental with cash payment
becoming- increasingly the only remaining- social
nexus between man and man. The legal historian,
Maine, with none of the same talent, observed the
replacement of all hitherto existing forms of
social bondage by the relation of "free" contract.
And the more recent historian, Tawney, tells us
that with the eclipse of the ancien regime:
All men, at least in theory, become equal
before the law...All men may enter all
occupations. All men may buy and sell,
trade and invest as they please. Above
all, all men may acquire property of all
kinds. And property itself changes its
nature. The element of sovereignty in it
- such at least is the intention - vanishes.
What remains is the right of exclusiv^
disposal over marketable commodities .
Here the commodity-connection of the legal form is
sketched out. But it is still only a legal view,
since the commodity-form is posited as the only
form of property. 11 (a)11 men may acquire property
1. Tawney, Equality, p .96. On Maine cf. post.
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of all kinds" - this is not so. The worker,
ceteris paribus, cannot become an owner of capital;
the condition of capitalist ownership is that the
mass of people are systematically prevented from
becoming owners of the means of production and
hence purchasers of labour-power and appropriators
of surplus-value. That form of proj^erty which
"all men may acquire" is property in exchange,
commodities, and "property of all kinds" does,
indeed, take this form at one time or another.
But it by no means follows therefore that "all men
may acquire property of all kinds" - not even "in
theory at least", because it is a theoretical
condition that "all men" do not have the means
of acquiring "property of all kinds", regardless
of its necessary appearance at some time or other
in the sphere of exchange. The labourer, for
instance, cannot be a purchaser of another's
labour-power.
It does absolutely no good to merely point
to the existence, true though " it is, of the
commodity-connection of the legal form; for, it
is precisely the commodity—form of property which
belies its real (capitalist) inner nature. There
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is no need to go into this any further since we
have considered it else\niere (especially in Pt . I
Chapter 11). But it is symptomatically here, at
the commodity-connection, that the empiricist
historians and sociologists (Tawney, ¥eber etc.)
come to a complete impasse. It is just at this
point where it is generally forgotten what the
relation in question was about, namely, a definite
set of socio-historical circumstances in which law
appears as a reflex of market conditions. Accordingly,
the "origins" of this legal form become rooted
out elsewhere — especially in Rome. This brings
us to the subject—matter which we shall now deal
with: Rome, where the commodity-form was developed
quite independently of the specific connections
peculiar to its modern socio-legal character, \vhere
the commodity-form was developed according to an
altogether different mode of social production.
Similar kinds of "origins" are also dredged from
the feudal era, a matter which we shall also consider.
Both cause and effect of these misplaced "origins"
of the modern legal form is that it is never fully
grasped in the first place and remains in the same
state of mystery at the end of it all; it remains
as it started, an underived commodity or "market"
connection.
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"Origins" and the Legal Form
1. Roman law and the idea of its "reception".
¥e shoved in the last section how the commodity
connection distinguishes hardly anything in respect
of the form of law. This is so at least in so far
as the material basis of such a connection is left
out of the reclaming, in so far as it remains a
merely empirical, quantitative or analytic observation.
Further, it is as such, i.e. as a merely empirical,
quantitative etc. observation, that it becomes the
basis for postulating the sameness of law in the
most diverse of historical circumstances and
conditions.
The commodity connection is evident, for
example, in the ancient Roman form of contract per
aes et libram which appears as early as the 4th
century 3.C. Legal transactions per aes et libram
(through copper and balance) related to property
in exchange. But the form of property in exchange
here is a relation of slavery. The mancipatio,
with which these transactions were primarily associated,
was a mode whereby slaves, land and cattle (res
mancipi) were exchanged. The slave appears here,
himself, as a commodity. On the other hand, the
slave as property in use becomes the producer of
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of property in exchange and is therefore, objectively,
the producer of himself, i.e. as a slave. As we
made clear in part 1, commodities and money in Roman
times could only figure as such, as value relations,
because and so far as they were posited by slave
production. It can only have been the labour of
slaves therefore, which rendered copper as a universal
equivalent in those very early times. Hence, when
a slave, a piece of land, cattle etc. exchanged for
such and such an amount, that quantity could roily
be on average a portion of materialised slave labour.
Thus on either side of the transaction per aes et
libram we would have, say, a slave on the one side
and a quantity of copper on the other. On each
side we would therefore have, materially, the slave-
labour which a. the slave embodied, in, for instance,
the slave-produced grain etc. which he had converted
into bone, muscle and so forth, and which b. the
copper embodied, in its having been mined by slaves.
Per aes et libram means, implicitly, a form of
transaction grounded in slavery. Moreover, the same
is true of the later Roman contractual forms, regard¬
less of their having been cleansed of the ritualistic
elements characteristic of much earlier times. In
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this connection, Maine, despite an earlier warning
that, "the mistake of judging the men of other
periods by the morality of our own day has its
parallel in the mistake of supposing that every
wheel and bolt in the modern social machine has its
counterpart in more rudimentary societies," senses
no such "mistake" when he says a few pages further
on, with Roman developments alone in mind:
The transformation of (the) ancient view
(of contract) into the familiar notion of
contract is plainly seen in the history of
jurisprudence. First one or two steps in the
ceremonial are dispensed with; then the
others are simplified or permitted to be
neglected on certain conditions; lastly, a
few specific contracts are separated from the
rest . . . the selected contracts being those
on which the activity and energy of social
intercourse depend.
Here, "the familiar notion of contract" is arrived
at purely through a documentation of specifically
Roman developments. By the time Maine has arrived
at the "consensual" contract juris gentium, he has
somehow arrived also at the modern form of "free"
contract; for, he says of the former:
The motion of the will which constitutes
agreement was now completely insulated, and
became the subject of.separate contemplation;
forms (he means the older ritualistic and
cumbersome forms) were entirely eliminated
from the notion of contract, and external acts
were only regarded as symbols of the internal
act of volition.
1. Maine, Ancient Law, pps. 325 » 327-
2. ibid., p.346.
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All that is posited by the "internal act of
volition" here is the exchange form of property,
property as an object in exchange. In other words,
all Maine expresses is the sameness of the Roman
form on the basis of the commodity connection alone.
But the commodity form supposed in contracts juris
gentium is just as much a relation of slavery as
in the case of the foregoing example of the
transaction per aes et libram. And apart from
this, the idea of simply an "internal act of
volition" is quite alien to the Roman jurists,
since there was no abstract willing subject
capable of being produced, as a legal conception,
under slavery. "What Maine effectively does is to
covertly slip the "familiar notion of contract"
into what he understands as the Roman form. The
net result is that neither the "familiar notion"
nor the Roman form are properly grasped in their
real connections. How the "internal act of
volition" wills a relation of capital and wage
labour in the one case and a relation of slavery
in the other, Maine, needless to add, does not say.
It is, of course, the "free" contract which
Maine reads into the contract juris gentium. The
source of the error is that the "free" contract is a
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relation not of commodity exchange per se, i.e. not
of the historically general existence of commodity
exchange, but< of the historically specific existence
of generalised commodity exchange. In thinking
otherwise, Maine commits himself to the view that
either the "familiar" contract is a relation of
slavery or that "every \\rheel and bolt in the modern
social machine has its counterpart in more
rudimentary societies." Similar errors arise in
connection with the idea of the "reception" of
Roman law, and to this we may now turn.
It is quite strange that the idea of the
"reception" of Roman law into modern legal
institutions has attained almost the character of
a statement of fact for modern legal thinking; for,
even without much further thought about the matter,
it poses the most elementary of logical problems.
Roman law supposes the conditions of Roman law.
If Roman law is "received", then so also must its
conditions be similarly "received" - which is not
the case. Therefore the "reception" of Roman law
is not the "reception" of Roman law.
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T'eber, for example, says:
Among the ancient jurists , as a result of the
historically conditioned analytical nature of
Roman legal thought, properly "constructive"
ability, even though it was not entirely
absent, was only of small significance. Now
when this law was transposed into entirely
strange fact situations (1), unknown in
antiquity, the task of "construing" the
situation (in the "strange fact situations")
in a logically impeccable way became almost
the exclusive task.
"In this way," Weber adds, as if he had explained
something, "that conception of law which still
prevails to-day and which sees in law a logically
consistent and gapless complex of 'norms * waiting
to be ''applied' became a decisive conception for
legal thought." "In this way," as a matter of
fact, "that cnnception of law which still prevails
to-day" is completely and utterly mystified. Firstly,
in Roman times legal "'constructive' ability", Weber
correctly observes, is "historically conditioned".
The "'constructive' ability" of Roman legal thought,
in other words, is a child of its time. This is a
condition of its nature as specifically Roman legal
thought: it cannot "construct" as modern law because
it is not materially furnished with abstract personality;
it "constructs" therefore on an altogether different
basis. Consequently, it is quite erroneous to go
1 . ¥eber, Law etc., p.277
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on and say that, "this law was transposed into
entirely strange fact situations," (by which is
meant primarily bourgeois "fact situations")
because "this law" logically entails specifically
Roman "'constructive' ability". If Roman
"'constructive' ability' is "transposed...(etc .
then by that very act it is no longer distinctly
Roman, because what originally distinguished it was
the fact that the conditions for such a development,
for becoming un-Roraan, were logically antithetical
to it .
Roman constructive ability (there is no real
need to have inverted commas around it - "Weber's
use of these is symptomatic of the erroneous attempt
to give it a dual meaning) is a relation of slavery.
This is its differentia specifica. Accordingly
there is no abstract subject in Roman lav; there
is no material basis for such a thing as a self-
sufficient legal category. The legal subject here
is not abstract as a subject, but as a freedman,
a Roman citizen and so forth.The entire ground
and foundation of Roman legal abstraction is the
1. cf. Justinian, Institutes, Bk. 1, titles 3-8.
-30Q-
slave system which pre-determines the height, limit
and form of all its constructions- Hence Roman law
is no more "received" in modern times than the
system of slavery.
Historical inquiry into the "reception" of
Roman law, in so far as it is bent upon upholding
the implied thesis, naturally has a self-defeating
character about it. For, the more the matter is
gone into, the more it transpires that Roman law is
just and precisely that, i.e. Roman law, the law
appropriate to specifically Roman conditions.
"once the origination of an institution has been
shorn to be wholly to the purpose and necessary
in the circumstances of the time," said Hegel,
"the demands of history have been fulfilled."
Hegel also had the historicist error in mind, for
he adds to this:
Hut if this is supposed to pass for a general
justification of the thing itself, it turns
out to be the opposite, because, since those
circumstances are no longer present, the
institution so far from being justified has
by their disappearance lost its meaning and
its right.
1 . Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p.17.
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Jndeed, as Weber and others talk about the "reception"
of Roman law, they fail completely to "justify" the
form of law which they have in mind, i.e. bourgeois
law, for their mode of "justification" or reasoning
here, in persisting with connections of a legal
form grounded in slavery and long since passed
away, does just the opposite. In this connection,
popular criticism (of Weber especially) which points
to "bourgeois apologetics", "justification of status
1
quo" etc. etc. needs to think again.
Naturally as Roman law transpires increasingly
as something essentially connected with Roman conditions,
it correspondingly becomes increasingly alien to
the form of modern law — and the grounds of the
"reception" agruraent must accordingly be modified.
1. Marxist criticism of Weber is often vulgar:
Weber becomes here the embodiment of "self-
evident" falsities such as "Kantianism"
(cf. ante), "liberal nominalism", "value-
freedom", "empiricism" etc. etc. On the other
hand, "sociological" adulation of Weber with
the most inappropriate of phrases and
descriptions: "rigorous", "profound", "genius",
"the answer to Marx", "Marx's intellectual
equal" (to be found in most sociology textbooks
- even the best, cf. Giddens, Capitalism and
Modern Social Theory)-— all this is equally
vulgar if not more so.
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Such, modification, however, doesn't alter the
theoretical error; it merely disguises it. Thus
the following is generally accepted: of course
Roman law is not received in complexu, only certain
of its elements - or some such argument of the kind.
In "Weber, for instance, the elements "received"
turn on the "logical", "formal", "rational" etc.,
characteristics of Roman law. Here is an instance:
As Ehrlich has properly emphasised, in order
for them to be received at all, the Roman legal
institutions had to be cleansed of all remnants
of national contextual association and to be
elevated into the sphere of the logically
abstract; and Roman law itself had to be
absolutised as the very embodiment of right
reason. The six centuries of civil law juris¬
prudence have produced exactly this result.
At the same time, the modes of legal thought
were turned more and more in the direction of
formal logic. The occasional brilliant apercus
of the Roman jurists ...were torn out of the
context of the concrete cases of the Pandects
and were raised to the level of ultimate legal
principles from which. deductive arguments
could be derived.
But then, after six hundred years or so since the
early glosses of the twelfth century, after all this
so-called "cleansing", stripping and tearing from
context etc., the question must arise as to what is
particularly Roman about the result. The impression
given by Weber is that there is something implicit
1 . Weber, Law etc., p.276-7-
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in the Roman form which over the ages has rendered
itself capable of extrapolation, "cleansing" etc.
(this latter term is a typically German piece of
arrogance in this connection). In other words, we
have here just another re-statement of the
historicist error: the modern form is covertly
pre-posited in the ancient, but here it is dormant,
latent, unrealised (in fact, not there at all);
however, thanks to the juristic labours of almost
two tnillenia, the thing emerges fully fledged,
completely "unfolded" in modern (but especially
the German variety) legal science. German legal
science: a sealed gift from Rome that had taken
almost two inillenia to uncover. This at least was
the message of the pandectists of the Historical
School - in no uncertain terms- 3ut for Weber,
"Kantian" that he is, this must be given the blessing
of reason itself. The sealed gift is therefore
the "rational" or "logical" elements contained
within Roman legal thought, and, not surprisingly,
the perfect embodiment of rational legal thought is
that body of doctrine developed by the modern
(especially German) pandec.tist civil lawyers:
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Savigny, Windscheid, Puchta, linger etc.
Bun what does it mean to say that modern law
has "received" the "logical", "rational" etc. elements
of Roman law? By the same token present-day cuisine
has "received" the logical elements of ancient
Babylonian cookery, present-day mathematics has
"received" the logical elements of Aztec construction,
and so on and so forth. Logic, since its form is
universal, is "received" by everything at all times
2
in. all places .
The "reception" of Roman law is basically a
historicist error. In Weber it is disguised with
a little "Kantianism" whereupon it appears in the
form of a "reception" of law as rational thought.
Still, the underlying historicist error by no means
disappears with this much-abused sleight-of—hand
trick. In. comparison with the naiveities of the
old Historical School, the modern legal form is
1. cf. Ehrlich, Principles of Sociology of Law,
p.319 et . seq. , where the Roman connections of
these thinkers appear much less mysterious
than in "Weber.
2. In any case, as Hegel once had cause to point
out, it was to a considerable extent by dint
of their being illogical, that the Roman
jurists and praetors achieved their high
distinction as legal thinkers; by considering,
for example, that a filia was a filius in
regard of the twelve tables, and so forth.
cf. Hegel's discussion of Hugo's "Leblbuch",
Philosophy of Right, p.20.
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here just as much covertly presupposed, in fact
much more covertly presupposed, in the ancient form.
The only difference is that now the legal form is
no longer a principle of equality, but rather a
rational technique in the application of "norms11
to "fact situations"•
Quite apart from the fact that "rationality",
"logical form" etc. can be abstracted from literally
anything, and can therefore connect literally anything
together (obviously at the most indifferent and
superficial level - at the analytic level of mere
being, to give it its precise philosophical expression),
there is still the question as to why so many
hundreds of commentators have persisted with the
idea of the "reception" of the Roman into the modern
legal form. The basis of this is the commodity-
connection of the legal form which is clearly
apparent in both bourgeois and later Roman law.
This, at any rate, is the basis for the association
in modern times (in Maine and "Weber, for example).
But the whole issue is easily confused by the
immensely complicated historical developments
connecting Roman and feudal law - which is an
entirely different matter. Generally these
developments have much to do with the position of
the Roman church throughout the Middle Ages. The
315-
The first "reception" of Roman law thus occurs
in Italy and Southern France around the eleventh
and twelfth centuries, at which time the first
glosses are made upon the Roman sources . But the
practical application of Roman law under feudal
conditions was impossible, and the medieval jurists
in effect were set with an unworkable forced error
at the hands of the Roman church. The inevitable
result was that Roman law, so far as it became
anything other than an esoteric pursuit, became
feudalised, i.e. no longer Roman law but feudal
law in Roman style. The material basis of this
subsists in the antithesis of property relations
arising from slavery on the one hand, and property
relations arising from the feudal system of land-
tenure on the other. Fhrlich shows a sense of this
when he says:
At the time of the (medieval) reception,
irresoluble questions..cried out to the
Continental jurists from every line of the
corpus juris. Had they been men of scientific
training, let us say of the Historical School
of Savigny or of the modern sociological
school (sic), they would never have undertaken
this task (of applying the Roman sources).
They would have said to themselves at the
outset: The kind- of ownership that the
sources speak of does not exist among us; the
unfree person thcjtt we are dealing with is not
the Roman slave.
1. Ehrlich, ibid., p300
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Ivliy the bourgeois "reception" should be any less
contradictory, "scientific" no less, Bhrlich does
not say. But we have seen how "scientifically"
the Historical School "receives" its Roman law,
namely, on condition that the latter is first made
the disguised embodiment of the bourgeois principle
of right; in other words, with a not dissimilar
"scientific" spirit from that of the medieval jurists
who in their day dredged from it similarly impossible
principles of feudal right.
There are two "receptions" of Roman law; the
medieval and the bourgeois. They are, in their
completely different ways, equally contradictory
affairs. This is because the property relations
of bourgeois society (wage labour, capital -
generalised coinrnodity-ownership etc.), of feudal
society (feudal land-tenture) and of ancient
society (slavery) all correspond with very definite
and specific forms of law that are inextricably
bound up therewith. History, however, isn't as
clear-cut as this, and one especial confusion
over the "reception" may be illustrated in this
connection. It concerns the uneven development
of societies. In the seventeenth century, for
example, Holland is taking great steps towards
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maturity as a bourgeois society, whereas Germany
is still, quite definitely, feudal. The Dutch
jurists are therefore working upon the Roman sources
from a bourgeois standpoint while their German
counterparts are still involved with the distinctly
medieval usus nodernus of the Roman pandects. It
is only in the nineteenth century that the Germans
begin to consider Roman law in anything resembling
a distinctly bourgeois connection, whereupon the
older medieval conceptions of the usus modernus
are vigorously repulsed for their "unscientific"
character. Corresponding with this, the German
Imperial Code at the end of the nineteenth century
systematically overrides a whole mass of medieval
"Roman influences" within the old common law. Sohm
expresses the belated arrival of the new bourgeois
notion of the "reception" when he says of this code:
In the code all regulations focus in the private
individual, considered in the abstract. It
deals with property, family and inheritance.
Not the farmer nor the nobleman is considered;
only the legally eligible subject, the abstract
unit of the jus gentium being here in evidence.
This unit or person appears in but one capacity
- either as creditor or debtor; and this
conception may be truly said tip embody the
highest ideal of the merchant.
Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law, cited in Lee's
Historical Jurisprudence, p.415*
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A distinctly bourgeois code: "the private
individual considered in the abstract", namely,
as the owner of property in exchange - a result of
generalised coramodity-oimership. But as quick as
lightening ' this commodity-connection is swept back
to Rome, generalised commodity-ownorship becomes
conflated with commodity-ownership in general,
"the abstract unit of the jus gentium (appears)
in evidence". Thus the bourgeois "reception" of
Roman law: basically the historicist error, a
mode: of expressing complete indifference to the
form of commodity-ownership and thus the form of
law also, both Roman and modern.
To repeat: the commodity-connection of the
persona juris gentium is a relation of slavery;
this "abstract unit of the jus gentium" is conditioned
in form and content by slavery, just as was the
development of the exchange economy upon which it
arose as a legal form. As we remarked in Chapter IX, (part
the development of exchange relations here is in
contradiction with its basis, because the rational
and unhindered development of exchange demands the
equalisation of human labour. Slavery becomes the
irrational limit to any further development of the
productive forces actuated thereupon, and the historical
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result of this contradiction between the relations
and forces of production is the eventual disintegration
of the Roman Empire. This, furthermore, is the
secret behind the much-observed but little-understood
struggle between imperial law and the jus gentium
in the later Empire. The jus gentium, or "law
of nations" is the legal form of the expansion of
these productive forces on the surface of exchange;
hence, almost all contracts are juris gentium. It
is this legal form which increasingly "sees no reason"
in slavery, which is the fetter upon the social
development of the economic relations upon which it
arises as a legal form. It is therefore a threat
working under the very foundations of the Roman
imperium. No slavery, no ancient civilisation.
And imperial power accordingly (more or less
-unconsciously) struggles to contain the "law of
nations".
But to return to our main point, the latent
demand for "individuality" to which the development
of the persona juris gentium bears witness, has
nothing to do with "concealed" bourgeois individuality;
it is a symptom of the impending fortunes of slavery
and the Roman imperium. The persona juris gentium
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is no less a relation of slavery for the fact that
it is a contradiction within itself. The "abstract
unit of the jus gentium", to use the words of
Sohm, is a legal relation of slavery and is no more
"in evidence" in the modern legal form than is the
slave in the modern factory or the Roman centurion
in the modem army. In the juridical vein, which
guilelessly constitutes a "reception" of Roman law
here, it is "inadmissible evidence".
In summary, the Roman "origins" of the modern
legal form are constituted on the basis of a historicist
error, basically the error of conflating the legal
evidence of generalised commodity relations with
the legal evidence of commodity relations in Roman
times (i.e. commodity relations in general). This,
schematically at any rate, is the mode upon which
the modern "reception" is articulated. Xt is, of
course, a product of bourgeois society and thus
becomes distinguished historically from the medieval
"reception" as bourgeois legal relations begin to
emerge in the general transition from feudalism
to capitalism. But to view the bourgeois "reception"
as "scientific", "rational" etc. on this account
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(as do Ehrlich and ¥eber, for example), i.e. in mere
contradistinction from the overtly irrational medieval
plagiarism of the Roman sources, in other words
merely "because it is bourgeois" (if the expression
may be permitted) — this just glorifies the
historicist error. And it is really hardly any
better than the commonplace historical descriptions
of the "reception" that do not even bother to
distinguish the medieval from the modern in any
shape or form, that describe an unterrupted continuum
beginning around about the time of the re-discovery
of the Justinian Digest at Almalfi in the twelfth
century and proceeding through the various glosses
and "applications" in the feudal era, and then, as
if the exact "same thing" is at work, to the blossoming
of Romanism in the works of the great jurists in
Holland in the sixteenth century, Scotland in the
seventeenth century, France in the eighteenth,
Germany in the nineteenth and so on and so forth.
But having got at the essential elements of the




The "origins" of the modern legal form, it
should now be apparent, reside in modern society
1
and nowhere else. We have concentrated so far
primarily upon ancient "origins" in this connection,
but it would not be merely for the sake of symmetry,
to look briefly at the possibility of feudal "origins".
Unlike the case of the Roman form, there is no
notion of the "reception" of feudal law into the
1 . Ehrlich summarises his Principles of the
Sociology of Law in the following sentence:
"At the present as well as any other time, the
centre of gravity of legal development lies
not in legislation, nor in juristic science,
nor in judicial, decision, but in society
itself." — foreword, ibid. It is a pity that
Ehrlich didn't notice the extent to which
"juristic science" encroached upon the domain
which he marked out as the sociology of law,
throwing his investigations well outside this
gravitational field. Of course, to make
statements about the social character of law
just in so many words is a very easy thing
to do, whereas to remain consistent with this
principle is an altogether different matter.
Such a consistency, needless to add, requires
a recognition of the cardinal "juridical
sins" all of which promote the apparently
ahistorical character of law in an innumerable
variety of disguises - in general the3r &re
(methodologically speaking) the "sins" of
"Kantianism", historicism, etc.,
but it must be remembered that it is also easy
to say this "just in so many words".
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modern legal form; but there is a popular notion
which connects the feudal with the modern (yet. not
in so many words, since the feudal form is never
properly distinguished, as it ought to be, from
the ancient form in this connection), it is the
idea of the development of lav/ from "status" to
contract. We shall first consider the kinds of
connections that are implied by this idea as it was
initially expounded by the legal historian, Maine.
And secondly, more importantly, we shall consider
the real connections of status law proper, namely,
not as a connection of the modern legal form, but
as the form of law of feudal society.
It was the legal historical, Maine, who popularised
the idea of "status to contract" as a description
of the historical development of legal relations.
Ke says:
The'movement of progressive societies has been
uniform in one respect. Through all its course
it has been distinguished by the gradual
dissolution of family dependency, and the
growth of individual obligation in its place.
The individual is steadily siibstituted for the
family, as the unit of which civil laws take
account...Nor is it difficult to see what is
the tie between man..and man which replaces
by degrees the forms of reciprocity in rights
and duties which have their origin in the family.
It is contract. Starting, as from one terminus
of history, from a condition of society in which
all/
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all the relations of persons are summed up in
the relations of the family, we seem to have
moved steadily towards a phase of social
order in which all these relations arise from
the free agreement of individuals ...(Y)e may
say that the movement of progressive societies
has hitherto been a movement from status to
contract.
Again, pre-capitalist society (Maine never bothers
to distinguish any particular pre-capitalist social
formation in this connection) figures merely as
something upon which the modern might be artictilat ed.
The only difference is that whereas here we have
the individual, there we have its opposite, the
group, the family. But even this is hardly a
difference, since the individual here is the
expression of a group in being "the unit" of which
civil laws take account", and by this same token,
the family becomes conceived under the legal form
of individuality. In any case, if we look at
the most important older legal forms, the contract
juris gentium for example, there is nothing of the
"family*in it. Even in the case of the paterfamilias,
the Roman legal unit subsuming all that was contained
within the familia (slaves, children etc.), its
basis is not the "family" but the economic, .system
upon which the familia, as such, arose, namely the
slave system, the "origin" of the Roman legal form
in general.
1. Maine, Ancient Law, p.172-4.
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Maine connects "status" and "contract" in a
journey-like fashion. The connective, which places
them at opposite ends of the same road, as it were,
is that they both similarly express the "tie between
man and man", that is to say, they both express this
thing legally. Still, every legal expression is of
a "tie between man and man" in one way or another,
and so the connective boils down to the fact that
both "status" and "contract" are categories of law,
which is only a sufficient reason for being a
connective in so far as it is the same law which is
under consideration. In Maine this is the case.
For, he is talking all the time about bourgeois law,
while giving the impression that he is talking about
just the opposite. Hence, in talking of "status"
he really talks about "contract". In this way,
"status" figures as a "form of reciprocity in
rights and duties", a "unit of which civil laws
take account", a "tie between man and man" - terms
which can describe the modern form and the modern
form alone. The "status" relation can have nothing
to do with "reciprocity" (mutual give and take),
cannot possibly figure as a legal "unit" implying
the relation of equality, the relation of merely
"man and man". This is the form of contract, i.e.
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of the modern legal relation. Maine's celebrated
"status to contract" is, in fact, contract to "status"
1
and back again. In other words, the modern form,
which is all about "contract", "reciprocity" ,
1. "Maine's now celebrated dictum as to the movement
from status to contract," says Pollock, who
wrote some notes to Maine's book, "is perhaps
to be understood as limited to the law of
property, taking that term in its widest sense
as inclusive of whatever has a value measureable
in exchange" - ibid., p. 183- Pollock, however,
did not mean here that Maine's "status to
contract" was nothing more than a historicist
embellishment of generalised commodity-relations.
His objection was rather that Maine had
considered his "status to contract" in relation
to the legal form of "persons", i.e. the
"individual", "man and man" etc. - forgetting,
of course, that the legal form of "persons"
here is, precisely, the legal form of property
in exchange. But Pollock, whose gaze focused
backwards to the tradition of Coke, Bracton
and Blackstone, found any number of "bourgeois"
developments distasteful - the erosion of the
old doctrine of privity of contract, for
instance, and, in the present case, the idea
that the legal person reduced itself to a
matter of contract. 'The lav/ of persons",
he says, "may be and has been cut short; but
so long as we recognise any differences at
all among persons we cannot allow their
existence and nature to be treated merely as
a matter of bargain." - ibid. Sentiments
worthy of a knightly champion of the common
law: Honi soit qui mal y pense. cf. Sir
F. Pollock and -\U. Maitland, History of
English Law.
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"man and nan" etc., in a word, a generalised
equivalent form, automatically posits its oi>posite
as "status" or, at any rate, a relation of
inequality, privilege, distinction etc. But as
soon as this opposition, this "status", is formed,
it is made to return to that which initially posited
it as a merely negative reflex of itself, namely,
the modern form. Thus "status", having never really
been anywhere outside the modern form, returns to
contract; it becomes a form of "reciprocity", a
relation of "man and man", an abstract "unit" of
legal thought etc. But we know that this language
of equality has just the opposite of the "status"
relation in mind. Hence, Maine's thesis in truth
is not "status to contract", but "status-as-contract"
- a purely imaginary historical journey, since
"status" never really leaves contract. "Status to
contract" is just a superficial appearance of
contract posited as self-reflected opposition,
journeying back to itself, reaffirming itself by
seeing only itself in that to which it is opposed.
But before he turns "status" into contract,
Maine at least brings out first of all that which
the form of contract itself tells us (at the merely
-328-
analytic level) , namely, tliat contract opposes
"status". Or, more general!}", equality opposes
inequality. Maine, of course, then proceeds to
try and refute the analytic proposition here (a
sheer impossibility since analytic propositions
are always true), i.e. by turning "status" (inequality)
into contract (equality - "man and man", "unit"
of law etc.). Departing from the analytic principle
in a more appropriate direction, we get the following
general historical proposition: "status", so far
as law is concerned, is firstly a mark of pre¬
capitalist law (Maine, of course, can only imply
this, whereas by turning "status" into the form
of contract he contradicts this implication).
Still, this distinguishes very little. Left here,
"status" becomes applicable to totally different
forms of law - ancient and feudal la%\r for example.
Indeed, at this level of indifference, "status"
may be deemed applicable to bourgeois law, to
isolated instances such as diplomatic immunity,
parliamentary privilege, or even the legal distinctions
that are made on the grounds of sanity, age and so
forth, which are all "status" distinctions of one
kind or another that are recognised in modern law.
Clearly we have not departed very far from the
analytic principle with this minor development of
the historical sense of "status."
Regarding bourgeois society, ancient
society etc. it needs hardly be said that
we have always supposed primarily only the
abstract average conditions behind their
respective systems of property relations.
Thus in connection with ancient society we
mention primarily the slave end his master,
even though empirically a whole host of
further distinctions may be made. The
same is true in regard of the wage-labourer
and the capitalist in bourgeois society,
where clearly not everyone is either a
wage-labourer or a capitalist. These
class relations (master/slave, capitalist/
wage-labourer) are nevertheless the
scientific indicia around which the
respective systems of property relations
(hence law) are established. Similarly,
the abstract relation of lord and serf in
regard of feudal society, with which we
are now dealing, is naturally an abstraction
Still, it is of no less value for the
fact that feudal society is par excellence
the ground of innumerable class distinctions
for this manifold nevertheless coalesces
around either the abstraction of serf
or lord.
"In England, modern society is
indisputably most highly and classically
developed in economic structure. Never¬
theless, even here the stratification of
classes does not appear in its pure form.
Middle and intermediate strata even here
obliterate lines of demarcation everywhere
... However, this is immaterial for our
analysis." - Marx, Capital, Vol. 111 , p.SSp.
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"Status", if it is to become a scientifically
reputable socio-legal category, must be grounded
in a definite form of law. The ground of status
law (to relieve it from its inverted commas) is
feudal society.
Status law is a relation of lord and serf
in the same abstract way that Roman law is a relation
of slavery and modern laxv a relation of capital and
wage-labour. Status law is the legal reflex of the
feudal system of landed property. Let us see ho\^
this connection comes about.
Feudal society is articulated around a distinct
mode of production, a distinct system of property
relations. It is based neither upon slavery nor
capital and wage-labour, even though villeinage
often approached the condition of slavery and
worse, and quite regardless of the fact that l!free"
hired-labour was not uncommon as well as large
accumulations of merchant capital (especially in
later feudal times). ^
Under feudalism the serf, unlike the wage-
labourer under modern conditions or the slave under
ancient conditions has a property-right in a poi"tion
of the means of production. The serf is neither owned
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as a means of production (the case of the slave),
nor is he completely separated from ownership of
the means of production (the case of the "free"
wage-labourer). The peculiar relation of the direct
producer to the means of production in feudal
society, as is the case with all societies, determines
the specific social form of property in that
society and therewith its form of law. In
bourgeois society this relation is one of complete
separation of the direct producer from ownership
of the means of production; the wage-labourer
must therefore sell as a commodity his ability to
create value to the owner of those means; the
capital-form of property here appears in the form
of generalised commodity-ownership, and the specific
legal form which arises thereupon appears as an
abstract subject, and so forth - these connections,
we have, of course, dealt with in detail elsewhere.
Similarly, in Roman times this relation of the
direct producer to the means of production consists
in the direct producer being owned as a means of
production, i.e. as a slave, and this in turn
posits the form of Roman law - connections which
we have also dealt with in detail elsewhere.
Similarly again, in feudal society, which we have
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not said a great deal about, the relation of the
serf to the land, the specific conditions of this
relation, determines the form of law here — status
law. ¥e shall now give an outline of these
connections.
The serf has a right to a portion of the means
of production (his strip of land, for instance) on
condition that surplus-labour is performed by him
for his lord (in one form or another: but, as we
have already noted, we are dealing here with an
abstracted average set of conditions in regard
of feudal property relations). Having a right to
propert}--, the serf naturally becomes recognised
as a person in law; but having the right to property
in this particular way, namely, on condition that
he works, for example, three days on his own land
and three days on his master's (resting on the
seventh), means that, as a legal entity, he is not
the same as his master. As a legal entity, the
serf is unequal with other legal entities. In
other words, the form of law is status law. The
serf has his rights and duties , and the master has
his, and their different status as legal entities
is directly reflected in feudal law. Tiiis, it is
crucial to point out (especially to English legal
historians), is not because one is landlord and
the other tenant in the sense of the modern landlord
and tenant agreement. The feudal form is completely
and utterly different on account of the specific
form of property underlying it. The modern landlord
and tenant are not differing types of legal person;
their distinction, which is made for obvious technical
reasons, is made on the basis of their fundamental
equality as legal persons and has nothing to do
with status distinction. It is only the feudal
property relation which is reflected as status la%v,
as a heterogeneitjr of separate right-holders.
Roman law has nothing of this because the direct
producer, the slave, does not need to be considered
as a legal person. Modern law has nothing of this
because the direct producer, the wage-labourer,
is considered as an equal with all others as a legal
person.
The serf is distinguished from the slave in
that he is a person in law, and from the "free"
wage-labourer in that he is an unequal person in law.
This, schematically, is how feudal law is to be
distinguished as specifically status law. Before
we look at this matter in a little more detail,
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it is to be pointed out that this is no mere
quibble about the use of the word "status", yet
nor does it seek to be dogmatic about the use of
this word in connection with legal matters- Indeed,
it is quite sensible to want to say that the Roman
citizen had a special "status" in Roman law, or
that the rnemDer of parliament has a special "status"
on the floor of the house of Commons in having a
certain immunity from libel laws in this connection,
and so forth. But then, the word "status" here is
only of descriptive weight and has no theoretic
bearing so far as the form of law is concerned;
hence the form of privilege-right in question is
never distinguished from one case to the next by
calling then all instances of "status" law.
Let us say a little more about the social form
of property under feudal conditions . The serf has
property in land on condition that he performs
surplus labour for his master. Surplus and necessary
labour, as Marx often used to point out in contra¬
distinction from the capitalist mode, are here
separated in space and time. That which the serf
produces for himself on his own piece of land, i.e.
his means of subsistence, is clearly and distinctly
separated from that which he produces for his master
on his master's estate. The relation of exploitation
is therefore quite explicit; the serf must produce
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not onl}' for himself, but for his lord too by
viture of the latter's monopolistic position in
relation to the conditions of land tenure. The
lord, really, is the law. And on the business of
the serf's legal rights it is to be pointed out
that, although certain forms of action were
available to him if the lord treated him "wrongfully",
such evidence must be treated with far more caution
1
than is characteristic of the legal history books.
The fact that the feudal lord was often effectively
the arbiter of right and wrong, that he presided
over his own. court of law, that he had God on his
side, that he had a monopoly over the means of
physical coercion amongst other things (e.g. his
ownership of the mill for the grinding of corn)
- all this tends to be overlooked by the legal
historians who think that they get at the real
character of feudal la^v by fastidiously poring over
the forms of action written down in Glanvill.
Indeed, had the various rights of the feudal tenant
vis a vis his lord been so significant, there
could have been no general historical expropriation
of the- peasantry (which occurred at different times
and in different ways in all the modern capitalist
1 . cf. Maitland, Forms of Action etc. and, more
recently, Milsom, The Legal Structure of
Feudalism.
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nations); hence no creation of a mass of "free"
wage-labourers, no transformation of merchant
capital into industrial capital, no growth of the
towns and cities, no eclipse of feudalism, in a word,
no modern society.
This latter point brings us to something which
is rather important in regard of the heterogeneous
character of feudal law. For, the natural economy
of feudal society, i.e. the simple relation of lord
and serf to the land, is as we have already noted,
an abstraction of the form of feudal society. This
relation does not exist in the towns and cities.
Accordingly, the development of the towns, urban
development in general upon the basis of manufacture,
handicrafts etc., is a development which eventually
stands in an antithetical position in relation to
the feudal system as such which is based upon
agriculture. Let us illustrate what this means.
The towns are the centres of commercial activity,
of the production of luxury and other goods circulated
by the capital of the merchant. But production here
is still in the hands of the guildmaster and his
journeymen, who are craftsmen owning their own
instruments of production and bound together in a
caste-like maimer. As such the guilcl-system poses
no threat to dominant system of feudal property in
land, since the capital of the merchant can only
purchase from the guildsmen their products, but
not the guildsmen themselves nor their instruments
of production from which they are inseparable.
The strict regulation of the guild-system, which
becomes one of the heterogeneous elements within
feudal law as a whole, thus limits the scale of
production. The merchant or usurer who has
accumulated a considerable amount of money cannot
simply assemble together the instruments of
production under one roof and invite the skilled
craftsmen to come along and start producing for
him. The guilds have first to be broken up. Such
a process corresponds with the expansion of
production, the growth of the urban areas, the
ruin of the feudal landlord who falls within the
clutches of the usurer because the surplus which
the former extracts from his serfs cannot compensate
for the new consumption levels to \hich he has
become accustomed as a result of this general
expansion of production. As the guilds become
a fetter upon the development of manufacture, so
the feudal system of land tenure becomes a fetter
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upon the production of agricultural goods. As
the feudal land-owner becomes increasingly dis¬
contented with the living provided for him by his
serfs, as he becomes increasingl}' the market for
the various luxuries that are brought his way by
the merchant who is encouraging at the same time
the break-up of the guilds and the general
expansion of production in the urban areas , as all
this is taking place, this same land-owner must
"rationalise" his mm methods of production to
compensate, i.e. he must become more oppressive,
1
must extract more surplus from his serfs. But
this is not enough at a certain stage: where the
commutation of specific services into money payments
is not leasable, the landowner begins to throw his
peasants off the land in order to meet the productive
levels that are being set for him in the towns and
cities. At the same time, the peasants who are
expropriated drift towards these towns and cities
and form a readily available source of "free" labour
1. Empirically this process would gather
momentum such that the lowest classes of the
feudal order feel the oppression worst: The
lord would become more oppressive upon his vassals,
who in turn would pass the buck on to
their serfs, and these if they were better-
off serfs, onto their employees.
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for the fast expanding "capitalist" system of
manufacture. Eventually this process (which is
long and protracted and by no means so simple as
we have described it) spells the ultimate demise
of feudalism and the transition to capitalism as
the dominant mode of social production.
The growth of the urban areas in the Middle
Ages and the expansion of production and trade which
this brings is in latent opposition to feudalism,
but as such it is still a feudal development just
as the growth of commerce and trade throughout the
Roman Empire was nevertheless distinctly a Roman
development. The "empirical" character of this
opposition is expressed by Marx when he says,
"If the country-side exploits the town politically
in the Middle Ages-.the town, on the other hand,
exploits the land economically everywhere and
without exception, through its monopoly prices, its
guild organisation, its dii"ect commercial fraudulence
1
and its usury." This opposition only becomes
"theoretical" as the guildsmen become separated
from their means of production, as the resulting
1 . Marx, Capital Vol. 111 , p.<S01 .
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exeoptional increase in the production of
manufactured goods begins to pose a real threat
to the production of agricultural goods still under
a purely feudal integument, as the feudal landlord
becomes compelled to alter his productive methods
and begins to throw his peasants from their land,
i.e. to separate these also from their means of
production. It is only once this general separation
of the direct producers from the means of production
has begun that it gains momentum and begins to
destroy the feudal system of property. Italy in the
Middle Ages is an early and somewhat isolated example
of the beginnings of such a process, where, as
Marx points out, exceptional urban development
1
breaks feudalism down. To this extent the city
laws, the particular forms of guild regulation here
are not strictly feudal.
1. cf. Dobb, Studies in the Development of
Capitalism. "In Florence in 1338 there were
said to be as many as 200 workshops engaged
in cloth manufacture, employing a total of
30,000 workmen or about a quarter of the whole
occupied population of the city; and bitter
struggles were waged over the workman's right
of independent organisation." - i.e. over the
workman's (feudal) right to a portion of the
means of production. ibid. p.157«
cf. also Sweezy, Transition from Feudalism to
Capitalism.
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Reflecting these developments on the legal side
of things, Ehrlich says, "the city soon became very
important, and achieved a considerable measure of
independence, which in effect placed it outside the
feudal constitution. The feudal constitution, in
fact, has always remained a constitution of the
open country. ¥ithin the walls of the city...for
the first time fully developed legal institutions
were expressed in a number of legal propositions:
the law of real property, of pledge, of contract,
of inheritance." It is these particular legal
developments which correspond with the economic
growth of the cities and which therefore come into
confrontation with status law as the "law of the
land" in accordance with "the general eclipse of
feudalism. But so far as the separation of the
direct producers from the means of production has
not properly begun, in other words, so far as
property is still feudal property, law is still
predominantly status law and the legal developments
in the cities remain merely a heterogeneous element
existing insignificantly alongside it.
1. Ehrlich-, Principles etc., p.34,
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As feudal property relations are progressively
shattered through, the gradual separation of the
direct producers from their means of subsistence
production, so status laxv gradually gives way to
the birth of a new legal form. And here, historically
at the dawning of bourgeois society, we approach,
at last, the movement from status to contract.
Certainly this movement corresponds with a long
and protracted historical process - but not over
the whole of history. Feudal remnants are long
carried over into the new era, sometimes gradually
disappearing in an apparently piecemeal fashion
as in England, sometimes going with an apparently
"clean sweep" as in France. For this reason, we
shall see in our next section, an important debate
has arisen in legal sociology about the "irrationality"
of English law, but which for rather different
reasons passes into a debate not quite the same.
-3^2-
Legal Rationality
Let us locate the subject-matter of this
section with a few propositions. English legal
thought, according to Max Weber, displays a
"degree of legal rationality (which) is essentially
lower than, and of a type different from, that of
continental Eruope."^ The quantitative "degree...
lower than" does not, of itself, yield the qualitative
"different type". Quantitative difference may or
may not pass into qualitative difference; water
only becomes steam at one hundred degrees centigrade.
Contrary to l/eber's supposition, English legal
thought is not of a "different type" from that of
continental Europe. On the other hand, English and
continental European legal thought have their
"degrees" of difference.
Continental European law (here, as throughout,
we mean modern lav/) is very rational, says Weber,
because it "received" the rational elements of
1 . Weber, Law etc., p.310.
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Roman lav. Conversely, English law is less
rational because it didn't. The truth of the
matter is that the jurists on the continent
historicised their law on a more rational terrain
(Rome), whereas the English jurists historicised
their same "bourgeois" la"w on feudal soil.
1 . cf. ante, on the "reception". Weber's "ideal
type" of modern legal rationality in this
connection is given as follows: "Present-day
legal science, at least in those forms which
have achieved the highest measure of method¬
ological and logical rationality, i.e. those
which have been produced through the legal
science of the Pandectists' Civil Law, proceeds
from the following five postulates: viz.,
first, that every concrete legal decision be
the 'Application" of an abstract legal proposition
to a concrete "fact situation"; second, that
it must be possible in every concrete case
to derive the decision from abstract legal
propositions by means of legal logic; third,
that the law must actually or virtually
constitute a "gapless" system of legal
propositions, or must, at least be treated
as if it were such a gapless system;
fourth, that whatever cannot be "construed"
legally in rational terms is also legally
irrelevant; and fifth, that every social
action of human beings must always be
visualised as either an "application" or
"execution" of legal propositions, or as an
"infringement" thereof." - ibid., p.64.
Only bourgeois law, or rather the description
thereof, could possibly be so odourless,
colorless and, above all, tasteless.
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The real ground of Weber1s arguments here is
therefore the ancient as opposed to the feudal,
where the abundant superiority of the noble Romans
in all matters concerning the rational is
indisputable. The profound truth of this is that
it comes through in spite of Weber1s observations:
continental legal thought is "more rational".
But before we go on to look at this, there is
an underhand motif which Weber slips in behind
these differences of modern legal thought that
deserves special mention. It is a notion not
unconnected with the assumption that these
differences constitute differing "types" of legal
thought; it is the notion that capitalist social
organisation is not "decisive" in regard of the
foiwa of law. Whereas Weber's elxisive quantitative
description of things enabled him to posit sameness
in connection with Roman law (as we saw earlier),
here it enables him in the same arbitrary manner
to posit difference. Again it may be noted that
to talk merely in terms of the quantitative: degree,
measure, scope, extension, intension, more, less,
greater, smaller etc. etc. (Weber's entire sociology
. 1
is packed with this language), leaves the qualitativ
1 . cf. Weber's Economy and Society generally.
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wide open to idle speculation - an ambiguity which
Weber exploits to the full with his "value-free"
prejudices. ¥eber never says why "the less rational
qualities of English law should amount to a differing
form or "type" of law - and by "type" it is only
rational to suppose that he means legal form (in
our sense), that is, in so far as he connects it
with specifically capitalist social organisation.
Briefly, Weber's position here is this
Britain and Europe (we use the term "Europe" as
an abstraction of the continental European
jurisdiction) are capitalist societies at roughly
the same stage of development; but on account
of the differing degrees of rationality in their
respective systems of legal thought, "capitalism"
nans11 determined the "type" of law in either
case, but rather such things as the "intrinsic
1
intellectual needs of the legal theorists" have
figured as the major determining element. The
political psychology which belies this little
example of "value-free" sociology consists in the
supposition of a ghostly opponent in the shadows
arguing that "capitalism" should have produced
1 . Weber, ibid., p.278.
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German or French, legal theorists in England, or
some such unfathomably mystical notion. "(T)he
essential similarity of the capitalistic development
on the continent > and in England," says Weber, "has
not been able to eliminate the sharp contrasts between
1
the two types of legal systems." Apart from the
"two types of legal systems", which we shall come
to, there is a great deal which hangs on this
"essential similarity of the capitalistic development".
For, it is difficult to see what is "essentially
similar" about the "capitalistic development" in
England, which began to take root as early as the
sixteenth century, and that of Germany, which was
practically non-existent until the early part of
the nineteenth century. Further, it is precisely
for these reasons, namely, that England developed
early along capitalist lines and Germany late, that
England appears legally "backward" and Germany
legally "advanced".
"The Germans have thought..what other nations
2
have done,r Marx wrote. If the German legal thinkers
1 . Weber, ibid., p.318.
2. Marx, Early Writings, p.250. - which continues,
"Germany has been' their theoretical conscience.
The abstraction and arrogance of Germany's
thought always kept pace with the one-sided and
stunted character of their reality."
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cudgelled their logical and systematic brains in
order to "think" the most appropriate legal
expressions for the requirements of modern social
development, the English achieved the same result
by "doing" that which was required. The specifically
capitalist expansion of production and tra.de does
not depend on the wisdom of legal philosophers and
professors of Roman law (something which Weber
admits); but for this same reason, neither does
the form of lax<r depend upon the absence or presence
of such wisdom (which Weber doesn't admit). The
jurist does not determine the form of law, he merely
articulates it - well or ill depending upon the
circumstances. And in this connection Weber is quite
right when he writes:
The differences between continental and common
law methods of legal thought have been produced
mostly by factors which are respectively
connected with the internal structure and modes
of existence of the legal profession as well
as by factors related to differences in
political development. The economic elements,
hoxirever, have been determinative only in
connection with these elements (they could not
be otherwise —S.M.). What we are concerned
with here is the fact that, once everything is
said and done about these differences in
historical development, modern capitalism
prospers equally and manifests essentially
identical economic traits under legal systems
containing rules and institutions which
considerably differ from each other at least
from the juridical point of view.
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Absolutely correct is the addition, "at least from
the juridical point of view". But utterly misleading is
the following further addition:
Indeed, we may say that the legal systems
under which modern capitalism has been
prospering differ profoundly from each other
even in th^ir ultimate principles of formal
structure.
The form of lav/ under modern capitalism contains
one "ultimate principle of formal structure" which
is the same in both continental and common law
jurisdictions quite independently of the "juridical
point of view"; it is "the" ultimate principle,
namely, the principle of generalised equality, of
1 . Weber, Law etc. p.315-4. The general character
of Weber1s argument here and throughout his
entire sociology has been seen as a dialogue
with Marx. "Weber and Marx" has become a
rather infamous conjunction of modern sociologj'".
Weber and "economic determinism" would be the
more appropriate conjunction., for it is only by
setting up such a terrific distortion of Marx,
that Weber may appear on the same stage - and
"win" the debate. For example, a principle
of Weber's sociology in general: the economy
does not "determine" religion, politics, law,
thought, etc.. Everything turns here upon
first giving a rude impression of the connective,
of bringing it over as some kind of insensitive
mechanistic relation of cause and effect. In
its place, Weber makes a more "sensitive" and
"subtle" connective; - the "elective affinity"
(a phrase artlessly and insensitively appropriated
from Goethe). On the other hand, so much of
modern politics, law and thought in general is
so unashamedly a direct and mechanical reflex of
the changing fortunes of the capitalist economy,
that one hesitates in regard of the general
usefulness of pointing out the errors of
"economic determinism" and its erstwhile critics.
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generalised right- which arises on the basis of
capitalist commodity ownership. All the "juridical
point of view" can do is express this ultimate
principle in differing ways, more or less rationally
depending upon the particular historical circumstances.
We shall now consider some of these circumstances.
English legal thought is "less rational" than
that of continental Europe. Theoretically this is
a quantitative difference which cannot possibly pass
into a qualitative difference of legal form. The
legal form is a relation of capital and wage-labour,
and this is so quite regardless of the varying
degrees of juristic wisdom that- have reflected it
in different ways. Apart from this, which is no
small matter, Weber has a fair appreciation of the
facts. English law, or rather the common law method
by which it may be characterised, proceeds
"empirically" from case to case in a haphazardly
casuistic manner. Historically, the monopolisation
by the Inns of Court of legal training accounted
for a good deal of the lack of intellectual rigour
associated with keeping this mode of legal thinking
alive. The resulting "craftlike specialisation of
lawyers", as Weber points out, meant that any fully
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comprehensive and clear treatment of the body of
law as a whole was systematically prevented and
that legal practice in general aimed simply, in a
passive way, at adapting to a "pra.ctically useful
scheme of contracts and actions, oriented towards
the interests of clients in typically recurrent
situations." In this kind of situation there could
be little or* no inducement to clear away the
intellectually clumsy results and to generate
concepts "by abstraction from concreteness or
by logical interpretation of meaning or by
generalisation and subsumption." But as Weber
himself goes on to say:
Once the patterns of contracts and actions,
required by the needs of interested parties,
had been established with sufficient elasticity,
the official law could preserve a highly
archaic character and survive the greatest ^
economic transformations without formal change.
Or rather, to put it a little more precisely (since
the "official law" by this very fact does not
really "preserve a highly archaic character"):
cnce the bourgeois form of legality has smashed
through the feudal for all practical purposes, those
remaining feudal appearances "survive" in the same
way that a dead man. "survives" - by leaving us with
a few bones and parts of his skeletal frame.
1. Weber, Law etc., p.201-2.
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But let us look a little more closely at this
"archaic character" of the common law method. One
of its prime "irrational" facets emphasised by
¥eber in contradistinction with the continental
method is its system of binding precedent (stare
decisis), whereupon past decisions of higher
courts become binding upon future decisions of
courts of the same and lower levels. For all
appearances such a thing constitutes an irrational
constraint of the past upon the present. However,
the significance of this as something wholly
irrational in comparison with the methods of legal
decision on the continent is dubious: firstly,
because it is only the "reason" (the ratio
decidendi) of the precedent decision which is
binding and secondly, because a similar, albeit
far more informal, system of judicial deference to
"authoritative" decisions has evolved on the continent.
Zn fact, the "reason" or ratio of a precedent only
"binds" to the extent that the jurists in question
decide that it "appropriately" binds them; and
whether or not such a thing is "appropriate" is
greatly assisted by what is generally recognised
as the "open texture" of legal decisions. Clever
jurists can gesticulate remarkably freely once
they realise that it is only elastic by which their
hands are tied. Apart from this, it is to be jjointed
out that this distinctive feature of English law
is not "archaic". The strictly binding system of
precedent is of very recent origin, having come
into being in England gradually throughout the latter
part of the eighteenth century. Hitherto, case
law had figured as a mode of analogy, with no formal
criteria of distinguishing its authority. Consequently
the emergence of rules proscribing the use of
precedents (regardless of the crudeness of these
rules, i.e. merely in regard of their — the precedents'
- origin in the court hierarchy) can equally be seen
as a "rational" development in English law.
Still, for all the arguments which may be used
to narrow the degree of difference, there is no
escaping the fact that English law is "less rational"
than that of continental Europe. But not in Heber's
sense of the word. Although his descriptions are
factually correct, the sense in which they are
construed is distorted by the leitmotif of the
polemic against "economic determinism". The sense
of the "less rational" is inseparable from this in
T/eber. Nor is "la superstition du cas", as the
French jurists call it, a sufficiently rigorous
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form of argument in this connection. As we have
already pointed out, the "binding" character of
precedent can be made effectively just as rational
as "la jurisprudence", which equally recognises the
authority of precedent decisions where it sees fit.
However, the correctness of the "less rational"
proposition does indeed concern the common law and
the "empirical" character of legal thought in this
connection. But this is not a self-evident truth.
The absence of a civil code and the development of
private law through case law does not automatically
mean that it is "less rational". Moreover, it is
vitally important to give such a difference as
precise and specific a formulation as possible.
For, as a difference of private law it becomes a
1
difference which concerns the form of law as such.
The most important place to look for the precise
character of the "less rational" is therefore the
sphere of contract. It is here that this difference
of degree can be exactly located from the properly
scientific standpoint.
1. Pt. I, ch. 3., ante.
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¥e have said enough already elsewhere about the
relations that are involved in the modern legal
form of contract: the form of property in exchange,
the abstract subject of the exchange act etc. They
are of course supposed in the English form of
contract just as much as they are on the continent.
The difference, to repeat, is not and cannot be
a question of legal form. The difference consists
in the articulation of this form - "less rational"
in the case of the English version. Let us now
see what this means- The English expression of the
form of contract has an irrational peculiarity which
is due to the solidly empirical character of common
law thinking. This peculiarity is what is known as
the doctrine of consideration, and fi"om the purely
legal standpoint it is theoretically unnecessary.
This is recognised implicitly on the continent
where the form of contract is articulated generally
din terms of the utterance alone. On the other hand,
the English contract, with the doctrine of consideration,
takes in a little bit of the performance. Thus, in
the English contract we have not just the conception
of the utterance (offer and acceptance), but along
with this an irrational observation of the performance
which constitutes a third element. The English
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contract is: offer, acceptance and consideration.
The latter is an irrational element for this reason:
the only form of property necessary in the conception
of the contract (from the legal standpoint) is
property in exchange, i.e. property which is mutual
in all respects except for the fact that in one
case it is held by the buyer, and in the other by
the seller. All the legal view requires therefore,
is the conception of buyer and seller with equal
rights, i.e. the conception of the utterance, for
the exchange of property, the form of property in
exchange, is implied in this alone. This we showed
when we dealt earlier with the "free" contract. The
idea of consideration, however, ascribes to the
seller or offeror a first infintessimal part of
the the actual exchange which is given up by the
offeree not strictly in exchange. Consideration
need only be a peppercorn, as the common law says,
whereas it doesn't even need to be this. Consideration
doesn't need to exist at all, because all the elements
of the "free" contract ai"e contained in the utterance.
This above example contains a number of important
points which we have made elsewhere. But the
particular point which it meets here in our present
concern is the nature of the "less rational" character
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of the common law - it actually comes down to the
difference made by a peppercorn. A theoretical
difference this certainly is, since property in
exchange can only be rationally considered as
mutual alienation and appropriation, that is, not
involving the slightest "little bit" being alienated
'first'by one of the parties to the exchange act.
From the rational legal standpoint, the contract
is thoroughly binding in the utterance; as Hegel
says, "it does not need the performance of one or
the other to become so - otherwise we should have
an infinite regress or infinite division of thing,
1
labour, and time." The empirical naivety of the
doctrine of consideration leads theoretically to
just such an infinite division. On the other hand,
the continental jurists, with their rational
formulation of contract, only recognise this in a
negative and passive wa}r - a fact which is proved
in so far as they only sense intuitively the iirational
effects of the systematisation of legal thinking
on the basis of case law.
1. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, p.245- Hegel touches
upon the essential elements of the legal form
here. Being a speculative deduction, however,
Kegel only gets hold of these elements from an
"ideal" standpoint; but in it we observe the
repulsion of the real basis (having to do with
"thing, labour and time") as a rational condition
of the legal form as such - which is quite
remarkable.
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The irrational element in the English formulation
of the legel elements of contract is the most
rigorous indicium possible of the "degree" of modern
common law irrationality in general- This is so
because it relates to the most direct (common law)
legal expression of the legal form in general,
i.e. the private law form of contract, and therefore
strips the issue of rational legal expression right
down to its essential roots. Further, we do indeed
find in the English form a "less rational" legal
expression of its most essential connections as
a legal form, that is, in the sphere where the
modern legal form in general is closest to its
essential nature as a commodity-relation, namely,
the private law sphere of contract. It is therefore
not surprising that Feber, for example, is able to
argue very powerfully in favour of the existence
of a different "type" of law in this connection -
for this very reason (even though he never mentions
it . )
Of course, Feber is not the only writer to
have overrated the differences of common law and
codified systems of legal reasoning. Such a thesis
is implicit as a standing part of both Anglo-American
and continental-European juristic reflection. But
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for this reason we have been primarily concerned
with what legal sociology has to say here, i.e.
because legal sociology (in Weber at least) has
the merit of attempting to be scientifically
explicit in its distinctions. Anglo-American
jurists in general merely treat as a matter of
1
pride "their" common law methods. Juristic
writers on the continent, on the other hand, are
more wide-ranging and intellectualist in their
approach, and testify to the rational superiority
2
of their mode of thinking in just this way.
We have dealt with a difference in the "rational"
expression of modern legality. Theoretically it is
a difference which may be ignored so far as the
general character of the legal form is concerned.
The same is true of such "rational" differences in
general, i.e. the differences between continental-
European and Anglo-American legal reason generally.
Notwithstanding the superior "rationality" of German
legal abstraction, for instance, the generally
utilitarian character of this after the Historical
School hardly becomes worthy of the name of Bentham,
1 . cf. Pollock, History etc.; Bryce, Studies in
History and Jurisprudence; Holmes, The Common
Law; Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition.
2. Continental juristic writing is more "philosophical"
than Anglo-American juristic writing. cf. for
instance, the French writers, Fouillee, Charraont,
JJemogue - Modern French Philosophy, series VII.
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let alone that of Kant. But this sort of terrain
we have already covered.
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In Lieu of a Conclusion: A Note on Legal Continuity
Here I shall not attempt to summarise the
results of the foregoing pages (as they stand they
constitute summary-enough results in themselves).
I shall, on the other hand, here draw attention to
a theme which has figured largely throughout the
whole of this work, and which would not suffer
brief recapitulation.
The legal form is basically a form of articulation
of generalised commodity-ownership. It is a one¬
sided articulation. Relations between things
(commodities) become conceived as relations between
persons (legally co-equal individuals), and,
consequently, relations between (real) persons
become effectively subsumed under t:ie form of a
relation between things. This process, amongst
other tilings, we dealt with in part 1 . But as an
"articulation" of generalised commodity-oiraership,
the legal form exists in the way of categories,
abstractions, conceptions; in a word, as something
which is thought. The criticism of modern legality
therefore becomes the criticism of legal thought,
and most especially legal thought in its most
articulate forms, in legal philosophy, legal history,
legal sociology.
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Now thought in. general has always the aim
of contemplating j^articular things in universal terms,
of uniting the particular with the universal, and
legal thought is no exception to this rule.
Consequently, the most fundamental particular
contemplated under the legal form, that is to say,
its most basic category, the abstract subject, is
contemplated in universal terms. But the mere
fact that something is thought by no means implies
that the object of thought has been appropriately
grasped in its universal connections. Such a
result is not achieved by thinking alone. Thus,
when legal philosophy engages the abstract subject
a priori, or when legal history and, with a more
elaborate web—work of intellectual inventiveness,
legal sociology posits it at the dawn of civilisation,
we are by no means bound to accept this universal
character so attached to it. On the contrary, as
we have shown again and again, such universal
connections of the abstract subject are quite
erroneous and lead to all kinds of untenable
notions: the "free" contract in feudal society,
modern capitalism in ancient society, and so on.
Tiie actual universal character of the abstract
subject consists in its generalised character, in
bourgeois society alone, whereupon "all men"
become legally co-equal individuals. But the
hallmark of the legal standpoint on this question
is that the determinate (bourgeois) limitation
upon the universality of the abstract subject is
systematically overlooked. The history of modern
legality as the history of an articulation of
generalised comnodity-oTOership, as the history of
an articulation of the abstract subject, is therefor
the history of an error. As the commodity-relation
becomes merely a relation of legally co-equal
individuals, the individual or abstract subject
becomes, as it were, a man for all seasons, constant
as the northern star. The generalised or universal
character of the abstract subject, beheld in the
legal gaze, becomes stripped of its determinate
socio-historical connections and is cast sub specie
aeterni.
The history of modern legality is the history
of an error. The error takes on a variety of forms,
as we have shown: Kantianism, historicism, the
confounding of generalised commodity-relations with
commodity-relations in general, leading to such
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things as the appearance of the abstract subject
in Roman law, the Roman persona juris gentium in
modern law and so on and so forth. There is no
need to go over these things again here. But
there is an important theme linked with the
persistence and tenacity of the error here, namely,
1
the theme of continuity.
The error of modern legality is its appearance
as something constant, unchanging, immune from the
general turmoil of historical circumstances in which
it is inextricably bound up. The error is basically
the conception of the abstract subject. If all else
may change, this remains unchanging. If legality
always finds itself compromised in one way and
another due to definite and particular historical
1. The idea of the persistence and tenacity of
"the error" is one which is particularly
associated with the work of the philosopher,
Bachelard. Bachelard has shown in connection
with various subject-matters how the process
of appropriating knowledge of those subjects
has been persistently hindered by obstacles
of a psychic nature. cf., for instance, his
"Psychoanalysis of Fire". But apart from
the fact that the error of modern legality
has primarily very little to do with psychic
reasons, it is evident that the history of
modern legality since the eclipse of classical
thought at the turn of the eighteenth century,
has nothing to do with the history of the
scientific analysis of modern legality and
that, therefore, the persistent error is not
of the Bachelardian—type.
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conditions, if particular laws are made, changed,
abolished and so forth as a result of the most
immediate demands of the moment, if all else is
subject to the requirements of the times, the
abstract subject remains constant. The abstract
subject becomes the theme of legal continuity.
Nov; the theme of continuity in thought generally
has recently come under attack by a number of
philosophers (l use this description very loosely) .
Foucault, for example, warns that "we must rid
ourselves of a whole mass of notions, each of which,
in its own way, diversifies the theme of continuity'1.
He goes on to say:
They (these notions) nrn*y not have a very
rigorous conceptual structure, but they
have a very precise function. Take the
notion of tradition: it is intended to
give a special temporal status to a group
of phenomena that are both successive and
identical (or at least similar); it makes
it possible to rethink the dispersion of
history in the form of the same...tradition
enables us to isolate the new against a
background of permanence, and to transfer its
merit to originality, to genius, to the
decisions proper to individuals. Then there
is the notion of influence, which provides a
support - of too magical a kind to be very
amenable to analysis - for the facts of
transmission and communication; which refers
to an apparently causal process ('out with
neither rigorous delimitation nor theoretical
definition) the phenomena of resemblance or
repetition; which links, at a distance and
through/
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through time - as if through the mediation of
a medium of propagation — such defined unities
as individuals, oeuvres, notions or theories
...There is the notion of "spirit", which
enables us to establish between the simultaneous
or successive phenomena of a given period a
community of meanings, symbolic links, an
interplay of resemblance and reflection, or
which allows the sovereignty of collective
consciousness to emerg^ as the principle of
unity and explanation.
This stock-in-trade, tradition, influence, spirit,
has been par excellence that of legal writers.
The abstract subject has been diversified by
precisely these kinds of notions. The abstract
subject becomes the folk-spirit of the Historical
School, the "common purposes" of the Interest School,
1 . Foucault, "The Archaeology of Knowledge, p.21-2.
Foucault would undoubtably spurn the description
of "philosopher", preferring perhaps the title
of "archaeologist". But regardless of labels,
the overwhelming feeling upon reading his books
is inescapable, that his tastes, for all the
tremendous denial, are philosophical. In
his "Archaeology.." he says, "Only those who
cannot read will be surprised that I have
learned (to ask my questions) more clearly
from Cuvier, Bopp, and Ricardo than from Kant
or Hegel." (p.3°7)« The question arises as
to whether this little line is slipped in for
the benefit of the illiterates who read his
book. Since the illiterate cannot read this
seems doubtful. It is there, I believe, for
just the reverse category of "readers", the
fastidious ones, those whom he secretly suspects
as his best audience, who will appreciate
his depth and make of him, in spite of everything
- a philosopher. Today's philosopher, scratching
out an area beneath the subtlest of modern
sciences, the sciences of man.
the "socially organised purposes" of the French legal
positivists, the unit of "tradition" in legal
historiography (e.g. Gierke), the basis of the
"influence of Bentham" in Dicey, and so on and so
forth. By these routes the abstract subject becomes
insulated, mummified, sealed-off from the precision
of its connections with the generalised commodity-
structure of bourgeois society.
While on the theme of legal continuity, it is
appropriate to take note of the following idea:
"it is our belief," says Poulantzas, "that it is
precisely the kind of internally coherent system-
atisation at the basis of formal logic, a logic
founded upon the independence of forms and concepts
from their content, that enables the legal order
to be attributed with a diaciironic stability."^
Tnere is nothing "precise" about this at all. Formal
logic is pure abstraction, and applied to legal
subject-matters it establishes "diachronic stability"
or continuity of form no more than it does in regard
of any other subject-matter. It is not the abstraction
1. Poulantzas, "Nature des Choses et Droit", p. 264.
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of formal logic which establishes the continuity
of the legal order, but the abstraction of the
individual, that is, the abstract subject. Xt is
the abstract subject which is "precisely" the theme
of legal continuity. The application of formal
logic to legal subject-matters figures primarily
as a mode of diversifying this theme in modern
legal philosophy, just as the aforementioned notions
of spirit, tradition and influence diversify the
theme of legal continuity in legal history, legal
historiography and legal socio log}". Xn themselves
there is nothing wrong with formal logic or the ideas
of tradition, influence etc. It is only (in the
present case) in connection with the mystification
of the abstract subject that they become distorted
and one-sided. Apart from this, the application
of formal logic in the "concept of law", or the
-t
"concept of a legal system", or some such thing,
that is to say, the abstraction of common character¬
istics of all legal systems, this sort of procedure
least of all "enables the legal order to be attributed
with a diachronic stability", for its object is least
1 . cf. Hart, "The Concept of Law" and Raz, "The
Concept of a Legal System".
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of all "the legal order". Formal logical procedures
here abstract from "the legal order" such tilings as
"rules", "norms" and logical types thereof in the
same way that man is abstracted from Socrates,
red from the rose, colour from red etc., in the course
of which, "the legal order" is lost as the object
of cognition. Formal logic never says what is
legal about the rule in the same way that it never
says what is Socratic about the man, rose-like
about red, red about colour.
The element of specifically legal continuity
is the abstract subject, not formal logic. Poulantzas
conflates the two. The abstract subject is basically
the commodity-owner under conditions of generalised
commodity production. Only under these conditions
does such an abstraction arise, for only here do
all social relations appear the result of isolated,
independent individuals freely and equally consenting
to engage therein. In other words, only here is
the form of all social relations dominated by the
form of an exchange agreement, by the "cash nexus".
Consequently, the continuity of the legal form is
a relation of generalised commodity production, and
to turn it into a relation of formal logic or
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philosopiiical idealism (which Poulantzas also does)
1
is tantamount to denying this connection. Formal
logic was developed by the ancients and in particular
by Aristotle; so with philosophical idealism,
e.g. Plato.
The continuity of the legal form is a relation
of generalised commodity production, and generalised
commodity production is alone capitalist production.
The abstract subject, as the private owner of
property in its common or exchange form equalises
the owner of capital on the one side and the owner
of merely the ability to work (labour-power) on the
other. But at the same time it is precisely this
inequality of ownership in regard of the means of
production which produces over and over again the
legal form of equality of owners and non-owners
of these means, i.e. capital, because it is this
particular relationship of inequality which forms
the basis of production exclusively for exchange,
of production of all things as commodities and,
consequently, of all social relations as relations
1 . Similar errors are apparent in Poulantzas '
later work where he attempts to make the state
into something in the nature of a category of
"autonom}'" . cf. Poulantzas, "Political Power
and Social Classes."
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between apparently'- isolated co-equal individuals.
Once this relationship of inequality of ownership
of the means of jiroduction is abolished therefore,
so also is the abstract subject. The element of
legal continuity is completely broken. For this
reason it is quite absurd to think, as Karl Rentier
did for example, that the overthrow of capitalism
would bring with it only a few minor technical
adjustments in the law. Such a view flows dix^ectly
from the belief that the abstract subject is
historically-- universal and quite unconnected with
capitalist production and exchange. Just the
reverse is the case. And when xoroduction
exclusively for exchange is replaced by production
for social needs, that is, when the latter no longer
has to be minimally guaranteed by an "interfering"
state, then the abstract subject must inevitably
disappear - whereupon "taking rights seriously"
will no longer be an exercise bound by this inhuman
1
abstraction of humanity.
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